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Introduction
William G. Braun III, Stéfanie von Hlatky, Kim Richard Nossal

Each year, the Kingston Consortium on International Security (KCIS)—a
partnership of the academy and the military—organize a conference
on international security. This conference seeks to inform debate and
advance knowledge in the field of security and defence, by identifying priorities in military affairs and convening world-class experts to
engage with a series of common questions. The partners—the Centre
for International and Defence Policy at Queen’s University, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, the Canadian Army
Doctrine and Training Centre, and the NATO Defense College—work
together to develop a multifaceted program for what has become one of
the leading international security conferences in North America.
The topic explored by the conference in 2019 was the changing international order and its implications for international security. The liberal
international order that was created under the leadership of the United States in the 1940s, and maintained in various iterations since then
by a succession of administrations in Washington, is under stress as
never before. Today, that order is being challenged, not only by states
that clearly do not accept an American-led international order, such as
China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, but also by non-state actors such
as transnational criminal organizations and global jihadist movements.
The result is a hypercompetitive, multipolar environment marked by
a persistent struggle for influence and position within a “grey zone”
of competition that falls below the threshold of conventional war. An
array of actors is engaging in aggressive and destabilizing activity to di-
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minish Western influence and position, and are “weaponizing” non-traditional tools to skew perceptions of power, exploit political divisions,
gain economic advantage, and magnify social and cultural fissures in
target countries.
The liberal international order is also being challenged from within,
by those who are skeptical about the benefits of that order. In both the
United States and Europe there is evidence that politicians and their constituents are concerned and skeptical about the value of the international order. That skepticism is particularly pronounced in the United States,
as expressed by the Trump administration’s “America First” foreign
policy. The legitimacy that underpinned the Western liberal approach
to global politics has increasingly found itself under assault. Mounting
concerns about the costs, both military and economic, of sustaining that
order has been accompanied by a rise of nationalism and protectionism
that further calls into question the sustainability of that order.
The presentations, keynotes, and discussions at KCIS yielded a number of key insights about the changing international order and the implications for the security environment. While a full conference report
is available on the KCIS website,1 we highlight six key insights from the
discussions in June 2019:
• After a period of considerable stability, the international order
appears to be transitioning back to a multipolar dynamic, with a
commensurate return of great-power politics.
• China’s ascendency as a global economic power (and as a result,
military power) is challenging U.S. leadership over the international order, and China is replacing the U.S. as a regional hegemonic influencer in Asia.
• The U.S. is the manager and enforcer of the current international
order. If the U.S. role changes, the status quo order is likely to
change.
• Resurgence of nationalism and populism in domestic politics
around the world is altering international relationships, which are
trending towards issue-specific, bilateral partnerships, and away
from comprehensive, multilateral agreements.
• International and multilateral institutions are important components of the international liberal order. Existing institutions re1. Conference Report: KCIS 2019, https://www.queensu.ca/kcis/sites/webpublish.queensu.
ca.kciswww/files/files/2019/Presentations/KCIS2019%20Conference%20Report.pdf.
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inforce and support the management of the current order; new
and emerging institutions may pose a significant challenge to the
status quo.
• Arguably, the uncertainty tied to managing this transition smoothly is a greater threat to peace than the prospects of a change in the
leadership of the international order.
KCIS 2019: Selected Papers
As with past KCIS conferences, we present here a selection of papers
given at KCIS 2019. These are evidence-based examinations of the
changes and concerns about the international order that have been in
train since the end of the decade-long “unipolar moment” enjoyed by
the United States following the Cold War. Papers in the volume examine legitimacy challenges to the liberal international order, and why it
has been so difficult to articulate a compelling narrative to support the
continuation of American leadership. The authors also examined how
the order is changing, and what the implications of those changes will
be for the future security environment faced by the United States and
its allies in the Americas, in the North Atlantic, and in the Indo-Pacific
region. The authors were encouraged to analyze specific indicators of
shifts in geopolitical power, the structural erosion of norms and institutions, and the relative resonance of competing narratives to capture
the causes and trajectory of change. They were further asked to identify
new and innovative insights into the possible contours of a new international order. While each author adopted different approaches and
emphasized different aspects of the charter, collectively they achieved
that broader purpose.
We begin with two papers that focus on key drivers of change in
the contemporary international order. William G. Braun III explores the
impact of American domestic politics on the broader shift in geopolitical patterns. While acknowledging larger systemic elements at work,
Braun identifies the effect that growing populist-nationalist trends in
the United States has had on American politics, particularly the rise of
Donald J. Trump and his election as president in 2016. The Trump administration directly challenges elements of U.S. foreign policy, which
Braun suggests both mirrors and encourages Americans to reject key
elements of American foreign policy, including globalization, the proselytization of western values, and the promotion of liberal order collective governance. This has given rise to an evident desire for a more
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minimalist role for the United States in global affairs, constitutes a new
narrative in American foreign policy. This, as much as changes in the
international environment driven by such crucial factors as the rise of
China, will challenge—and change—the status quo and will see the
emergence of a new international order.
Carol V. Evans complements Braun’s focus on domestic drivers by
addressing the impact of economic factors in reshaping the international order. Because economic levers and instruments are increasingly
more important than military factors in giving shape to the international security order, she identifies three key economic drivers and their
implications for international order. She begins with an examination of
the erosion of multilateral economic frameworks. While this erosion began before the Trump administration came to office in 2017, it has been
accelerated by the administration’s “America First” trade policies, particularly the withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the threat
to withdraw from the World Trade Organization. The administration’s
trade war with China and its use of tariffs against America’s allies have
all reshaped the global order. But Evans notes that the international
security order is also being affected by China’s embrace of economic
statecraft, particularly the Belt and Road Initiative. This $1 trillion infrastructure program is providing a significant fillip to China’s broader
global ambitions, since it challenges directly America’s global pre-eminence. Finally, Evans argues that critical infrastructure has become a
key economic driver in the reshaping of the contemporary order: sectors critical to Western security—energy, transportation, information,
communications, and the defence industrial base—are all being targeted as a means of weakening control and heightening vulnerabilities.
While all three of these geoeconomics drivers are reshaping the order,
Evans concludes that the shape of the new international order will depend on how states respond to these challenges.
The remaining chapters in the volume focus on three regions: the
Americas, the North Atlantic, and the Indo-Pacific, highlighting the
way in which the United States and its partners in those regions have
responded to the changes in the global order.
Ferry de Kerckhove provides an analytical perspective on the changes in the international order from south of the Rio Grande. Central to
an understanding of the evolving debate over the international order
in the Americas, de Kerckhove suggests, is that economic factors are
driving insecurity and instability, a trajectory accelerated by the novel
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coronavirus (covid-19) pandemic. The economic sources of insecurity
are magnified by recent political developments, particularly a marked
swing to the right in politics in Central and Latin America. However,
the arrival of Donald J. Trump as president is altering the nature of
the traditional relationship between the United States and its southern neighbours. In de Kerckhove’s view, the Trump administration has
yet to articulate a comprehensive policy towards the Caribbean and
Central and South America, with the president himself evincing little
interest in these regions beyond border control. For de Kerckhove, one
logical conclusion is that the liberal international order that the United
States once upheld in the hemisphere is increasingly seen as no longer
worth defending.
The lack of a clear hemispheric policy provides Kathryn Marie Fisher
with an opening to explore the theoretical and normative implications
of the changing global order as it applies to the western hemisphere.
Given what she characterizes as “the inconsistency and unpredictability of U.S. policy-making,” Fisher argues that we should focus on two
sets of relational interplays: the relationship between foreign and domestic politics, and the relationship among multiple time horizons. She
suggests that we need to pay attention to the security challenges posed
by such factors as transnational criminal activity, a globalized economy, and climate change. The emergence of an increasingly multipolar
world and the resulting “decentred globalism” means that individual
states are less and less able to manage contemporary security challenges on their own. Rather, a more holistic approach that goes beyond a
focus on state actors becomes necessary. The normative implications,
Fisher argues, are clear: we need more imaginative and transformative
commitments to deal with the profound security challenges that we
face.
Sara K. McGuire explores the relationship between the shifting international order in global security and what is in essence a local security
issue: the contested southern border of the United States. She traces the
longer-term effects of the attacks of September 11, 2001. These attacks
transformed border security, first to an anti-terrorist focus, and then,
in the absence of efforts of foreign terrorists to present themselves at
U.S. border checkpoints, to a focus on immigration. She surveys the
approaches of the three presidents who have held office since 2001—
George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald J. Trump—to demonstrate how inconsistent American policy on border security has been.
This, however, has had considerable foreign policy effects, particularly
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during the Trump administration, as the embrace of an “America First”
approach affected relations with the countries of the Northern Triangle,
and in turn had an impact on a rules-based international approach to
key transnational policy issues like migration and the treatment of asylum seekers.
Anna Geis’s chapter shifts our focus to the European Union and the
EU’s efforts to redefine its place in a world that is not only growing
increasingly multipolar, but more and more shaped by great-power
competition. As the “unipolar moment” of the immediate post–Cold
War period receded, to be replaced by a certain transatlantic distance,
the EU has increasingly sought greater strategic autonomy. To be sure,
what “strategic autonomy” actually meant was not always clear, since
the EU’s capacity for truly united action in geostrategic terms has always been limited. Moreover, it has been common in Europe to conceive of the EU as a “civilian power” rather than a militarily robust
geostrategic great power, even if it has the objective capacity to be one.
On the contrary: some talk of the EU as a “normative power.” But behind such inflated rhetoric lay an important reality: the EU has always
sought to frame the international order in liberal terms. And in this,
the EU was always very much part of a broader liberal world ordering project, as Geis notes, and this project always had the backing of
the United States. The increasing skepticism of many Americans about
the transatlantic link—a skepticism profoundly reflected in the Trump
administration—has in turn prompted a rethink in Europe, a rethink
accelerated by Brexit, the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the
EU. In this new world, Geis argues, the EU is a “strange animal.” It is
not a “pole” in the classical meaning of that term. But the EU remains
committed to the idea of a “security community,” which will require
a rediscovery of the transatlantic community that has been fractured
under the Trump administration.
If the EU provides a clear example of an actor in world politics deeply committed to the liberal international order, India presents a more
paradoxical case. India gained its independence from the British Empire in 1947 as a polity committed to liberal democracy; but this liberal democratic polity, as Šumit Ganguly demonstrates in his chapter,
was quite ambivalent about the liberal international order that grew up
with post-independence India. Indeed, during much of the Cold War,
India was actively hostile to the economic liberal order globally and
highly skeptical about laissez-faire economics and free markets. While
this shifted somewhat in the post–Cold War period, the return to power
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of the Bharatiya Janata Party under its leader Narendra Modi in 2019
suggests that there will continue to be a certain ambivalence toward
liberalism and the liberal international order in New Delhi.
The two final selections of the papers presented at KCIS 2019 focus
on Canada and the changing world order. Christopher Ankersen examines the impact of shifts in great power politics on Canadian foreign
policy in the Indo-Pacific region of shifts in great-power politics. While
there is widespread agreement in Canada that the centre of gravity in
global politics is shifting from where it has been since the mid-1940s,
there is little willingness on the part of the Canadian government to
actually do what would be necessary to transform Canada from being,
as Ankersen characterizes it, “small and alone” in Asia. In particular,
there is no willingness at all to increase spending on enlarging Canada’s diplomatic, political, military, or other footprints in the Asia-Pacific. Ankersen argues that Canada needs to decide whether it wants to
make the Indo-Pacific a Canadian priority, and if it does, the Canadian
government needs to embrace a modest vision for the future and a willingness to allocate resources to the region.
The concluding paper, by Ben Rowswell, president of the Canadian
International Council (CIC), is a reflection on the contemporary international order inspired by the work of one of his predecessors in that
role. In the 1960s, the president of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA), as the CIC was then known, was John W. Holmes,
a former Canadian diplomat who in the 1950s had been active in the
efforts of the Canadian government to support the liberal international
order. In his role as president of the CIIA, and as a professor of international relations at the University of Toronto from the 1960s to the
1980s, Holmes helped popularize the idea that there was a group of
countries in global politics—Canada prime among them—that were
key in maintaining a global order that was liberal and American-led.
Rowswell’s paper—based on his keynote address to KCIS 2019—reflects on the similarities between the 1940s, which gave rise to the liberal international order, and the contemporary period. Those similarities,
he argues, suggest that just as Canadian diplomacy in the 1940s aimed
at aligning the world’s democracies in an era of geopolitical flux, so too
should Canadian diplomacy in the contemporary era of flux also focus
on developing an alliance of democracies to give shape to a new global
order.
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U.S. Domestic Politics and the
Changing Order
William G. Braun III

According to President Donald J. Trump, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is “obsolete.”1 The North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) “cost the U.S. millions of jobs.”2 The
multilateral Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) was “an attack on
America’s business.”3 Rather, “bilateral deals are far more efficient, profitable, and better for OUR workers.”4 The World Trade
Organization (WTO) needs to “shape up”: “If they don’t shape up,
I would withdraw from the WTO.”5 The United Nations (UN) “is
not a friend” of the United States;6 “America will always choose
independence and cooperation over global governance, control,

1. Shayna Freisleben, “A Guide to Trump’s Past Comments about NATO,” CBS News,
12 April 2017, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-nato-past-comments/.
2. Donald J. Trump, Twitter, 1 September 2018, 8:12 a.m., http://twitter.com/
realdonaldtrump.
3. Donald J. Trump, Twitter, 22 April 2015, 4:56 p.m., http://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump.
4. Donald J. Trump, Twitter, 17 April 2018, 7:49 p.m., http://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump.
5. John Micklethwait, Margaret Talev, and Jennifer Jacobs, “Trump Threatens to Pull
U.S. Out of WTO if It Doesn’t ‘Shape Up,’” Bloomberg News, 30 August 2018, https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-30/trump-says-he-will-pull-u-s-out-of-wto-ifthey-don-t-shape-up.
6. Donald J. Trump, “Speech to American Israel Public Affairs Committee,” Time, 21
March 2016, https://time.com/4267058/donald-trump-aipac-speech-transcript/.
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and domination…. We reject the ideology of globalism.”7

A brief scan of books and articles in the popular press, authored by
prominent international relations and foreign policy scholars, confirms
a wide-spread and growing concern that United States retrenchment
from the international order is accelerating, causing the perception of a
leadership vacuum over the management of the international order.8 By
contrast, a more nuanced understanding of the Trump administration’s
position would draw a distinction between its view of the international
order and U.S. foreign policy. The Trump administration is dissatisfied
with, and skeptical of, collaboration through international order alliances and institutions, as the quotations in the epigraph above suggest.
The administration harbors strong opposition to the ideology underpinning U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.9 In particular
it rejects a foreign policy based on an assertive liberal internationalist
ideology that seeks to impose individual rights, western values, and
democracy around the globe.10
The Trump administration’s position is not the only driver of change
7. Donald J. Trump, “Remarks by President Trump to the 73rd Session of the United
Nations General Assembly, New York, NY” (White House: Foreign Policy, 25
September 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presidenttrump-73rd-session-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-ny/.
8. Robert Kagan, The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World (New York:
Penguin Random House, 2018); Richard Haass, A World in Disarray: American Foreign
Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order (New York: Penguin Random House, 2017);
Jeffrey D. Sachs, A New Foreign Policy: Beyond American Exceptionalism (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2018). For contrarian views, see Peter Harris, “Trump’s
Foreign Policy ‘Restraint’ in Syria Could Be a Train Wreck,” The National Interest, 9
October 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/trumps-foreign-policy-restraintsyria-could-be-train-wreck-86931, which suggests that Congress and other structural
impediments could prevent Trump from pursuing a foreign policy of retrenchment.
Likewise, Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, “Trump Didn’t Shrink U.S.
Military Commitments Abroad – He Expanded Them,” Foreign Affairs, 3 December
2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-12-03/trump-didnt-shrink-us-militarycommitments-abroad-he-expanded-them, which suggests Trump’s retrenchment
language is simply rhetorical, and not the basis of his foreign policy behavior.
9. Doug Stokes, “Trump, American Hegemony and the Future of the Liberal
International Order,” International Affairs 94, no. 1 (2018): 133–50; Iulian Chifu and
Teodor Frunzeti, “Trump Doctrine: ‘The Principled Realism,’” Strategic Impact 68–69
(2018): 7–18, https://cssas.unap.ro/en/pdf_periodicals/si68-69.pdf.
10. John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of Liberal Hegemony,” Henry L. Stimson
Lectures on World Affairs, Yale University, 15 November 2017, https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=ESwIVY2oimI.
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placing pressure on the international order, however. Among the most
influential factors are geoeconomic and geopolitical changes affecting
nation-state relationships within the international community. The rise
of China and the prospect of China achieving peer-status with the U.S.
in economic influence (and military power derived from its prosperity)
is the most pressing driver of change in the international order. The
relative relationship of U.S. and Chinese economic power trends are dependent on each of these country’s internal politics and ability to adapt
to the external competitive environment. Neither country is likely to
derail the other’s economic path using external pressure. The purpose
of this chapter is to examine the influence of U.S. domestic politics on
change in the international order. Therefore, the economic and political
implications of a rising China are examined in the context of their impact on U.S. foreign policy. The most significant security implication of
China’s rise—and a return to a multipolar world—is the need for the
U.S. to abandon the engagement and enlargement foreign policy it has
pursued since the Cold War.11
Domestic politics and international geopolitical trends, reflected in
populist-nationalist movements across many societies, also place significant pressure on the international order. Populist-nationalist movements such as Brexit in Britain, the Five Star Movement in Italy, the
Arab Spring in Anbar, Egypt, and the Maghreb; and the emergence of
nationalist leaders around the globe, such as President Vladimir Putin
in Russia, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey, Prime Minister
Andrej Babis in the Czech Republic, President Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India, all suggest that the
populist-nationalist trend extends well beyond the United States. Currently twenty countries around the globe are under some form of populist government.12 This indicates a growing uneasiness with existing
international order, distrust of policy elites, and an inflection point in
the foreign policy choices pursued by many affected nations. Domestic
politics in the U.S. are being driven by similar populist sensibilities.
According to Pew Research Center, 71 percent of the U.S. public believe
11. William J. Clinton, “A National Security Strategy for Engagement and Enlargement”
(Washington, D.C.: White House, July 1994).
12. Jordan Kyle and Limor Gultchin, Populists in Power Around the World (London: Tony
Blair Institute for Global Change, 2018); Yahsa Mounk and Jordan Kyle, “What
Populists Do To Democracies,” The Atlantic, 26 December 2018, https://www.theatlantic.
com/ideas/archive/2018/12/hard-data-populism-bolsonaro-trump/578878/.
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political elites are out of touch with what they think.13
The U.S. is the chief architect and the principal leader and norm enforcer of the international order. If that role changes, then the status quo
order is likely to change. This chapter examines how U.S. popular opinion, as reflected by the Trump administration, presents a new view of
the appropriate U.S. role in the international order. The Trump administration only enjoys a plurality of support for his foreign policy positions, and particularly his mistrust of the institutions of the international order. Further, the Trump administration’s foreign policy favorability
ratings are heavily skewed along partisan lines. However, a majority of
Americans are confident he can negotiate favorable trade agreements,
and nearly half (49 percent) believe he will make good decisions about
economic policy.14 President Trump’s plurality of support determined
the outcome of the 2016 election, and those election results are affecting
how the U.S. is engaging the world. Indicators of changing domestic
perceptions are reflected in the dissonance between traditional policy
positions and current behavior, and emerging new narratives regarding
U.S. foreign policy.
This chapter’s analysis acknowledges the benefits derived from a
stable international order, enjoyed since the end of the Second World
War. Given that context, the bulk of the chapter examines pressures
on the international order, populist-nationalist trends in U.S. domestic
politics, and changing U.S. public perceptions of U.S. foreign policy relative to the international order. The “blame it on” construct of the chapter sections offer various explanations for heightened risk or pressure
on traditional U.S. foreign policy positions, and therefore pressure for
international order change. The chapter concludes by speculating on
the future of the international order and U.S. foreign policy.
Competing Leadership: Blame It on China’s Rise
The status quo order has not been a static arrangement among states.
To maintain stable relations, it has undergone significant change over
13. Richard Wike and Shannon Schumacher, “Democratic Rights Popular Globally but
Commitment to Them Not Always Strong,” Pew Research Center, 27 February 2020,
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/02/27/democratic-rights-popular-globally-butcommitment-to-them-not-always-strong/.
14. Kristen Bialik, “State of the Union 2019: How Americans see Major National Issues,”
Pew Research Center, 4 February 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/02/27/
democratic-rights-popular-globally-but-commitment-to-them-not-always-strong/.
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the last seventy years, adapting to the changing demands of the global
community. Recent changes include an increased number of UN member states, NATO expansion that absorbed former Warsaw Pact states,
China’s executive board membership on the International Monetary
Fund, and China’s admission to the World Trade Organization. Despite
criticisms that economically weak and developing countries have been
left behind, the institutions responsible for setting and overseeing international order norms and standards have been relatively inclusive,
expansive, and adaptive over the years.
In his recent book, The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled
World, Robert Kagan argues that the U.S., the West, and others (including China) have enjoyed tremendous advances in prosperity and peace
as a result of the United States–led international order. Acknowledging
failures and costs, Kagan argues that democracy, economic prosperity, and peace among great powers have been advanced because of the
enlightened self-interest approach to leadership by the United States.
He further argues a more controversial position: that without U.S. leadership, relations among nations will revert to the poverty, authoritarianism, and instability that characterized great power relations prior
to the Second World War. Kagan therefore advocates for a U.S. recommitment to the institutions of the international order.15 Others, like Jon
Meacham, are optimistic that the U.S. can overcome its current political
turmoil and reconnect with its core values, making it worthy of the
leadership role.16
Critics argue that the current international order must fundamentally change to adapt to the existing geostrategic environment, or risk
being replaced by a rival system. Voices of change advocate for an updated governance structure that more closely reflects the geostrategic
power structure of the twenty-first century, a development model that
offers more opportunity to undeveloped nations, and capital loan practices that imposes fewer ideological barriers to access.
Both internally and externally, China is directly challenging the existing international order and the institutions that govern it. Optimists
have largely abandoned the hope that China would find the barriers to
entry so low, and the probability of prosperity so attractive, that China would assimilate the underlying values of the international order.
15. Kagan, Jungle Grows Back.
16. Jon Meacham, The Soul of America: The Battle for Our Better Angels (New York:
Penguin Random House, 2018).
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China’s illiberal governance structure and underlying value system call
into question Beijing’s willingness to assimilate into the order. China
is regularly accused of intellectual property theft, currency manipulation, market protectionism, predatory loan practices, and opaque trade
agreements backed by coercive state pressure.17
Further, China is asserting its own vision of a Chinese-led international order. It has created capital investment banks and lending practices to operationalize its vision, effectively establishing a competing
set of international order institutions. The most publicized is arguably
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). To execute the BRI the multinational
Asian Infrastructure Bank led by Jin Liqun, a Chinese banker and politician, established relationships and pledged funds to many countries
throughout the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. According to Boston
University’s Global Development Policy Center, developing countries
receive as much financing from the China Development Bank and the
Export-Import Bank of China as they do from the World Bank.18 China
also created the New Development Bank with Brazil, India, Russia, and
South Africa.
Through this financing, China is addressing an estimated $3 trillion
capital development and infrastructure need around the world. In return for loans, China does not require controversial policy choices on
human rights, deregulated markets, or privatization of public companies—a common characteristic of western order capital loan deals.19
However, critics claim China is not committed to international norms of
transparency and the collective good. Contract terms, especially those
negotiated between China and authoritarian regimes behind closed
doors, are suspected of being predatory. China requires collateral to
back its loans, often acquiring facilities, real estate, and mineral rights
associated with their investment projects if the projects fail. Two often
cited examples of this happening are the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka
and Venezuela’s national oil company and associated mineral rights.
As a result of China’s growing influence and assertive behavior,
17. U.S. Tools to Address Chinese Market Distortions: Hearing before the U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, 115th Congress, 2nd session (8 June 2018), https://
www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/Hearing%20Transcript%20-%20June%208,%20
2018.pdf.
18. Kevin P. Gallagher, “Opinion: China’s Role as the World’s Development Bank
Cannot Be Ignored,” NPR, 11 October 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/10/11/646421776/
opinion-chinas-role-as-the-world-s-development-bank-cannot-be-ignored.
19. Ibid.
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the U.S. finds itself in an international environment where rival actors
could rapidly destroy or render obsolete U.S. competitive advantage.20
In the 1990s, Richard A. D’Aveni of Dartmouth University described
this environment in the business context as hypercompetition.21 A hypercompetitive environment is characterized by rapidly eroding transient advantage, and frequent disruptions to established norms of cooperation and competition. In this environment, all interactions must
be evaluated in the relative context of sequential rival counter-actions.
The speed and intensity of competitive escalation requires new strategies for survival. Traditional strategies seeking semi-permanent advantage and cooperative behavior to advance stability are out-maneuvered
by disruptive rivals.22 Collective action, based on formal consensus decision making, is seldom agile enough to gain advantage in a hypercompetitive environment.
In part, changing U.S. foreign policy norms and retrenchment from
its traditional commitment to lead the international order is a reaction
to the rise of China, its growing assertiveness, and the emergence of a
multi-polar hypercompetitive security environment. The shift in U.S.
security policy is also driven by U.S. domestic politics. A growing public skepticism of policy elite assumptions, dissatisfaction with foreign
policy outcomes, and mistrust of international order institutions animate the U.S. domestic populist movement. A growing public consensus is skeptical of the international order, and whether the foreign policy to advance it protects their interests.
Flawed Assumptions: Blame It on the Blob
From the administrations of George H. W. Bush to Barack Obama, the
U.S. pursued an expansionist national security strategy and foreign

20. Examples of the growing capabilities of rivals to the U.S. include China’s nascent
hypersonic capability, Beijing’s advances in the cyber and space competitive
environment and the weaponization of information, and the manipulation of social
media as a delivery platform by the Russian Federation.
21. Richard A. D’Aveni, Hypercompetition: Managing the Dynamics of Strategic
Maneuvering (New York: The Free Press, 1994).
22. Nathan Freier, James Hayes, Michael Hatfield, and Lisa Lamb, “Game On or Game
Over: Hypercompetition and Military Advantage,” (United States Army War College
War Room, 22 May 2018), https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/the-new-defensenormal-nine-fundamentals-of-hypercompetition/. This article applies D’Aveni’s business
concept to an international security context.   
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policy.23 This expansionist agenda was enabled by a perception that
the U.S. enjoyed what Charles Krauthammer called a “unipolar moment.”24 Policy elites were mobilized by seemingly uncontested U.S.
global power. Ben Rhodes, Obama’s speech writer, coined the phrase
“The Blob” to describe foreign policy elites who are unified in their
approach to project western values through intervention, but are increasingly out of touch with U.S. populist sensibilities.25 The bipartisan
“Blob” contains both liberal-progressive and neo-conservative zealots.
Criticism for pushing back against the Blob’s sensibilities is also bipartisan. Obama’s administration, not just the Trump administration, was
criticized for several foreign policy choices that pushed back against
the elite’s interventionist tendencies.26
In The Hell of Good Intentions, Stephen Walt examines the conditions
that lead to the Blob adopting a common view of world affairs. The Blob
adheres to a belief system that advocates the benefits of globalization
and collective security, proselytizing democracy and western values,
and asserting a rule-of-law and universal individual rights agenda.27
The Blob employs U.S. foreign policy to project these values around the
world. It further advocates for a U.S. leadership role as the guarantor
of these values.
The Trump administration represents a radically different foreign
policy platform, condemning institutions of the international order and
the policy elite’s globalist approach. Walter Russell Mead characterized
the Trump administration narrative as most closely aligning with the
Jacksonian foreign policy tradition in the United States.28 Two Austra23. See William G. Braun III and Charles D. Allen, “Shaping a 21st Century
Defense Strategy: Reconciling Military Roles,” Joint Forces Quarterly 73 (2014):
53, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-73/jfq-73_52-59_BraunAllen.pdf?ver=2014-04-01-122213-937. See section “A Shift from Containment
to Enlargement” for a quick summary of the U.S. National Security Strategy
consistencies from George H. W. Bush through Barack Obama.
24. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1990/1991):
23–33.
25. Ben Rhodes interview, “Behind the Scenes of the Obama White House,” CBSN - Red
& Blue, 6 June 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4QM2zDDEw4k
26. Among these choices were the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, “leading from
behind” in Libya, and not enforcing “red lines” in Syria.
27. Stephen M. Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the
Decline of U.S. Primacy (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018).
28. Walter Russell Mead, “The Jacksonian Tradition: and American Foreign Policy,” The
National Interest 58 (Winter 1999/2000): 5–29.
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lian scholars, Michael Clarke and Anthony Ricketts, expanded on this
thesis, describing the motivation, key themes, and political style adopted by Jacksonian populist-nationalists.29 Their description of the tradition provides a basis for understanding the Trump administration’s
“America First” and “Make America Great Again (MAGA)” campaign
slogans.
According to Clarke and Ricketts, Jacksonians are primarily motivated by a pessimistic view of the political elite, and a fear of concentrated central government power influenced by that elite. This view is fueled by a visceral perception that the elite leadership has let the public
down, and that the U.S. suffers at the hands of a global community. This
populist view is fueled by a semi-formed cornucopia of negative issues
that combine concerns about job loss, reliance on foreign supply chains,
unlawful immigration, cheating (unfair markets, intellectual property
theft, state and individual “free-riding”), eroding western values, and a
general perception of U.S. decline and failure around the globe.
Walter Russell Mead suggests Jeffersonian populist-nationalist
movements are defined by the principles of populism, individualism,
honor, and courage. Their principles are grounded in individual and
national identity versus a global collective identity. Disenchanted populists reject elites, and rally behind (usually charismatic and emotionally energized) populist leaders.30 These leaders are animated by an instinct to promote the political, economic, and moral well-being of what
Clarke and Ricketts call “the folk community.”31
Jacksonian nationalists endorse a minimalist foreign policy ethos.
They are anti-globalist, but not isolationist. On pragmatic grounds,
they reject the effectiveness of a crusading U.S. committed to the advancement of western values. They apprehend that the liberal elite’s
foreign policy overextends resources, relieves like-minded nations of
their share of regional burdens, and promotes futile attempts to reform
theocratic and autocratic societies that reject western values. Jacksonians are not willing to underwrite international political and economic
institutional governance; however, they are willing to cooperate with
29. Michael Clarke and Anthony Ricketts, “Donald Trump and American Foreign
Policy: The Return of the Jacksonian Tradition,” Comparative Strategy 36, no. 4, (2017):
366–79. The remainder of this section is largely derived from the discussions in
Mead and Clarke and Ricketts.
30. Among U.S. presidents, Theodore Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson,
and Ronald Reagan are often categorized as historic populist-leaders.
31. Clarke and Ricketts, “Donald Trump and American Foreign Policy,” 370.
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other nations to the extent the U.S. controls its own affairs.
The Jacksonian threshold for military action is high. Triggers for
military action must demonstrate a direct threat to life, prosperity, or
national honor by an aggressor. Further, populist leaders prefer to act
only when they believe they can make a clear case to the public, before
or after the action, that the U.S. is the aggrieved party. Jacksonians resist interventions intended to prevent illiberal behavior, especially if
that behavior is not directed at U.S. interests. Once committed however,
Jacksonians will condone aggressive, unilateralist military action, and
rapid escalation to demonstrate U.S. prestige and resolve.
Populist leaders see themselves (and are seen by their followers)
as the sole, legitimate representatives of the people against the elite.32
They advocate for their followers against the elite with rhetorical swagger, emotional appeal, and righteous indignation. They often respond
to perceived personal slights to honor or reputation, directing colorful
language at their antagonists. Nationalist policy choices trend toward
economic protectionism, aggressive deregulation, and transactional security and foreign policy arrangements with a nationalistic bias. This
leadership style, nationalist rhetoric, and policy choice can create perceptions of moral dilemma, which are troubling to the foreign policy
elite. Any number of policy actions, from detentions on the U.S. border, trade wars with China, or disrespectful engagements with foreign
leaders (such as referring to Kim Jong Un as “Rocket Man”), can trigger
these concerns.
No nation can prosper in the complex international arena without
established forums, processes, and norms to stabilize behavior and
facilitate cooperation between nations. Many nationalist leaders acknowledge the U.S. cannot “go it alone,” recognizing the U.S. requires
collective security and economic arrangements to sustain national
prosperity and peace. Trump’s former National Security Advisor, LTG
H.R. McMaster, and chief advisor and director of Trump’s national economic council, Gary Cohn, wrote in 2017 that “President Trump has a
‘clear-eyed view’ that the world is not a ‘global community’ but an arena where nations, nongovernmental actors, and businesses engage and
compete for advantage.”33 In this arena, nationalists are less willing to
32. Georg Löfflmann, “America First and the Populist Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy,”
Survival 61, no. 6 (2019): 115–38.
33. H. R. McMaster and Gary D. Cohn, “America First Doesn’t Mean America Alone,”
Wall Street Journal, 30 May 2017. For a liberal internationalist perspective on the
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trade sovereignty, leverage, or advantage to achieve the values-based
objectives of liberal internationalists, who believe U.S. prosperity and
security is a residual benefit of pursuing the common good.
Nationalists in powerful states are also less willing to shoulder the
burden or suffer the criticism associated with forging collective consensus, preferring bilateral agreements where they can exert more leverage. Absent U.S. leadership over collective consensus within the western order, three possible futures emerge: a group of like-minded states
assume co-equal burden with the U.S. to maintain the order; the status
quo order is replaced by a more nationalist-mercantilist system, probably led by China; or some hybrid, where a weaker western liberal order
competes with a nationalist-mercantilist system.34 If that hybrid-order
emerges, the U.S. will likely operate in both systems, but lead neither.
The pursuit of national objectives, without a unifying national cultural norm, renders nationalist leaders susceptible to charges of racism
and bigotry. Any policy advantaging or catering to the sensibilities of
one segment of the electorate will inevitably disadvantage or offend another segment of the electorate. A populist leader’s idiosyncratic style,
and the embodiment of the national identity in a single figure, renders
the economic and security decisions they make susceptible to the influence of perceived slights to personal honor and national reputation.
Under the Jacksonian tradition, it is good that the threshold for military
action is high. Issues of honor and reputation are hard to operationalize
into military objectives, and even harder to satisfy.
Failure: Blame It on Policy and Intervention Overreach
Selectorate theory holds that voters reward public policy success and
punish failure.35 In order for the voting public to constrain failed policy, “political parties must provide voters with alternative platforms.”36
article, see The Editorial Board, “America in Retreat,” New York Times 3 June 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/03/opinion/sunday/trump-america-in-retreat.html.
34. Fareed Zakaria, “Trump’s Radical Departure from Post War Foreign Policy,”
Washington Post, 1 June 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-couldspur-the-rise-of-a-new-not-so-liberal-world-order/2017/06/01/1e9aeff2-4707-11e7-98cdaf64b4fe2dfc_story.html.
35. Christopher Gelpi, “Democracies in Conflict: The Role of Public Opinion, Political
Parties, and the Press in Shaping Security Policy,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 61,
no. 9 (2017): 1925–49. This literature review of democratic peace theory offers insight
into the role of selectorate theory and domestic opinion in shaping foreign policy.
36. Gelpi, “Democracies in Conflict,” 1939.
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The military interventionist foreign policy of the United States enjoyed an uneven record during a honeymoon period between 1980 and
2000.37 The attacks of 2001 marked a definitive turning point for those
successes. Since then, American military intervention, as measured by
public dissatisfaction with outcomes, has failed. According to the Pew
Research Center, a majority of U.S. adults believe U.S. military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan were not worth the costs. This public
sentiment extends further, to Syria, Libya, and beyond.38
Two overarching causes of failure during this period were foreign
policy overreach, and the use of coercive military force to effect the
engagement and enlargement agenda. Trump’s populist-nationalist
movement was inspired in part by the prospect that he represents a
clear alternative to globalist and interventionist foreign policies.
Nationalists—and many realists—view the last four decades of U.S.
foreign policy as a disaster. John Mearsheimer of the University of
Chicago coined the term “liberal hegemony” to label a foreign policy in pursuit of an assertive liberal internationalist ideology, seeking
to impose individual rights, western values, and democracy around
the globe. Mearsheimer argues that liberal hegemony’s underlying
assumptions are fundamentally flawed and its aspirational objectives
unachievable.39 Under this broad foreign policy agenda, the U.S. failed
to achieve strategic objectives, while depleting national resources fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and combating Al Qaeda and Daesh
across the globe. The U.S. further stretched its resources by participating in collective security arrangements around the globe.
During this same period, the U.S. has seen China’s economy soar,
and rivals including China and Russia benefit from unfair practices
associated with theft and coercion. The Trump administration even
finds multilateral trade agreements among friends problematic. It
walked away from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiated by
37. Examples of military intervention successes during this period include Grenada
(1983), Panama (1989), Saudi Arabia/Iraq (1990–96), and Bosnia and Herzegovina
(1990s). Military interventions widely considered failures (either immediately or
over the longer-term) include Lebanon (1982–83) and Somalia (1993).
38. Ruth Igielnick and Kim Parker, “Majorities of U.S. Veterans, Public Say the Wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan Were Not Worth Fighting,” Pew Research Center, 10 July 2019,
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/10/majorities-of-u-s-veterans-public-say-thewars-in-iraq-and-afghanistan-were-not-worth-fighting/.
39. Mearsheimer, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2018).
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the Obama administration, renegotiated the North Atlantic Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada, and hopes to renegotiate the Transatlantic Trade Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the
European Union. While the U.S. benefited from these treaties, there is
a growing perception that the overall cost-benefit equation is tipping
away from U.S. advantage.
An easier case to make is that U.S. foreign policy has been militarized, and that trend has failed to achieve the broader strategic political
objectives set out for it. Chris Preble, a libertarian historian at the CATO
Institute, contends that the availability of a standing U.S. Army facilitated the marginalization of trade, diplomacy, and cultural exchange in
favor of military intervention. The Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, and Carter
administrations all sought to make trade and diplomacy the hallmarks
of their administrations, despite a standing army. It was only after the
Cold War, and the pursuit of a more interventionist U.S. foreign policy,
that American foreign policy became militarized. The second-order implication of a large standing army and an interventionist foreign policy
is the expansion of a national security state and the commensurate expense of a much larger domestic government.40
Rosa Brooks of Georgetown University describes a vicious cycle
leading to the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. This cycle is characterized by an increasing number and scope of military tasks, followed
by increased defense budgets, and an even greater number of tasks perpetuated by a general lack of policy performance accountability. This
cycle has resulted in the military becoming the institution presidents
call on to project U.S. power. In addition to failures due to the mismatch
between the military instrument and political objectives, Brooks highlights two additional problems caused by the militarization of foreign
policy. First, it blurs the mission of the military as an instrument of war
and an instrument to sustain peace. This tension places a strain on the
military as it attempts to reconcile demands to achieve objectives in
these two very different environments. Second, U.S. law and civilian
values may be negatively impacted when the military’s leaders are
asked to resolve the moral dilemmas of peace and war. While military
leaders do this well in the security environments where they are asked
to make such choices, Brooks’s concern is the transfer of those norms to

40. Christopher A. Preble, Peace, War, and Liberty: Understanding U.S. Foreign Policy
(Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 2019).
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a peaceful domestic context.41
The Jacksonian movement aligns with Mersheimer’s view that the
foreign policy goals of liberal hegemony are probably not achievable.
The Trump administration has diligently avoided using the military to
project U.S. values around the globe, preferring to extend U.S. interests through economic and information instruments of national power. Critics have condemned his coercive trade practices and sometimes
caustic rhetoric, but few charge him with expanding U.S. interests
through intervention. The U.S. government expended life and national
treasure for two decades in Iraq and Afghanistan but failed to achieve
sustainable peace and security in those countries—much less advance
a prosperous, democratic, and open market outcome.
Beyond these two wars, U.S. national honor and reputation have
arguably suffered because of extensive global military engagements.
Regardless of liberal hegemony’s philosophical rhetoric justifying interventionist policy, the U.S. is villainized, with attributions of ulterior motives, neo-colonialism, and heavy-handed domination. These
ubiquitous charges are levied both domestically and internationally by
friend and foe alike. Charges of negative motives play into populist-nationalist concerns over tarnished national legitimacy, honor, and pride.
Nationalists do not appear to believe that projecting western values
and expanding democratic governance globally are worth the effort.
The emerging narrative on the use of the military in foreign affairs
today is strikingly different than the narrative after the end of the Cold
War. Military involvement may be inevitable, as it is the most available
and responsive tool at a president’s disposal. However, it will be used
differently. Both senior civilian and military leaders are advocating for
a strong military, focused on readiness for major combat operations
against peer rival states. The approach rejects security agreements that
require the U.S. to defend prosperous partner nations but supports cooperative agreements between capable nations willing to equally share
the collective burdens of regional security.
The Jacksonian expectation is to remove the U.S. from existing nation-building operations and military interventions. Jacksonians might
entertain the use of the military to impose security through the threat
of lethal force, or to support other non-military operations. But to the
extent current U.S. leadership will entertain security cooperation, se41. Rosa Brooks, How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales
from the Pentagon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2016.)
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curity force assistance, humanitarian, development, or peacekeeping
operations, the adage “they need to want it more than we want it” is
emerging as the guiding principle. However, when and where combat
operations are required, quick escalation and decisive action are preferred. An “America first” military strategy of decisive, iterative strikes
to achieve limited objectives (often described as whack-a-mole, cuttingthe-lawn, or tending-the-garden) appears to be acceptable.
New Narrative: What Next, and What to Do?
Despite a great many uncertainties about the future, what appears
sure is the rise of China. China’s rise renders projecting western values
through military intervention, and policing the international system,
even more impractical than during the alleged “unipolar moment.”
Therefore, it is likely that U.S. foreign policy will probably continue to
lean toward nationalist or realist ideology (in other words, assessing
U.S. national interests in pragmatic versus ideological terms).
Globalization and the theory of free market competition are sound—
as many states, including the U.S. and China, have benefited from both.
However, despite a generally positive track record, collective approaches to economic competition have reached their practical limit when
confronted by norm violations, corruption, and irreconcilable ideological differences among major economic blocks.42 The international order
is only as strong or weak as member states’ willingness to manage it
and sustain it through their support. That support starts with financial support and voluntary compliance with norms of cooperation. An
increasingly important form of support is demonstrated collaborative
leadership, along with a national willingness to enforce compliance
and punish non-compliance with international norms.
The U.S. public increasingly supports a less robust, more minimalist
foreign policy. In 2017, the Pew Center was reporting that “The public
is evenly divided over whether the U.S. should be active in world affairs.43 By 2019, a strong minority (40 percent) believed that U.S. nation42. Shaomin Li and Ilan Alon, “China’s Intellectual Property Rights Provocation: A
Political Economy View,” Journal of International Business Policy 3 (2020): 60–72;
Thomas Wright, “The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable,” The Atlantic,
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/liberal-international-order-freeworld-trump-authoritarianism/569881/.
43. “Foreign Policy,” Pew Research Center, 5 October 2017, https://www.people-press.
org/2017/10/05/3-foreign-policy/.
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al interests should be advanced even when allies strongly disagreed
with the policy. This position is most strongly held by Republicans
and independents who lean Republican, fully 57 percent of whom favor paying less attention to overseas problems.44 As a result, the U.S.
is stepping back from a lead role in managing the order and enforcing
its norms. Therefore, it is likely a dual track system of international
order norms will emerge: one system will adhere to traditional western
norms, while a second system will adopt more transactional nationalist-mercantilist norms.
The U.S. must operate within a collective international order to prosper. Therefore, the U.S. can be expected to advance its national interests
in both systems. The U.S. will likely continue its pivot to Asia, engaging
China more as a rival than a competitor. That may mean occasional
collaborative agreements to cooperate among partner nations; but will
more likely result in transactional bilateral agreements to challenge
China’s aspirations for greater influence and control over Indo-Pacific
nations and their economies. In other parts of the globe, the U.S. will
cooperate with partners to pursue its national interests, adhering to
the principles of a western-led, rules-based international order without committing to external governance. This autonomous cooperation
is similar to how the U.S. adheres to the United Nations Convention
for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), without being a signatory. Whether
the U.S. commitment to a nationalist and minimalist relationship with
the international order will persist beyond the Trump administration
remains to be seen.
The military-led interventionist foreign policy pursued by the U.S.
since the end of the Cold War has failed to achieve political objectives.
The trend to optimize the U.S. military for major combat operations
against peer competitors, and punitive strikes to achieve shorter-term
limited objectives, will likely continue. Current priorities, focused on
material readiness for major combat operations, overlook or undervalue advantages derived from investment in ubiquitous, low-cost
engagement opportunities through forward presence. No simple solutions exist, but engagement through forward posturing of the military
seems a more prudent measure to assure allies and partners, and for the
U.S. to compete effectively in the hypercompetitive peace environment,
44. “Large Majorities in Both Parties Say NATO Is Good for the U.S.,” (Pew Research
Center, 2 April 2019), https://www.people-press.org/2019/04/02/large-majorities-in-bothparties-say-nato-is-good-for-the-u-s/.
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or “Gray Zone.” Forward posturing strengthens relationships and ensures access, offering the nation greater flexibility and opportunities
for shaping outcomes. Further, forward posturing creates military
options for commanders and dilemmas for rivals in the event combat
arises. However, even if the U.S. adopts forward posture engagement
for pragmatic reasons, it is unlikely the U.S. military will lead foreign
nation-building reform efforts anytime soon.
To the extent the U.S. continues to support security institutions of
the international order, member nations will need to embrace greater
burden-sharing challenges.45 Investing a greater percentage of GDP in
defense is just a start. What matters is the delivery of regional military capabilities to enhance regional security.46 The U.S. public believes
there is insufficient international burden-sharing to maintain the order. For example, NATO enjoys continued bipartisan favorable ratings
among the U.S. public, but according an October 2017 survey by Pew
Research Center, “almost half of Americans (48%) said NATO does not
do enough to help solve world problems.”47
NATO members must reassess their mission in the modern context
and commit to achieving objectives without the U.S. in the lead. Partner
nations in the Middle East and Asia must contribute more effectively to
their own national defense. Further, partner nations of the Indo-Pacific must commit to greater regional security collaboration beyond their
borders. These arrangements do not require direct challenges to China,
nor formal alliances like NATO. However, partner nations in the Indo-Pacific must engage in meaningful regional security dialogue and
demonstrate commitment to participate in collaborative military exercises. Sharing ports, facilities, logistics support, and intelligence during
military exercises is a good start. Conducting multi-national military
support to humanitarian and disaster relief operations is even better.
45. It is important to remember that presidents from Truman through Trump have
expressed these burden-sharing narratives to a greater or lesser extent. What is
unique about Trump’s message is the replacement of diplomatic language with New
York real estate tycoon rhetoric.
46. Richard Sokolsky and Gordon Adams, “Penny Wise, Pound Foolish: Trump’s
Misguided Views of European Defense Spending,” War on the Rocks, 7 March 2017,
https://warontherocks.com/2017/03/penny-wise-pound-foolish-trumps-misguided-views-ofeuropean-defense-spending/.
47. Moira Fagan, “NATO is Seen Favorably in Many Member Countries, But Almost
Half of Americans Say It Does Too Little,” Pew Research Center, 9 July 2019, https://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/07/09/nato-is-seen-favorably-in-many-membercountries-but-almost-half-of-americans-say-it-does-too-little/.
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Middle powers and western partners that believe globalization and
the status quo international order are valuable to their national interests should demonstrate greater commitment to sustaining and managing its institutions. In time the U.S. may return to a leadership role,
or it may choose to compete independently. The U.S. is still sufficiently
powerful economically, militarily, and culturally to take its own narrowly defined nationalistic path if it wishes. If the U.S. pursues this idiosyncratic course, it will likely adhere to international order norms in a
way that is similar to how it adheres to United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea—in other words, selectively. Alternatively, if nations
do not find the benefits of collaboration worth the burden of order sustainment and norm enforcement, the world may well suffer a return to
pre-Second World War power dynamics—when, in the famous words
of Thucydides, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what
they must.”
Conclusion
American foreign policy under the 46th president will necessarily need
to accommodate growing populist-nationalist trends in the U.S. Therefore, while the form and style of U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy may
change, the emerging narrative will likely reflect an increasingly minimalist foreign policy, supported by a populist plurality that embraces a
more nationalist view of U.S. interests.
As the U.S. role as manager and enforcer of the international order
changes, so too will the status quo order change. Domestic politics in
the U.S. is driving a new normal, a more minimalist supporting role in
the international order. The Trump administration’s policies reflect a
growing populist mistrust of political elite assumptions about globalization, the value of proselytizing western values and democracy, and
leading the global enterprise of international order cooperation. The
Trump administration reflects a foreign policy approach that asserts
a more nationalist view of how to best pursue U.S. interests, through
cooperative agreements with countries that are capable and willing to
equally share the collective burdens of regional security. Dissonance between U.S. policy and behavior, and emerging narratives regarding the
international order, confirm U.S. foreign policy is undergoing fundamental change and anticipates a new international order arrangement.
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Economic Drivers and the Reshaping of
the International Security Landscape
Carol V. Evans

Introduction
Economic drivers are paramount in reshaping the global international
security landscape. Military power as a determining factor shaping foreign policy influence has waned. Rather, nation states are increasingly
employing economic instruments as a primary means of “projecting
influence and conducting geopolitical combat in the twenty-first century.”1 And, geostrategic competition itself is being determined by the
degree to which a nation state uses these instruments effectively.
In this paper, I address three key economic drivers affecting geopolitics, with important implications for the international rules-based
order and the security environment. The first economic driver is the
rapid erosion of multilateral economic frameworks, hastened primarily by the focus of the administration of President Donald J. Trump on
“America First” economic-nationalist policies. The Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the
1. For a thorough and absorbing discussion on geoeconomics, see Robert D. Blackwell
and Jennifer M. Harris, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2016), 33.

28

Carol V. Evans

threat to withdraw from the World Trade Organization (WTO) presage
a strong, preferential shift towards bilateral trade agreements. Ensuing
trade wars with China and tariffs on strategic allies have had unintended consequences. These repercussive effects include stronger Sino-Russian relations, NATO disharmony, and countries from the Balkans to
Southeast Asia being drawn into China’s economic orbit.
The second driver is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) embraced by
President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China. This $1 trillion
infrastructure program involves an estimated eighty countries. Designed to secure China’s energy, natural resources, and trade routes in
the maritime and overland environments, the BRI is enabling China’s
ambitions of regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific and may displace
U.S. global power pre-eminence in the near future.
The third driver that affects international security is critical infrastructure (CI), which has now become the weapon of choice by nation
states. Look no further than the Russian Federation’s hybrid operations
in Ukraine and its cyber-attacks on the U.S. electric grid, as well as China’s strategic penetration of U.S. and European telecommunications,
transportation, and defense industrial base sectors. These disturbing
examples portend the capabilities and intentions of America’s adversaries to use critical infrastructure to shape the geostrategic battlespace
and to undermine U.S. and NATO military supremacy.
U.S. Retreat from Multilateralism
Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize winning economist, suggested that when
Donald J. Trump became president, he “threw a hand grenade into
the global economic order.”2 Having based his election campaign on a
promise to “Make America Great Again” by narrowing the U.S. trade
deficit and creating jobs for American workers, Trump launched an
economic nationalist agenda. This agenda astutely linked U.S. standing
in the world with the need to wield geoeconomic might to ensure U.S.
global military and economic competitiveness. The Trump administration also had a deep skepticism about the benefits of the multilateral
world order that had largely been underpinned by U.S. and European leadership. Speaking in Brussels in December 2018, the Secretary of
State, Mike Pompeo, announced that the international order “failed us,
2. Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents Revisited (New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 2018), xv.
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and it failed you.” Pointing to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the WTO, Pompeo argued that “International bodies
must help facilitate cooperation that bolsters the security and values of
the free world, or they must be reformed or eliminated.”3
The Administration’s “America First” approach marked what many
economic observers consider to be a fundamental and dramatic shift
in trade policy.4 Indeed, since 2017, the Trump administration used a
range of geoeconomic tools—access to the U.S. market and the imposition of tariffs and economic sanctions—to reshape the global economic
world order in America’s favor. It withdrew from the TPP; it renegotiated NAFTA; it threatened to withdraw from the WTO; and it encouraged the United Kingdom (UK) to leave the European Union (EU), i.e.,
“Brexit.” Certainly, these moves were indicative of President Trump’s
aversion to multilateral and regional trade arrangements. As he put it in
2018, “Believe me, we’re going to have a lot of trade deals. But they’ll be
one-on-one. There won’t be a whole big mash pot.”5 Instead, the administration’s focus has been on securing bilateral trade agreements with
individual TPP members, South Korea (KORUS), Japan, and the UK,
where the U.S. can exert greater leverage by virtue of America’s dominant economic and military positions. But one may ask at what cost?6
One example of the negative repercussions for U.S. national security
is the administration’s decision to exit the Trans-Pacific Partnership.7
The TPP was a signature trade policy of the administration of Barack
3. Harris Gardiner, “Pompeo Questions the Value of International Groups like UN and
EU,” New York Times, 4 December 2018.
4. David S. Jacoby, Trump, Trade, and the End of Globalization (Santa Barbara, CA:
Praeger, 2018); Dominic Rushe, “More than 1,000 Economists Warn Trump His Trade
Views Echo 1930s Errors,” The Guardian, 3 May 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2018/may/03/donald-trump-trade-economists-warning-great-depression; and John
B. Judis, The Nationalist Revival: Trade, Immigration, and the Revolt Against Globalization
(New York: Columbia Global Reports, 2018).
5. Emel Akan, “Trump’s Tariffs Shake Up the Global Trade Order,” Epoch Times, 27
December 2018, https://www.theepochtimes.com/trumps-tariffs-shake-up-the-global-tradeorder_2745846.html.
6. The U.S. has ratified free trade agreements with six of the TPP nations: Canada,
Mexico, Peru, Chile, Australia, and Singapore, and is negotiating additional bilateral
trade agreements with Japan and New Zealand. U.S. Trade Representative, “Trade
Agreements,” https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements.
7. The TPP was a hotly debated issue in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Democratic
presidential candidates Hillary Rodham Clinton and Bernie Sanders both supported
the U.S. withdrawal from the TPP, siding with the then Republican contender,
Donald Trump.
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Obama; it was designed to enhance U.S. leadership and commerce in
the Asia-Pacific, and was seen as an important geoeconomic instrument
supporting the U.S. “pivot to the Asia” strategy. As the then Secretary
of Defense, Ashton Carter, affirmed in 2015, “passing TPP is as important to me as another aircraft carrier.”8 The U-turn in TPP policy by the
Trump administration has had unintended consequences. American
withdrawal has created a power vacuum in the region at a vital time
when U.S. “activism” is needed to counter both China’s rising military presence in the Indo-Pacific and assertive economic hegemony via
its Belt and Road Initiative. Absent U.S. leadership in promoting multilateral frameworks underpinning the global rules-based order, the
Chinese president, Xi Jinping, has been quick to jump in and exploit
this void by offering China’s own vision of a “community of common
destiny for mankind” for the future of the international order,9 namely,
Beijing’s long-term ambition to transform the international world order
towards China’s authoritarian “governance model and emergence as a
global leader.”10
The Trump administration has stirred trade conflicts on many fronts
with both adversaries and key allies, creating tension between the U.S.
and NATO, and driving strategic partners further into the orbits of
great-power adversaries: Turkey has been pushed into Russia’s orbit,
while Italy, Greece, and the Philippines have gravitated toward China.
While pushing Congress to ratify negotiated updates to NAFTA, the
administration imposed duties on key Canadian and Mexican imports:
25 percent on steel and 10 percent on aluminum. These hit America’s
NAFTA partners hard: In 2016, 88 percent of Canadian steel exports
went to the U.S., and 73 percent of Mexico’s steel was exported to the
U.S.11 Not surprisingly, Canada and Mexico immediately retaliated.12
8. U.S. Department of Defense, “Asia-Pacific Remarks,” Secretary of Defense Ashton
Carter, McCain Institute, Arizona State University, 5 April 2015.
9. Cao Desheng, “Xi’s Discourses on Mankind’s Shared Future Published,”
China Daily, 15 October 2018, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201810/15/
WS5c38adca310eff303282392.html.
10. Liza Tobin, “Xi’s Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A Strategic Challenge
for Washington and Its Allies,” Texas National Security Review 2, no. 1 (November
2018): 155–66, http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/863.
11. “The Looming Global Trade War: A Tariffically Bad Idea,” The Economist, 8 March
2018, https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/03/08/the-looming-global-trade-war.
12. Canada retaliated by placing duties on $12 billion worth of U.S. exports, including
whiskey and maple syrup, while Mexico slapped tariffs on $3 billion worth of
American goods.
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The administration also imposed steel and aluminum duties on Europe,
South Korea, Japan, and India. These latter countries are key strategic
partners and allies. Yet the rationale for the imposition of these tariffs
was ironically on the grounds of national security to protect U.S. steel
producers.13
Trade conflicts have also proliferated in the Indo-Pacific, and spread
to India, the world’s largest democratic country, and a vital U.S. partner
in the region. In June 2019 the administration terminated India’s designation as a beneficiary developing nation under the key Generalized
System of Preference (GSP) trade program, after determining that India had not assured the United States that it would provide “equitable
and reasonable access” to its markets.14 Continuation of GSP was a key
element of Indo-U.S. negotiations on a bilateral trade package, which
fell through in March 2019 when Washington announced its decision to
end the GSP benefit. India has also faced potential secondary sanctions
as part of U.S. pressure to reduce its imports of Iranian oil.15
India and the United States share many strong mutual interests in the
region and avenues for military cooperation. These include countering
China’s increasing naval encroachments in the Indian Ocean and monitoring Chinese economic and military activities with its northern nuclear rival, Pakistan, among many others. The fallout from these trade
frictions has led New Delhi once again to question Washington’s reliability as a strategic partner.16 As two researchers on U.S.-Indo relations
13. The Trump administration used Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to
restrict steel and aluminium imports because America’s armed forces and “critical
industries” required a domestic supply of steel.
14. The GSP is a U.S. trade preference program that is designed to promote economic
development by allowing duty-free entry for products from designated beneficiary
countries. “Trump Terminates Preferential Trade Status for India under GSP,”
Hindu Business Line, 1 June 2019, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/trumpterminates-preferential-trade-status-for-india-under-gsp/article27398318.ece.
15. Alyssa Ayres, “Opinion: Don’t Let U.S.-India Trade Differences Escalate into a Trade
War,” NPR Newscast, 27 June 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/06/27/736537671/opiniondont-let-u-s-india-trade-differences-escalate-into-a-trade-war.
16. “Washington cannot indefinitely continue to use the U.S. dollar as an instrument
for diplomatic blackmail and to disrupt world trade, through unilateral monetary
sanctions,” wrote the former High Commissioner to Pakistan, G. Parthasarathy, in a
widely cited article, “Is the United States a ‘Reliable Partner’?” The Hindustan Times,
30 May 2018, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/g-parthasarathy/isthe-united-states-a-reliable-partner/article24038231.ece. See also Samar Saran, “‘In India
We Trust’ Would Be Good US Policy,” Observer Research Foundation, 25 June 2019,
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-we-trust-would-be-good-us-policy-52345/.
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have observed, “Questions about trust, reliability, and motivations are
deeply rooted, and perceptions that the United States eventually comes
to dominate and even bully its strategic partners are real in New Delhi
and beyond.”17
Punitive U.S. economic sanctions on Russia, Iran, and Turkey have
had additional unintended consequences for U.S. national security.
For example, recent U.S. sanctions on Russian energy supplies have
encouraged closer Sino-Russian cooperation in the energy and Arctic
domains. U.S. sanctions against Iran, following America’s withdrawal
from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran Nuclear Accord),
spilled over to India and to Turkey, (both major importers of Iranian
oil), straining the already fragile and important security relationships
with these two countries. “We are not going to cut off our trade ties
with Iran because other countries told us so,” responded the Turkish
minister of economy, Nihat Zeybekci, by way of rebuke.18 In addition,
the imposition of U.S. financial sanctions in 2018 against senior Turkish
government officials over the detention of an American pastor has led
to serious repercussions for the solidarity of the NATO alliance. These
sanctions encouraged Turkey, an important NATO ally, to double down
on its purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense system, and for President
Tayyip Erdoğan to pivot to Beijing to discuss infrastructure investment
opportunities under the BRI.
The Belt & Road Initiative: A Path to Global Pre-Eminence?
Europe-Asia land bridge to form a greater Euro-Asian symbiotic
economic belt and use the countless economic links and common
interests with countries to the West in order to dismantle the U.S.
encirclement of China.—PLA General Liu Yazhou19

In September and October 2013, President Xi Xinping announced an
17. Šumit Ganguly and M. Chris Mason, An Unnatural Partnership? The Future of
U.S.-India Strategic Cooperation (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.
Army War College Press, May 2019), 21, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.
cfm?pubID=1410.
18. Cited in Peter Frankopan, The New Silk Roads: The Present and Future of the World
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2018), 152.
19. Cited in Nadège Rolland, China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications
of the Belt and Road Initiative (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research,
2017), 118.
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ambitious infrastructure development plan to build a “Silk Road Economic Belt” and a “Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road.” Originally called the One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative, in 2016, Beijing changed the name to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI
is central to Xi’s larger vision of the “China Dream,” the great rejuvenation and restoration of the Chinese nation. The overland Silk Road
economic “belt” entails six major infrastructure corridors intended to
connect China’s underdeveloped western provinces to Europe through
Central Asia via roads, bridges, high speed rail and telecommunication networks, pipelines, and other infrastructure.20 The maritime Silk
Road consists of three blue-water economic passages: the China-Indian
Ocean-Africa-Mediterranean passage, the China-Oceania-South Pacific
passage and the China-Europe-Arctic Ocean route. Through massive
investments in port infrastructure throughout the Maritime Silk Road
(deep-sea ports and facilities, industrial free trade zones, energy storage and refining facilities, high-speed railways, etc.), China aims to secure sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) and trade routes for its energy, natural resource, and supply chain needs. Approximately eighty
countries are participating in the estimated $1 trillion BRI, including
countries from the Central Asian republics, the Middle East, South and
South East Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, and most recently, Italy.
The BRI has attracted considerable interest and research by analysts,
scholars, and policymakers in the past few years with proponents arguing whether the BRI is motivated more by Chinese geoeconomics or
geopolitics—or both. Key economic drivers of the BRI include boosting the Chinese economy through spurring regional growth in China’s
western provinces, particularly in Xinjiang; exporting chronic overcapacity in China’s State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the steel, cement,
aluminum, and other construction related industries; stimulating demand for Chinese goods through the global expansion of exports and
direct foreign investments by its SOE and private sector companies;
promoting Chinese industry and technology standards in the energy,
transportation and telecommunications sectors; and encouraging the
20. The six major overland corridors are the New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic
Corridor, the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, the Bangladesh-ChinaIndia-Myanmar Economic Corridor, the China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic
Corridor, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and the China-Indochina
Peninsula Economic Corridor.
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internationalization of the Chinese currency, the renminbi.21
Other important economic factors shaping China’s BRI are its need
to secure energy resources from neighboring Russia and Central Asia,
Venezuela, and Brazil; as well as minerals and metals from Chile, Argentina, and Peru in Latin America, and Zimbabwe and the Democratic
Republic of Congo in Africa.22 Concurrent to secure energy and natural
resource supplies, is China’s goal to develop alternative maritime transportation routes to reduce dependence on the trans-shipment of these
vital supplies from the Middle East via the Malacca Straits to China.
Mitigating the so-called “Malacca Dilemma” is a top priority for Beijing
as this artery is a strategic vulnerability since 80 percent of China’s oil
imports, for example, pass through this narrow passage and the United
States dominates this SLOC upon which China’s trade is reliant.23
Speaking at the opening ceremony of the 2017 Belt and Road Forum,
Xi promised that the BRI would help “foster a new type of international relations featuring win-win cooperation,” and that “exchange will
replace estrangement, mutual learning will replace clashes, and coexistence will replace a sense of superiority.” He claimed that “in pursuing
the Belt and Road Initiative, we will not resort to outdated geopolitical
maneuvering.”24 Despite the rhetoric, one can well argue that the BRI
is indeed a geopolitical platform from which to assert PRC’s influence
with its neighbors. China has used BRI enticements to try to soften its
strained relations with Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam over its militarization of the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands and territori21. See Rolland, China’s Eurasian Century; Peter Cai, Understanding China’s Belt and Road
Initiative (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, March 2017); Gal Luft,
Silk Road 2.0: US Strategy toward China’s Belt and Road Initiative (Washington, DC:
The Atlantic Council, 2017); Frankopan, New Silk Roads; CSIS website (National
competing visions for connecting Asia), https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/
competing-visions/.
22. Agnia Grigas, The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2017), and Sharon Burke and Wyatt Scott, “Phase Zero: China’s Natural
Security, New America, May 2019.
23. Elizabeth Rosenberg, David Gordon, Ellie Maruyama, and Alexander Sullivan, The
New Great Game: Changing Global Energy Markets, the Re-Emergent Strategic Triangle,
and U.S. Policy (Center for a New American Security, June 2016), https://www.cnas.org/
publications/reports/the-new-great-game-changing-global-energy-markets-the-re-emergentstrategic-triangle-and-u-s-policy, and Rolland, China’s Eurasian Century.
24. Speech by H. E. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, At the
Opening Ceremony of The Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (14
May 2017), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/14/c_136282982.htm.

Economic Drivers and the Reshaping of the International Security Landscape 35

al maritime disputes in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and the
Sea of Japan.25 The geopolitical use of BRI incentives and controversial
debt diplomacy tactics are also part of a deliberate strategy by China to
coerce countries to break with Taiwan and to recognize Beijing’s “one
China” policy.26
Geoeconomics and geopolitics aside, China’s BRI “win-win” strategy hides more complex geostrategic ambitions. These ambitions, as in
the Chinese game of “Go,” are subtly and intentionally posing major
challenges to the United States and have the potential to alter the balance of power in the international system.27 Nowhere is this more evident than China’s calculated use of the BRI to establish global control
of vital, strategic, maritime chokepoints, ports and sea lanes of communication, as part of a larger military transformation of China into a
“maritime great power,” turning the People’s Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN) into a “two-ocean navy” capable of confronting the U.S. Navy
in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.28
Let’s start with China’s control of key chokepoints under the BRI.
Along the main China-Indian Ocean-Africa-Mediterranean passage,
China has secured major, long-term port agreements with Cambodia,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Djibouti, Tanzania, Namibia, Greece, and Italy. Djibouti is located
roughly 250 miles from the Strait of Hormuz and on the choke point
of Bab el-Bandeb, leading to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Half of
the world’s containerized cargo passes through Djibouti, the only U.S.
naval base in Africa and the primary base of operations for U.S. Africa Command in the Horn of Africa. Chinese berthing agreements in
Malaysia, near the Straits of Malacca (the shortest route between the
Indian and Pacific Oceans), and 99-year lease agreements for the deep
25. Darlene V. Estrada, “The Belt and Road Initiative and Philippine Participation in the
Maritime Silk Road,” CIRSS Commentaries 4, no. 7 (April 2017), http://www.fsi.gov.ph/
the-belt-and-road-initiative-and-philippine-participation-in-the-maritime-silk-road/; Steven
Stashwick, “South China Sea Militarization: Fighters in the Paracels and Combat
Logistics,” The Diplomat, 6 December 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/south-chinasea-militarization-fighters-in-the-paracels-and-combat-logistics/.
26. Examples include the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, The Gambia, Panama, and
the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe.
27. David Lai, Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China’s Strategic
Concept, Shi. SSI Inaugural Monograph on Advancing Strategic Thought Series
(Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 2004), https://fas.org/man/
eprint/lai.pdf.
28. Jonathan D. T. Ward, China’s Vision of Victory (United States: Atlas Publishing, 2019).
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water port in Gwadar, Pakistan, with proximity to the Persian Gulf,
and the port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean are other
notable examples. Along the BRI’s China-Oceania-South Pacific route,
China has made port acquisitions and other infrastructure investments
in Australia, the Maldives, Vanuatu, Oceania, and the Solomon Islands.
Officially, Beijing maintains that these commercial ports are public
goods, providing BRI countries with economic development, trade expansion, or helping to assist China’s U.N. anti-piracy, peacekeeping,
and humanitarian missions. However, some China observers disagree
with this benign characterization. They suggest that the PRC is using
this global network of commercial ports as a precursor to the buildup of
Chinese-controlled military logistics bases to counter U.S. naval dominance and to support future Chinese military operations. According
to James Fanell, a former U.S. Navy Pacific Fleet intelligence officer,
“The PRC is using state-owned companies and politically linked private firms to create a network of facilities designed to provide logistic
support to deployed PLAN warships, employing a ‘first civilian, later
military’ approach to port development across the region.”29
The opaque, “civilian, later military” strategy is well evidenced in
Djibouti, where the initial BRI commercial port agreement and development plan, generously funded through a $1 billion loan by Import-Export Bank of China, has morphed into a heavily fortified PLAN
military base, with thousands of troops expected to deploy there.30 In
recent testimony to the U.S. Congress, General Thomas Waldhauser,
AFRICOM’s commanding officer, said that U.S. Africa Command “considers access to Djibouti and to critical global shipping lanes through
the Bab-el-Mandeb strait an imperative to ensure U.S. strategic interests
29. James E. Fanell, “Asia Rising: China’s Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force
Structure,” Naval War College Review 72, no. 1 (2019), article 4, 9; Keith Johnson and
Dan De Luce, “One Belt, One Road, One Happy Chinese Navy,” Foreign Policy, 17
April 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/17/one-belt-one-road-one-happy-chinesenavy/.
30. According to the state-run news agency Xinhua “the Djibouti base has nothing to
do with an arms race or military expansion, and China has no intention of turning
the logistics center into a military foothold.” Tyler Headley, “China’s Djibouti Base:
A One Year Update,” The Diplomat, 4 December 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/
chinas-djibouti-base-a-one-year-update/. The “first civilian, later military” concept was
developed first by Zhang Jie, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
in 2015. See Devin Thorne and Ben Spevack, Harbored Ambitions: How China’s Port
Investments Are Strategically Reshaping the Indo-Pacific (Washington: Center for
Advanced Defense, 2017), https://c4ads.org/reports, 24.
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are not compromised.”31 Yet, that very access may be under threat as
China could well leverage its hold on roughly 80 percent of the country’s debt to gain control over Djibouti’s ports.32
The PRC strategy of debt trap control has also played out in the strategically located Sri Lankan port of Hambantota in the Indian Ocean.
Struggling to pay its $8 billion debt to Chinese state-controlled BRI
firms, Sri Lanka handed over the port of Hambantota to the China Merchant Ports Holdings Ltd. (CM Ports) on a 99-year lease.33 The Sri Lankan government’s decision to move a naval unit to Hambantota, and
Beijing’s overtures to “gift” a frigate to the Sri Lankan Navy, creates opportunities for the insertion of PLAN training and support teams at Sri
Lanka’s naval command, which is likely to encourage the positioning
of additional Chinese naval assets at the facility. 34 PLAN submarines
and warships have already made unannounced port visits to Sri Lanka’s second port in Colombo, which is also majority Chinese-owned
and operated.35
There is also growing concern over Chinese BRI investments in the
31. In Djibouti, Camp Lemonnier serves as a vital hub for Security Force Assistance,
operations, and logistics for five combatant commands: U.S. Africa Command, U.S.
Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Special Operations Command,
and U.S. Transportation Command. Statement of General Thomas D. Waldhauser,
United States Marine Corps, Commander United States African Command, before
the Senate Committee on Armed Services (7 February 2019), https://www.armedservices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Waldhauser_02-07-19.pdf.
32. General Thomas D. Waldhauser at HASC Hearing on National Security Challenges
and U.S. Military Activities in Africa, U.S. Africa Commander’s 2018 Posture
testimony to the House Armed Services Committee (6 March 2018), https://www.
africom.mil/media-room/transcript/30469/gen-thomas-d-waldhauser-at-hasc-hearing-onnational-security-challenges-and-u-s-military-activities.
33. According to the New York Times, Beijing’s leverage also involved millions in reelection campaign contributions to the then President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s 2015
campaign. Maria Abi-Habib, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port,” New
York Times, 25 June 2018.
34. Abhijit Singh, “China’s Strategic Ambitions Seen in the Hambantota Port in Sri
Lanka,” Hindustan Times (Updated: July 26, 2018); Daniel Kliman, Rush Doshi,
Kristine Lee, and Zack Cooper, Grading China’s Belt and Road (Washington: Center
for a New American Security, April 2019); and “China’s Massive Belt and Road
Initiative” (Backgrounder by Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, Council on
Foreign Relations, updated as of 21 May 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/
chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.
35. Plamen Tonchev, “Along the Road Sri Lanka’s Tale of Two Ports,” European Union
Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), April 2018, 4, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/
default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief%204%20Sri%20Lanka_0.pdf.
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Pakistani port of Gwadar. Geostrategically, Gwadar provides China
with critical access to the Indian Ocean, without having to go through
the Malacca Straits; it links China’s landlocked western provinces via
the BRI China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Pakistan owes China some
$30 billion in BRI loans, and many analysts predict that China will
leverage that debt as a means of ensuring the use Gwadar to expand
and strengthen its maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific region, as a
resupply base for the PLAN, and to service naval power projection in
the Arabian sea.36
Hambantota and Gwadar are but two crucial pieces of China’s BRI
game of “Go” to form a network of important maritime access points—
the so-called “String of Pearls” strategy—in the Indian Ocean. And
while these two port developments pose immediate strategic challenges for India, naval strategist Alfred Mahan predicts that, “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia, the destiny of the world will
be decided on its waters.”37
The impacts of China’s Belt and Road Initiative on the international
security environment are enormous and wide ranging. First and foremost, the BRI is challenging U.S. military dominance in the Indo-Pacific
region. Beijing’s use of ports for PLAN overseas based along the Maritime Silk Road, combined with likely deployments of the DF-26 anti-carrier ballistic missile system, will undoubtedly threaten U.S. force
projection and sustainment capabilities and operations in the Korean
Peninsula, Taiwan, and beyond. The BRI will be an effective mechanism
to contain and deter India’s military reach on land and at sea. Whether
China’s activities in the Indian Ocean will encourage the much needed
“strategic convergence” between India and United States, as advocated
by James Mattis, secretary of defense from 2017 to 2019, remains to be
seen.38 Additionally, China’s future control of SLOCs threatens the energy and critical supply chains for forward deployed U.S. and NATO
forces.
Despite these ongoing shifts in the tectonic plates underpinning the
36. Fanell, “Asia Rising.” In 2015 the PRC announced that it would sell eight
submarines to Pakistan in a deal worth up to $6 billion.
37. Amrita Jash, book review of India’s Ocean: The Story of India’s Bid for Regional
Leadership by David Brewster, Strategic Analysis 39, no. 4 (2015): 466–67, https://doi.org/
10.1080/09700161.2015.1047224.
38. Transcript of testimony by Secretary of Defense James Mattis before the U.S. Senate
Armed Service Committee, “Political and Security Situation in Afghanistan,” 3
October 2017, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/17-82_10-03-17.pdf.
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international balance of power, the U.S. and Europe, and by extension,
NATO, have been surprisingly slow to recognize BRI’s impacts. The
current U.S. administration has been focused on resolving its trade war
with Beijing. Europe is fractured by Brexit, and by rising anti-EU movements in Italy, Germany, Poland, and Hungary. How the U.S. and Europe can devise a coherent strategy to counter China’s ascendance via
the BRI in these circumstances remains unclear. Certainly the belated
rebalance to the Indo-Pacific by the administration, and Washington’s
promise of $113 million in new initiatives for the region are steps in the
right direction.39 The Trump administration’s recent Blue Dot Network
(BDN) initiative, with allies Japan and Australia, is the first major U.S.led effort to redress the U.S.-China geoeconomic rivalry instigated by
the BRI. The BDN is a welcome instrumental means to advantage the
United States in its larger geostrategic competition with China and to
signal its re-engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.
The Weaponization of Critical Infrastructure
A third economic driver reshaping the global international security
landscape is the increasing use by Western adversaries of critical infrastructure (CI) as a weapon of choice.40 U.S. and NATO critical infrastructure, particularly the energy, transportation, information, communications, and the defense industrial base (DIB) sectors are being targeted
as a potential means to disrupt logistics supply chains, and undermine
military capability, readiness and force projection. As the 2017 National
Security Strategy recognized, “The vulnerability of U.S. critical infrastructure to cyber, physical, and electromagnetic attacks means that adversaries could disrupt military command and control, banking and financial operations, the electrical grid, and means of communication.”41
In some cases adversaries are penetrating the critical infrastructure of
39. “U.S. Plans $113 Million ‘Down Payment on a New Era’ in Indo-Pacific: Pompeo,”
Reuters, 30 July 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-pompeo/u-s-plans-113million-down-payment-on-a-new-era-in-indo-pacific-pompeo-idUSKBN1KK1NP?il=0.
40. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security uses the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001
statutory definition of CI as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital
to the United States that their incapacity or destruction…would have a debilitating
impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or
any combination of those matters.” See section 1016(e) of the USA Patriot Act of 2001
(42 U.S.C. 5195c (e)).
41. National Security Strategy of the United States of America (December 2017), 12, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
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the U.S. and its allies to identify vulnerabilities for later exploitation. In
many other cases, CI is being “weaponized” by Russia, China, Iran, and
North Korea as part of their conduct of hybrid warfare.42
There are three domains where critical infrastructure is being used
as a weapon and impacting international security in overt and more
subtle ways. The first is the Russian Federation’s weaponization of CI
in Ukraine, arguably as a testing ground for the development of larger
hybrid warfare capabilities.43 The second is the penetration by Russia
and other adversaries of the U.S. energy sector, particularly the U.S.
electric grid, as a means of undermining future U.S. warfighting capabilities. The third is China’s strategic use of foreign investments to
infiltrate and control key CI segments of the American and European
defense industrial bases.
Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine
The linkage between CI as an instrument of hybrid warfare has been on
open display in the Ukraine, where a Russian cyber army, closely affiliated with the Kremlin, has systematically attacked almost every sector
of Ukraine’s infrastructure since 2014.44 Most notable were the attacks
against Ukraine’s electric grid in December 2015, which left large parts
of the capital city, Kyiv, and the western region of Ivano-Frankivsk in
the dark, followed by another, more technologically sophisticated, attack in 2016 on one of Kyiv’s transmission substations. These attacks
were set against the backdrop of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea
and continued military clashes in the eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions in Ukraine.
Governments and cyber experts attribute these cyber-attacks to a
Russian group known as Sandstorm, which deployed its BlackEnergy
malware to penetrate specialized computer architectures that are used
for remotely managing physical industrial equipment and control systems.45 What was most worrying to these cyber experts was that Sand42. Daniel R. Coates, Worldwide Threat Assessment, Statement for the Record, 13 February
2018, https://www.dni.gov/files/docments/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA-UnclassifiedSSCI.pdf.
43. Andy Greenberg, “How an Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab for Cyberwar,”
Wired, 20 June 2018, https://wired.com/story/russian-hackers-attack-ukraine/.
44. Kim Zetter, “Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid,”
Wired, 3 March 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hackukraines-power-grid/.
45. Andy Greenberg, “Your Guide to Russia’s Infrastructure Hacking Teams,” Wired, 12
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storm, and another Russian-backed group called Energetic Bear, had already targeted NATO networks, and had compromised the computers
of American and European electric and water utility companies with
the same Trojan malware. This malware could provide these hackers
with enough control to induce “blackouts on American soil at will.”46
Reflecting at the time of the Ukraine electric grid attacks, one cyber
forensic expert warned that “An adversary that had already targeted
American energy utilities had crossed the line and taken down a power
grid… It was an imminent threat to the United States.”47
The repeated cyber-attacks against Ukraine’s CI as part of its hybrid warfare strategy serve Russian interests in several strategic ways.
These attacks demonstrate the coercive power that Russia has exerted
as part of its destabilization campaign against Ukraine. This campaign
is designed to keep Ukraine in Russia’s continued orbit, by preventing
Ukraine from reducing its energy dependence on Russia and thwarting
Kyiv’s aims of integration with the European Union. Critical infrastructure, particularly in the energy realm, as a tool of Russian coercion, is
certainly not lost on NATO and the EU. Since 2006 Russia’s Gazprom
has repeatedly halted gas supplies in the midst of winter to Ukraine, a
vital trans-shipment country with pipelines to Europe, over disputes
on gas pricing. The upshot is that European countries, and NATO belatedly realize the vulnerabilities associated with their dependency on
Russian gas supplies.48
Another rationale for Russian CI attacks in Ukraine is to test, prove,
and refine Moscow’s cyber warfare capabilities against a country that
is unable to retaliate. In essence, use Ukraine as a test bed for Russian
hybrid warfare in future global conflicts, which includes the United
States.49 By turning the power off in Kyiv, Moscow is demonstrating
December 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/russian-hacking-teams-infrastructure.
46. Energetic Bear has other associated names: DragonFly, Koala, and Iron Liberty. See
Andy Greenberg, “Hackers Gain Direct Access to US Power Grid Controls,” Wired, 6
September 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/hackers-gain-switch-flipping-access-to-uspower-systems/.
47. Greenberg, “How an Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab for Cyberwar.”
48. Europe could not survive thirty days without Russian gas in the winter; its
vulnerabilities will only increase with Nord Stream coming online. Certain NATO
countries, such as Germany, are more dependent on Russian energy supplies,
leading President Trump at the 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels to tweet, “What
good is NATO if Germany is paying Russia billions of dollars for gas and energy?”
49. Much attention has been paid to Russian influence operations and hacking activities
during in the U.S. 2016 presidential election. For the purpose of this paper, the
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to Washington its ability and willingness to weaponize CI to challenge
America’s military might both at home and overseas.
Russian Penetration of the U.S. Energy Sector
In March 2018, the FBI and DHS confirmed that Russian government
cyber hacker teams had actively “targeted government entities and
multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, including the energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation, and critical manufacturing sectors.”50 The Russian cyber-attack teams included Sandstorm,
Dragonfly, and Palmetto Fusion, with some attributed to gaining remote access to actual industrial control systems and U.S. energy sector
networks, including a Kansas nuclear power facility.51 Cyber-attacks
against the U.S. power grid have continued. The group Triton or Xenotime have compromised electric facility safety systems in order to cause
potential plant disruption and damage. According to a researcher at
the U.S. cybersecurity firm Dragos, surveillance of the U.S. electric grid
is, “indicative of the preliminary actions required to set up for a future
intrusion and potentially a future attack.”52
Penetration of the U.S. electric grid has sounded alarm bells in the
Pentagon. DoD installations and associated infrastructure depend on
continuous and assured power to support military missions and operations both in the continental United States (CONUS) and outside
contiguous U.S. (OCONUS).53 Any extended loss of power is what has
been acknowledged as a glaring national security “Achilles heel.” The
United States must expect adversaries to disrupt the flow of power,
author would like to highlight the vulnerabilities to U.S. CONUS operations of
Russian cyber penetration of America’s electric grid.
50. Alert TA18-074A, “Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and
Other Critical Infrastructure,” U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 15 March 2018, https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/
TA18-074A.
51. Greenberg, “Your Guide to Russia’s Infrastructure Hacking Teams.” This
investigation led in part to U.S. Department of Treasury economic sanctions against
five Russian entities and fifteen Russian individuals in March 2018.
52. Andy Greenberg, “The Highly Dangerous ‘Triton’ Hackers Have Probed the US
Grid,” Wired, 14 June 2019, https://www.wired.com/story/triotnhackers-scan-us-powergrid/.
53. Note that OCONUS does not refer to foreign countries but to the states and
territories that are not part of the contiguous forty-eight states and the District
of Columbia, i.e., Alaska, Hawai‘i, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the
Northern Mariana Islands.
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with cascading impacts on transportation, communications, and other
CI services upon which the U.S. military depends. After all, for decades
the former Soviet Union carefully studied the U.S. homeland and its
warfighting infrastructure for infiltration and targeting purposes. The
game-changing nature for today, however, is that with cyberspace, and
the merging of CI with information and communications technologies,
our adversaries no longer require kinetic solutions and direct military
confrontation with the United States. Rather, as one senior DoD official conceded, “The smart thing to do is to maneuver around those
forces, attack the critical infrastructure, the facilities here in the United
States on which we depend to deploy, operate and sustain our forces
abroad.”54 The use of CI by our adversaries as a means of hybrid warfare has larger international security implications and threatens true
U.S. deterrence, for: “It does not matter how capable, how well trained
or how advanced a nation’s forces are if they can’t get to the front in
time.”55
Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Western Industrial Bases
China, in particular, has made it a national goal to acquire foreign
technologies to advance its economy and to modernize its military…It is comprehensively targeting advanced U.S. technologies
and the people, the information, businesses and research institutions that underpin them.—Kari A. Bingen, U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence.56

To achieve this national goal, China has used an effective combination
of industrial, trade, and investment policies. Initiated in 2015, Beijing’s
“Made in China 2025” industrial policy directs Chinese technological
54. Dr. Paul Stockton, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Americas’ Security Affairs, cited in Cynthia E. Ayers and Kenneth D. Chrosniak,
“Terminal Blackout: Critical Electric Infrastructure Vulnerabilities and Civil-Military
Resiliency,” Center for Strategic Leadership and Development, U.S. Army War
College, Issue Paper, vol. 1–13, (October 2013), CSL-5.
55. Omar Lamrani, “Why Logistics Will Be the Key to Any U.S. Conflict with Russia and
China,” Stratfor, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/why-logistics-will-be-key-any-usconflict-ussia-and-china/.
56. Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. Congress, “Military
Technology Transfer: Threats, Impacts, and Solutions for the Department of
Defense” (21 June 2018), https://armedservices.house.gov/2018/6/military-technologytransfer-threats-impacts-and-solutions-for-the-department-of-defense.
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development in important dual use areas: artificial intelligence, quantum computing, robotics, aerospace, autonomous and new energy vehicles, communications, and other emerging industries. China analysts
have largely focused on the PRC’s illicit means to acquire these technologies through espionage, cyber operations, evasion of U.S. export control restrictions, and through coercive intellectual property sharing requirements on foreign companies investing in the Chinese market. Less
attention has been paid to Beijing’s “Go Out” strategy of promoting
Chinese state-owned and private sector champions to invest overseas,
particularly in the United States and Europe, in key defense industrial
base sectors.57
This inattention changed dramatically with the recent bid by Huawei,
a Chinese tech giant, to provide 5G information and communications
technology (ICT) networks in the United States and Europe. The case
of Huawei poses a number of concerns for the physical infrastructure
security of the defense industrial base (DIB) in the U.S. and Europe. For
example: Should the U.S. and Europe be dependent on China to provide a key dual-use DIB infrastructure? Will China control the world’s
wireless and telecommunications backbone? What is the true nature of
the relationship between Huawei, nominally a private sector company, and the government in Beijing? Will the PRC use 5G networks as a
“Trojan horse” for commercial and military espionage purposes?
The response by the Trump administration to Huawei was swift and
decisive. It banned Huawei from all federal contracts for telecommunications equipment and services, and U.S. government contractors are
prohibited from doing business with Huawei as well.58 In December
2018, Huawei’s Chief Financial Officer, Meng Wanzhou, who is also the
daughter of the company’s founder, Ren Zhengfei, was arrested in Canada at the request of the United States. The U.S. Department of Justice
filed formal charges of fraud, obstruction of justice, and theft of trade
secrets against Huawei in January 2019. In addition, the administra57. Outward foreign investments and acquisitions have been assisted by Beijing-backed
investment vehicles, such as the China Investment Corporation, and massive
sovereign wealth funds. See “The White House,” How China’s Economic Aggression
Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World
(White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, June 2018).
58. The 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (signed into law in August 2018),
and April 2018, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) proposed rule:
“Protecting against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain
through FCC Programs.”

Economic Drivers and the Reshaping of the International Security Landscape 45

tion has exerted considerable pressure on its allies within the Five Eyes
intelligence community to ban Huawei from their respective markets.
Concerned about the larger implications of Chinese investments and
other adversarial activities involving the U.S. DIB infrastructure, the
Trump administration issued Executive Order 13806, which mandated an assessment of and recommendations for strengthening the U.S.
innovation, critical manufacturing, and supply chain resiliency for
the DIB. That assessment concluded, “All facets of the manufacturing
and defense industrial base are currently under threat, at a time when
strategic competitors and revisionist powers appear to be growing in
strength and capability.” 59 In addition, the administration expanded the
powers of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States,
an interagency committee in the U.S. Department of the Treasury that
reviews the national security implications of foreign investments.
European countries have been slow to recognize the potential security vulnerabilities and dependencies created by Chinese investments
under the BRI in defense-related infrastructure. China has launched the
17+1 Initiative, a BRI forum which includes 12 EU member states and
five Balkan countries, with major infrastructure loans going toward the
construction of high-speed rail networks, port infrastructure, communications, bridges and highways. Chinese companies have acquired
shipping terminals in Spain, Italy and Belgium. Major Chinese port
infrastructure projects include the Italian ports of Trieste, Venice, and
Ravenna, as well as the ports of Piraeus in Greece, Capodistria in Slovenia, and Fiume in Croatia.
Chinese involvement in key infrastructure projects in Europe (particularly in southern Europe and the Balkans), has garnered increasing
concern by NATO regarding Beijing’s intentions. A recent NATO report
emphasized the potential consequences for European security: “The
degree and impact of foreign direct investment in strategic sectors—
such as airports, sea ports, energy production and distribution, or telecoms—in some Allied nations raises questions about whether access
and control over such infrastructure can be maintained, particularly in
a crisis when it would be required to support the military.”60 As with
59. Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply
Chain Resiliency of the United States: Report to President Donald J. Trump by the
Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806 (September 2018), 8.
60. NATO, “Resilience: The First Line of Defense,” 27 February 2019, https://www.nato.int/
docu/review/articles/2019/02/27/resilience-the-first-line-of-defence/index.html.
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issues of energy dependency, NATO is grappling with dependency on
host country infrastructure and the vulnerabilities this poses for logistics, secure communications, and other requirements to enable mobilization, force projection, and sustainment.
Chinese BRI investments in Europe are part of a deliberate strategy
by Beijing to target the economically weaker EU NATO members to
draw them into China’s economic orbit. Indeed, this strategy appears
to be having some success. Hungary and Greece sought to block any
direct reference to China in an EU statement regarding the ruling by
the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague that struck down the
PRC’s legal claims in the South China Sea.61 Sounding the alarm over
the long-term implications of European BRI investments on EU unity,
Germany’s foreign minister forewarned, “If we do not succeed for example in developing a single strategy towards China, then China will
succeed in dividing Europe.”62 The fact that Italy formally joined the
BRI in March 2019 further highlights the failure of the EU to provide a
counterbalance and comprehensive strategic approach to Chinese use
of investments in defense critical infrastructure to undermine European economic security, upon which the NATO alliance relies.
A Changing International Order? Implications for the Security
Environment
This chapter has identified three major economic drivers that are altering the topography of the international rules-based order, with varying implications for the security environment. With the erosion of the
multilateral world economic order, caused in large part by the Trump
administration’s “America First” economic policies, it remains to be
seen what will be the full, long-term impact on the global security landscape. The retreat of U.S. leadership over the continued functioning of
the rules-based order has created an enormous vacuum—one that China appears carefully maneuvering to fill. The Trump administration’s
use of aggressive trade, investment, and other geoeconomic tools have
been at the behest of national security objectives, punishing adversaries
but straining relations with important allies and strategic partners in
61. Erik Brattberg and Etienne Soula, “Europe’s Emerging Approach to China’s Belt
and Road Initiative” (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 18
October 2019), https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/19/europe-s-emerging-approach-tochina-s-belt-and-road-initiative-pub-77536.
62. Cited in Frankopan, New Silk Roads, 172.
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the process.
The second driver re-shaping the international order is China’s Belt
and Road Initiative. Arguably the BRI may prove to be the most significant geostrategic strategy of the twenty-first strategy. As discussed
above, the BRI as a geoeconomic tool is dramatically restructuring the
international political economy in ways that have yet to be fully understood. The BRI is a brilliant and flexible strategic global framework.
Outwardly, it ensures the continued economic growth of the Chinese
economy and economic ascendance globally. At the subterranean level,
it also provides a means for regional hegemony within Asia, and signals the U.S. and Europe of its near peer ambitions.
The use of critical infrastructure as a weapon by Western adversaries is an important economic driver that has received little attention in
international security circles. As we have seen, CI can be used as an
instrument of hybrid warfare among weaker states such as the Ukraine,
and against superpowers such as the United States. Whether through
the use of cyber-attacks against a country’s infrastructure, or more covertly through surveillance and penetration, or via acquisitions and
direct foreign investment, targeting of CI enables our adversaries to
shape and control vital DIB infrastructure upon which U.S. and NATO
militaries rely.
Is the international order changing? Absolutely. The economic and
security challenges arising from a weakened international rules-based
order, an ascendant China, fragmentation in the U.S. and Europe are
just emerging. The issue is how nation states will adjust to and manage
these shifts in the international order. Unilaterally, as it would seem
in the cases of both the United States and the United Kingdom? Or
do solutions to these challenges require a more multilateral, collaborative approach as they are beyond any one country’s reach? As Secretary Mattis concluded in his letter of resignation in 2018, “While the US
remains the indispensable nation in the free world, we cannot protect
our interests or serve that role effectively without maintaining strong
alliances and showing respect to those allies.”63

63. James N. Mattis, Secretary of Defense, resignation letter (20 December 2018), https://
media.defense.gov/2018/Dec/20/2002075156/-1/-1/1/LETTER-FROM-SECRETARYJAMES-N-MATTIS.PDF.
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Perspectives on a Changing World
Order: The Americas
Ferry de Kerckhove

Introduction
The major crises affecting the Americas south of the Rio Grande have
worldwide reverberations even if the United States remains the ultimate prism through which light or darkness predominates. Venezuela
has become a world crisis of major proportion. The fate of the Colombian government’s agreement with the FARC guerrillas may be local
to that country, but it has major implications for drug trafficking and
regional stability. The destiny of the regime of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua is significant for the future of the Central America and Caribbean
region. The situation in the “unholy triangle” of Guatemala, Honduras
and El Salvador is a humanitarian crisis of major resonance for the migration crisis at the Mexican–U.S. border. Violence is a way of life in
many of these countries. Haiti is most commonly described as a “basket case,” an epithet used for decades. The elephant in every room of
each country of the region is the U.S. And while the seismic disruption
brought about by the arrival of President Donald J. Trump in transatlantic and transpacific relations, notably with America’s allies, is more
salient, the asymmetric relations between the U.S. and Latin American
countries writ large is more dominating, yet less visible. The uncertainty regarding the president’s interest in the region is a major security
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concern. A changing world it is, but the exact impact is hard to measure.
The Security of Latin America: It’s Still the Economy, Stupid
While the situation in Venezuela constitutes the most serious situation
in Latin America from all standpoints—humanitarian, security, political, economic, and social—and as such would deserve pride of place
in any survey of the region, it is still a subset of what can be described
as a general worsening of economic conditions in Latin America. The
catchphrase embraced by Bill Clinton in 1992 for his successful bid for
the presidency—“It’s the economy, stupid”—applies to any assessment
of Latin American security. Indeed, as the World Economic Forum puts
it: “After a decade of high growth thanks to the commodity super cycle,
Latin America has lost its glow: economic growth is near zero, equality gains have stalled, and the political landscape is changing.”1 While
economic integration has increased for the good, poor transportation
and logistics infrastructure, non-tariff barriers to internal trade, and
regulatory constraints slow down the process to the detriment of competitiveness in an increasingly uncertain world economy.2 Importantly, Latin America remains the most unequal region of the world,3 an
inequality exacerbated by the slowing down of the Chinese economy,
which has been important for investment and economic development
in the region.4
Latin America is also the most violent region of the world. As Rachel
Kleinfeld has noted in her exploration of extreme violence in contemporary global politics, paradoxically “The most violent places in the world
today are not at war.” Exacerbated by a process she calls “decivilizing,”
1. Keith Breene, “5 Things to Know about Latin America’s Economy,” World Economic
Forum, 19 January 2016, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/5-things-to-knowabout-latin-america-s-economy/.
2. Anabel González, “3 Challenges Latin American Economies Must Overcome to
Boost Intraregional Trade,” World Economic Forum, 27 March 2017, https://www.
weforum.org/agenda/2017/03/3-challenges-latin-american-economies-must-overcome-toboost-intraregional-trade
3. Alicia Bárcena Ibarra and Winnie Byanyima, “Latin America Is the World’s Most
Unequal Region. Here’s How to Fix It,” World Economic Forum, 17 January 2016,
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/inequality-is-getting-worse-in-latin-america-heres-how-to-fix-it/.
4. Marjo Koivisto, “Top Trends in Economics and Finance in Latin America,” World
Economic Forum, 16 June 2016, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/top-trends-ineconomics-and-finance-in-latin-america/.
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violence expands to engulf some societies: “Mexico had more violent
deaths from 2007 to 2014 than Iraq and Afghanistan combined. In 2015,
more Brazilian civilians died violently than Syrians. The devastating
violence engulfing places buckling under gangs, drug cartels, and organized crime can seem hopeless.”5 While the U.S. continues to fail to address gun violence at home, the response of other governments across
the hemisphere continues to emphasize repression, confinement, and
prison overcrowding. But the effectiveness of such an approach leaves
a lot to be desired against armed militias in Colombia, Brazil, and most
of Central America, where gangs persist in Honduras and El Salvador.
In Mexico, it is the multiplicity of police forces which reduces the effectiveness of the overall operations and encourages their penetration by
organized crime.
Even before the onset of the novel coronavirus (covid-19) pandemic,
health was also a growing fault-line in Latin America: As Jorge Alejandro García Ramirez, CEO of BIVE, a social business delivering healthcare in Colombia, has argued, the key challenges to health in Latin
America include access to health services; epidemiological transition
and chronic non-communicable diseases; training and distribution of
human resources in health; inequalities in health systems and coverage;
and the system for healthcare financing which concentrates on disease
and not health.6
Central America and the Caribbean seem to be less affected by the
broader changes in the region, but countries in this region have problems of their own. Puerto Rico has suffered considerably thanks to massive hurricanes and limited support from the Trump administration.
Guatemala suffers from political instability and several countries have
high levels of indebtedness. Panama has not recovered from a broadbased slowdown. But the whole region hurts from the impact of socio-political instability in El Salvador. As the U.S. appears to reduce its
5. Rachel Kleinfeld, A Savage Order: How the World’s Deadliest Countries Can Forge
a Path to Security (New York: Vintage Books, 2019); for a discussion, see https://
carnegieendowment.org/2018/11/28/savage-order-event-7014. However, as Kleinfeld
herself notes, “recivilizing” is possible, as the case of Medellin suggests. See also
Juan José Pocaterra, “Six Powerful Lessons from the Transformation of Medellin,”
World Economic Forum, 16 February 2016, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/02/6powerful-lessons-from-the-transformation-of-medellin.
6. Jorge Alejandro García Ramirez, “These Are the 5 Health Challenges Facing
Latin America, World Economic Forum, 16 June 2016, https://www.weforum.org/
agenda/2016/06/these-are-the-5-health-challenges-facing-latin-america/.
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security and humanitarian contribution to the region, the impact will
be felt increasingly, and any growth momentum is likely to ease.7
In short, the security/stability outlook does not look promising from
an economic standpoint.
Political Developments and Insecurity: Is There a Correlation?
There is a consensus that a swing to the right has taken place in Latin
America. We have seen such a swing take place in Brazil under Jair Bolsonaro, of course, but also in Chile, Argentina, and Colombia. This shift
followed fifteen years of left parties gaining power in most of the region
on the strength of what has been called a “pink tide,”8 supported by
the “bonanza” of rising prices for raw materials that allow greater social investments. The case of Mexico, as an emerging economic powerhouse, is special in light of its unique relationship with the U.S. and also
Canada, which may explain as much its “delayed” switch to the left
after the exhaustion of its fissured right. But these generalizations call
for a clearer definition of “left” and “right” in Latin American politics.
The left is defined in progressive terms on social issues and the need
to improve the lot of the poor, notably through better public services
and financial transfers. The president of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López
Obrador—or AMLO, as he is widely known—may have initially scared
the average American with his “socialist” views, but, by all accounts,
his approach is that of a moderate who emphasizes inclusion and conciliation. The Kirchners in Argentina and Tabaré Vàzquez in Uruguay
are not very different. As to the Latin American right, it tends to reflect
traditional, often Catholic values, with a drift towards evangelism, not
unlike the U.S. Such an approach is not insensitive to the needs of the
poor but emphasizes economic growth through an “appropriate” fiscal and legal framework. Brazil’s president, Jair Bolsonaro, is the new
dominant figure of the current group, with strong Trumpian populist
views and dangerous misogynist and militaristic undertones. But from
a socio-political perspective, he is aligned with Colombia’s former president, Álvaro Uribe, and Mauricio Macri, president of Argentina from
2015 to 2019.
7. “Central America Economic Outlook,” FocusEconomics, 11 July 2018, https://www.
focus-economics.com/regions/CA/news/CA-economic-outlook-july-2018.
8. Manuela Andreoni, “Latin America at the Crossroads Ahead of Big Election Year,”
Fair Observer, 19 April 2018, https://www.fairobserver.com/region/latin_america/latinamerica-elections-brazil-mexico-colombia-paraguay-costa-rica-news-analysis-14211/.
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Yet it is fair to say that beyond this neat divide between left and
right, there is a rise in instability in Latin America which is tied to several factors or trends as societal ills accumulate, including leadership
failings: Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela is only one of them; institutional and governance crisis throughout many countries of the region—
again Nicaragua is not a lone ranger—and failure to redress economic
inequalities despite increased raw growth figures promote instability.
Indeed, neither the left nor the right has been able to do much about
inequalities which has become a worldwide phenomenon although
exacerbated in Latin America. The executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Alicia
Bárcena, has put it squarely: “The Latin America and Caribbean region
has not yet adopted an agenda of social transformation that favors the
change from a culture of privilege to an environment in which equal
rights enable a sense of ownership in a more integrated society.”9
Now, populism in the Americas is not a new phenomenon; indeed,
some might argue that populism was born in Latin America. Yet, according to Joseph Tawney, “Populism is not an intrinsic part of Latin
America. It is a learned one, and it will continue to be a staple of the
Latin American political system until something changes.”10 But when
the president of Brazil calls on the armed forces to “commemorate” the
coup that installed a brutal military dictatorship years ago, it sends a
chilling message about the evolution of values in the continent. It begs
the fundamental question on the dichotomy between failing institutions and the recourse to a “savior” as a substitute to reform as the latter
is seen as synonymous to countervailing power. Indeed, Latin America
is not much different from other regions in the world where illiberalism is growing. Democracy is at a turning point everywhere. Political
systems appear less and less capable of meeting the demands of rapidly
changing societies, leaving behind large swaths of the population and
allowing corruption to become both systemic and endemic. Existing in9. “In Peru, UN Conference Addresses Poverty and Inequality in Latin America and
Caribbean,” UN News, 3 November 2015, https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/11/514442peru-un-conference-addresses-poverty-and-inequality-latin-america-and-caribbean; also see
“Alicia Bárcena Calls for Moving toward a New Development Paradigm and Putting
an End to Inefficient and Unsustainable Inequality,” Barnacle News, 13 February 2018,
https://www.thebarnaclenews.com/alicia-barcena-calls-moving-toward-new-developmentparadigm-putting-end-inefficient-unsustainable-inequality/.
10. Joseph Tawney, “Populism in Latin America,” International Policy Digest, 12 January
2018, https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/01/12/populism-latin-america/.
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stitutional frameworks or their mauling in the face of heightened anxieties have tended to both deepen divisions and stifle initiatives.
The lack of faith in a country’s institutions, when generalized within
the overwhelming majority of a population, not only produces a Hugo
Chavez, a lesser evil, and a Maduro, a systemic catastrophe, but destroys the resilience, the fibre, and the social consensus of that country,
leaving it open to both domestic strongmen/women’s whims and foreign interference. While one cannot be much surprised by Bolsonaro
having branded his opponent, Fernando Hadad, a “communist,” it is
somewhat disconcerting to have AMLO talk about the end of neo-liberalism in his inauguration speech. The 2016 United States election had
given us clear examples of words of hatred to bolster the Trump campaign. Brazil made such polarization essential electoral tools. Chavez,
Trump, and Bolsonaro, among others, have often made lies the essence
of the messages. What is worrisome for the sustainability of democracy is that in a world of growing inequalities, the parties who express
the greatest commitment to reducing them through government social
programs are usually on the left. In times of slower growth, they fail
miserably to fulfill such promises, bringing the right back to power.
The return to the right in Latin America in and of itself would not be
a calamity if it was not accompanied by a reduction of the democratic
fibre which Freedom House was celebrating a number of years ago.
This being said, historically, on the public expenditure side, as ably explained by Jean-Louis Martin, the policies of the left-wing governments
were hardly more reformist.11 Tax evasion is a common feature in Latin
America! In fact, between left and right, there is a considerable consensus on economic and financial orthodoxy, including the general acceptance of the principles of the 1989 Washington consensus even when
they flaunted most of them.12
11. Jean-Louis Martin, “Amérique latine: quel virage à droite?” La revue géopolitique, 24
February 2019, https://www.diploweb.com/Amerique-latine-quel-virage-a-droite.html.
12. As enunciated by John Williamson in 1989, the “Washington consensus” included
fiscal discipline; reordering public spending priorities from subsidies to broad-based
provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor services like primary education, primary
healthcare and infrastructure investment; tax reform, broadening the tax base and
adopting moderate marginal tax rates; liberalizing interest rates that are market
determined and positive (but moderate) in real terms; competitive exchange rates;
trade liberalization; any trade protection to be provided by low and relatively
uniform tariffs; liberalization of inward foreign direct investment; privatization of
state enterprises; deregulation: abolition of regulations that impede market entry
or restrict competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental and
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The Role of the United States in the Region
A 2013 survey of perceptions of the U.S. in Latin America revealed that
“Having moved out of the perspective that saw the United States in simplistic terms, Latin Americans have adopted a more pragmatic view of
their northern neighbor and its place in the world, understanding that
U.S. policy is driven by its own interests. And, whether because they
see U.S. power as waning or because, more than ever before, emerging
powers all around the world present a viable alternative to U.S. influence, Latin Americans decreasingly look to the United States.”13
But when Latin Americans look more closely at the U.S., it is seen
as an inevitable partner, as an ally of uncertain reliability, and above
all as an irascible giant whose unilateral decisions are taken with little
consideration for the interests of Latin Americans.14 This perception has
of course strengthened since Donald Trump became president. Despite
what is often seen as seismic change in domestic policies between left
and right in Latin American countries—somewhat of an exaggeration—
there is not much clear difference in the handling of relations with the
U.S. In specific cases, such as the Chavez regime, a cloud remains over
the U.S. position at the time of the 2002 attempted coup, which eventually expressed itself in outright hostility towards “Bolivarianism,” particularly Maduro’s. Of course, for Venezuela and Cuba, any closeness
with the U.S. by any Latin American country brings about condemnations of “valets of American imperialism.” Canada has experienced
a very difficult relationship with Brazil in the early 2000s, and while
Bolsonaro and Trump appear to be fellow travellers, it is unavoidable
that at some stage, the U.S. president will find himself at loggerheads
with Brazil, even if the trade balance remains in favour of the U.S.15
With a long history of American military interventions in the western
hemisphere, Latin American countries have certainly not been particularly delighted with Trump’s and Bolton’s allusions to military action
consumer protection grounds, and prudential oversight of financial institutions;
and legal security for property rights. See John Williamson, “A Short History of the
Washington Consensus,” conference paper, Barcelona, 24–25 September 2004, https://
www.piie.com/publications/papers/williamson0904-2.pdf.
13. “The State of U.S. Power: Perceptions Across the Globe,” Critical Conversations, 8
April 2014, https://www.csis.org/analysis/state-us-power-perceptions-across-globe .
14. Martin, “Amérique latine.”
15. United States, Census, “Trade in Goods with Brazil,” https://www.census.gov/foreigntrade/balance/c3510.html.
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against Venezuela, which only ensured a greater Russian presence in
the country with Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, once again
seizing any opportunity to fill a void, with the support of his Chinese
counterpart. Trump’s reversal of Obama’s overture to Cuba in the form
of an offer of “equal partnership” has also disappointed a majority of
Latin American governments.
Today, Latin American leaders are still waiting—not with bated
breath, however—for a Trump visit to some of their countries. Indeed,
other than at the G20 meeting in Argentina, Trump has not visited the
region and opted to send his vice president to the Summit of the Americas. It signals both contempt and lack of interest. Trump’s standing in
the region is very low and his decision to cut off or reduce aid to Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala has increased the dip.
Similarly, the conduct of renegotiation of the North American Free
Trade Agreement of 1992 by the U.S. with its Mexican and Canadian
partners was akin to bullying. Today’s United States–Mexico–Canada
Agreement (as it is known in the United States16) came into force on 1
July 2020, but the “New NAFTA” has not curbed the Trump administration’s protectionist proclivities. What kind of faith can Latin American partners of the U.S. put in their northern partner when Trump,
in an amazing form of blackmail, all of a sudden threatens to impose
tariffs on Mexico to force it to prevent migrants from coming to the U.S.,
or imposes aluminum tariffs on Canada because “Canada was taking
advantage of us, as usual”?17 Such measures only confirm that today’s
America not only has abandoned its self-anointed moral leadership of
the world but that it cannot be trusted even on the altar of “pacta sunt
servanda.”
Such behaviour can only inspire others to follow suit, with the result
that the rule of law risks taking a beating. A new form of international
lawlessness could be the next paradigm with possibly the punting of
implementing international law decisions under the weight of outside
influence, the way the president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte,
despite winning the case against China on the bases of the UN Law of
the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), opted to ignore the judgment of the
16. Each signatory refers to the agreement by a different name: in the U.S., it is the
USMCA. In Mexico, it is T-MEC (Tradato entre México, Estados Unidos y Canadá ).
In Canada it is the Canada–United States–Mexico Agreement (CUSMA)/Accord
Canada–Étas-Unis–Mexique (ACEUM).
17. Ana Swanson and Ian Austen, “Trump Reinstates Tariff on Canadian Aluminum,”
New York Times, 6 August 2020.
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Court and to deal bilaterally with China (to the latter’s delight, since
bilaterally it can exert much fuller pressure on Manila than it could in
multilateral fora). More worrisome in this day and age under Trump’s
rule is the demise of diplomacy and the reliance on military threats as
the preferred tool of influence—threatening Venezuela is but one example. Unwittingly, the Pentagon seems to have become an alternative to
the UN with the U.S. remaining stuck in “forever wars.”
The bottom line is that while for the Americas, Trump matters a lot,
the problem is that there does not seem to be an American policy towards the region—unless of course bulldozing tariffs is considered the
ultimate trait of genius. On the contrary: the Trump administration’s
foreign policy appears to be, in the words of the British ambassador to
Washington, Sir Kim Darroch, “inept” and “dysfunctional” (for which
truth-telling Darroch was called a “pompous fool” by the American
president and de facto declared persona non grata by Washington18).
The Role of China: A More Ominous Threat?
For the past ten years at least, if not more, the West has been pondering
the global role and goals pursued by China. The perennial question is
whether China is a military or an economic threat. Seen in historical
terms, in comparison, the Soviet Union was perceived in a unimodal way as an ominous, nuclear-armed, military threat but was rapidly
assessed as an economic dwarf, victim of its own communist ideology
and its inability to transfer the formidable power of its military technology to the civilian, industrial sector. China is first and foremost a
formidable economic power, capable of leap-frogging the United States
within a decade or two at most. Militarily, it is slowly catching up with
the U.S., but the latter will remain the ultimate superpower for years
to come. In fact, the real Chinese threat is civilizational: the PRC seeks
to present an alternative to the Western liberal order and Chinese influence is increasingly pervasive. Beijing has launched one of the most
amazing and controversial projects in recent history: the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), which harks back to the times of the Silk Road but modernized through massive investment in partner countries. The conventional Western world (other than unconventional Italy already associated with the BRI) has looked somewhat askance at this mechanism
18. William Booth, Josh Dawsey, and Karla Adam, “British Ambassador to U.S. Resigns
after Trump Criticism,” Washington Post, 10 July 2019.
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seen as creating unbreakable debts towards China in exchange for the
investments which beneficiaries have little say on. Yet, in Addis Ababa,
Islamabad, Nairobi, and other recipient capitals, the BRI is often seen
as the best thing that ever happened to them, irrespective of the major
liens it creates.
One of the most staggering figures floated by China is its commitment to invest $500 billion over ten years in Latin America—BRI on
steroids!19 This promise came at a time when the president of the United States was completely ignoring his own backyard—the Western
Hemisphere—and instead living in a kind of alternative reality that
has seen Trump ceding the American position in Latin America to both
Russia and even more so to China. On a day-to-day basis, other than
the psychological impact on Latin American leaders, it may seem incremental, but in the long run, particularly facing China’s determination,
the Trump’s ambivalence and inconsistency could prove profoundly
damaging.
For the Chinese, reality is based on a clear-eyed policy for the region.
As so ably put by Andres Aguilera-Castillo and Juan M. Gil-Barragan,
“One of the key aspects to understand the expansion of Chinese influence in Latin America is the Cross-Strait dispute, basically the People’s
Republic of China aims to reduce the number of political allies of Taiwan, which is seen by the PRC as a “separatist” region. In this sense
Latin America is an important player in the Cross-Strait dynamics given that several countries in the region acknowledge Taiwan as a sovereign nation-state.”20 Through its investments, China seeks to wean the
ten countries in Central America and the Caribbean from maintaining
their diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Out of 192 UN members, only
seventeen countries recognize Taiwan as China’s representative and
therefore have no diplomatic relations with the government in Beijing.
As Chris Horton puts it, “Taiwan’s status is a geopolitical absurdity”
19. For details, see Ben Miller, “China–Latin America 2.0: The Economic Footprint,”
Americas Quarterly, 22 April 2019, https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/china-latinamerica-2-0-the-economic-footprint/. Details for each Latin American country can
be found at https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/china-latin-america-relations. It
demonstrates how rapidly Bolsonaro switched from anti-China statements during
his campaign to embracing China’s economic presence in his country.
20. Andres Aguilera-Castillo and Juan M. Gil-Barragan, “China’s Policy Paper on Latin
America and the Caribbean: Ten Years After, E-International Relations, 5 November
2018, https://www.e-ir.info/2018/11/05/chinas-policy-paper-on-latin-america-and-thecaribbean-ten-years-after/.
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in that “The island is not recognized by its most important ally, faces an
existential threat from territory it claims as its own and its sovereign status is being gradually erased by companies seeking to preserve access to
the world’s largest market.”21 The absurdity of the situation is underscored by the fact that “Washington does not recognize the Republic of
China, yet Taiwan is the U.S.’s 11th-largest trading partner, the world’s
22nd-largest economy, and a crucial link in Silicon Valley’s supply chain”
and the U.S. Taiwan Relations Act is at the heart of the security relations
between the U.S. and the territory.
China’s Latin America policy also aims at countering the appeal and
potential influence in the region of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),
which the U.S. initiated during the Obama administration, but which
Trump withdrew from within days of taking office. Thus, China has
become a pivotal economic partner for Latin American countries with
trade growing from $10 to $270 billion in the last twelve years. Even
when trade is not significant with some of the region’s countries, such
as Central America, China’s investments are dictated by a clear appreciation of their geopolitical significance. China is the second biggest
user of the Panama Canal. What should be of deep concern is that, in
the face of Trump’s vagaries and commercial threats, Chinese leaders
are increasingly effective in portraying China as a reliable economic
partner. Moreover, Chinese leaders have been effective in being able to
hide China’s ruthlessness. In order to ensure the success of this “paint
job,” China cajoles, coerces, or manipulated its diaspora. What all this
means is that despite a deeply repressive regime and an authoritarian
control on a semi-capitalist economy, China is the country that, today,
seems to be embracing free trade, multilateralism, and globalization.
But clearly, this embrace plays out under different terms than the original model created after the Second World War. The real danger for the
region—as elsewhere in the world—is for countries to become so indebted to China that they will have limited option but to increasingly
cave into the demands that will eventually be made. But there are signs
of backlash within the region: “Leaders in Brazil, Ecuador and El Salvador are calling for change, worried about everything from predatory
loans to China’s acquisitions of land and strategic minerals like lithium.
There is growing talk in Latin American diplomatic circles of forming a
21. Chris Horton, “Taiwan’s Status Is a Geopolitical Absurdity, The Atlantic,” 8 July
2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/07/taiwans-status-geopoliticalabsurdity/593371/.
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common front to press China for better terms on trade and investment.
Beijing’s continued support for the Venezuelan dictatorship has also
alienated many.”22 Perhaps not surprisingly given its highly dysfunctional approach to foreign policy, the Trump administration has yet to
take advantage of this backlash.
China’s approach emerged from the disillusion of the 2008 financial
crisis which had many countries of the world questioning the value of
the capitalist/free market model and moving towards a more dirigiste,
state-run, with a controlled “free-market” economy and authoritarian
political systems. The fact that it happens in the U.S. backyard underpins the gravity of the change and may signal an irreversible trend. We
all know and sometime care to admit that the world’s centre of gravity
is definitely turning towards the Indo-Pacific region, but Trump is definitely hastening the process in destroying the foundations of the postwar multilateral system, collective defence, and free-trade regimes.
China, playing the long game, can only benefit from what may be a
point of no return in the weakening of the international liberal order.
Latin America becomes yet another area where Russia, guided by Putin’s tactical genius, more than by an acute strategic vision, can indeed
play a spoiler role.
From Plurilateral Foundations to Transactional Regimes
In the past few years, there has been a noticeable decrease in the importance and influence of regional organizations. In the western hemisphere, the Organization of the American States seems to have lost its
relevance. Already in 2011, there were serious concerns about its ability
to manage crises or to foster economic integration and political consensus. In March 2011, U.S. President Obama forgot the name of the secretary general of the OAS, José Miguel Insulza, during a stop in Chile. As
Anthony Depalma noted, “the televised slip-up struck many as indicative of Washington’s faded view of the OAS. The organization’s reputation is so weakened that bills were introduced in the last U.S. Congress
to demand substantial reforms or withdraw the United States altogether.”23 The recent rejection by many members of the organization of its
22. Brian Winter, “China and Latin America 2.0: What the Next Phase Will Look Like,”
Americas Quarterly, 9 May 2019, https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/china-latinamerica-next-phase-beijing.
23. Anthony Depalma, “Is the OAS Irrelevant?” Americas Quarterly, 5 August 2011,
https://www.americasquarterly.org/node/2756.
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secretary general’s call for a referendum in Venezuela is clear evidence
of its limited role in managing the Venezuelan crisis.24 Although it is
easy to blame multilateral institutions for their failings, one should
never forget that these institutions reflect much more the will—or lack
thereof—of their members than their autonomous ability to act.
At every level on the international scene, multilateral organizations
have been more evident for a lack of consensus than renowned for their
ability to arrive at agreed solutions. This only reflects the growing divisions within and between countries. The ideal of integration is as much
in danger as the concept of multilateralism and is bemoaned as opposed
to looked at as a path to common purpose. Transactional organizations
such as the G20 have become more successful because of their limited
concessions in terms of sovereignty unless specifically related to domestic interests, as evidenced in Osaka which was a success because of
an “à la carte” approach which did not affect the fundamentals.
Canada in the Americas is no different. In the recent crises it has had
to manage, it found little solace among multilateral organizations such
as the UN or the OAS. Other than the renegotiation of NAFTA, which
given the odds was superbly managed by Canada, Justin Trudeau, the
prime minister, has discovered loneliness with the lack of support by
“allies” on the Saudi crisis and Trump’s indifference for the impact on
Canada from his politicization of the arrest of Huawei’s Meng Wanzhou. Although Trudeau did start his mandate with a recommitment to
multilateralism—specifically at the UN and a pledge to win a seat on
the UN Security Council—very little was done in that direction and it
was thus not surprising that Canada lost its bid. It took Ottawa nearly
two years to eventually provide a small contingent and helicopters to
assist the UN mission in Mali. Particularly since the arrival of Donald
Trump, Canada’s foreign policy, assuming one exists in a clear formulation, has been mainly transactional. Bilateral relationships or institutions such as the G20 have been a more important locus for negotiations
than traditional, functionalist organizations.
Canada has had to come to terms with the fact that more than ever
Ottawa can make things happen only with U.S. support. Even Canada’s enhanced links with Europe through the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the European Union has lost its
dynamism in an era of tariffs, trade wars, Brexit, and illiberalism. In
24. Holly K. Sonneland, “Update: Venezuela and the OAS at Odds,” AS/OCA, 17 June
2016, https://www.as-coa.org/articles/update-venezuela-and-oas-odds.
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the past, when Canada did not have that support of the U.S., as for
example on the landmine treaty in 1997, its multilateral partners would
bring it across the finish line. Those days are gone as the U.S. now either attacks or ignores most international organizations that were the
bedrock of the international system on which Canada relied so much.
Trump’s personal attack on Trudeau after the G7 summit in Charlevoix
in June 2018 will remain a scar for long. Canadians know that they must
rely on themselves more than ever before. The Canadian government
knows this too: as Chrystia Freeland, then minister of foreign affairs,
so ably articulated in a June 2017 speech: “To rely solely on the U.S.
security umbrella would make us a client state.”25 Yet we have failed to
articulate a national security strategy or a clear-eyed foreign policy. The
Trudeau government’s efforts to articulate a feminist foreign policy for
Canada is admirable but is not a substitute.
Conclusion: Does It Matter?
The outlook for the Americas may seem less bleak than in more conflict-prone areas or regions but the western hemisphere should be a
beacon for other regions given earlier history and transitions to democracy and human rights charter and important economic and trade relations. However, the U.S. under Donald Trump has profoundly altered
the nature of dialogue. As Professor Daniel Drezner has written: “Foreign policy in the U.S. had always been the last preserve of bipartisanship,”26 and intimately tied to the international liberal order. Those
days are now over. The U.S. is abandoning treaties that were part of
that order, such as the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force treaty (INF)
which is providing Russia a free hand in developing further their own
systems while China feels even less pressure to engage on nuclear disarmament. All this is happening at a time when the U.S. economy, using purchasing power parity (PPP), is no longer as supreme a power as
in the past. While the U.S. continues to have the most powerful military
in the world, Trump’s embrace of Putin and other dictators has blinded
him—and thus his administration—to the external threats which are
the weapons of the future. Russian and Chinese asymmetric capabili25. Chrystia Freeland, “Address by Minister Freeland on Canada’s Foreign Policy
Priorities,” Ottawa, 6 June 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/06/
address_by_ministerfreelandoncanadasforeignpolicypriorities.html.
26. Daniel W. Drezner, “This Time Is Different: Why U.S. Foreign Policy Will Never
Recover,” Foreign Affairs 98, no. 3 (May-June 2019): 10–17.
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ties are some of the instruments which could eventually alter the foundations on which the Organization of American States was conceived.
Yet, the more the U.S. is weakened, the more it should privilege the
Americas as its strategic depth.
But there is another question looming ever larger as the very legitimacy of the existing yet fading international liberal order is under attack. We—whoever we are—are trying to defend it! But nowadays is
the liberal order seen as worth saving in the capitals of the world that
are not part of the old Atlantic world? In Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Bogota, Lima, Quito, and even Santiago, is maintaining the liberal order
a priority when the U.S. president—the leader of the free world, the
leader of the world’s once indispensable country—is presiding over the
slow obliteration of the American Century, and clearly doesn’t care?
As Leonard Cohen warned us hauntingly in 2016: there are some who
want it darker…

5

The Americas: (Dis)Ordering, Security,
and Politics
Kathryn Marie Fisher1

Maintaining favorable regional balances of power in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere.2
Current U.S. foreign policy and independent action may undermine the mechanisms necessary to moderate volatile change and
manage a smooth transition.”3

The first quotation above, from the United States National Defense
Strategy 2018, points to a focus on regional stability and power. The second, in contrast, marks a prescient observation following the Kingston
Conference on International Security 2019 on the destabilizing effects
of U.S. foreign policy. Put together, they present one example of the
competing nature of security-insecurity dynamics at play in the con1. The analyses and conclusions expressed here are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the National Defense University, the United States
Department of Defense, or any other governmental entity.
2. “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge,” 4, https://dod.defense.
gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
3. Conference Report: KCIS 2019 (4 January 2020), https://www.queensu.ca/
kcis/sites/webpublish.queensu.ca.kciswww/files/files/2019/Presentations/
KCIS2019%20Conference%20Report.pdf   
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temporary security environment.
At the time of writing in early January 2020, it is just days from news
that U.S. President Donald Trump ordered an airstrike in Iraq against
Iranian commander Qasem Soleimani. The strike killed Soleimani, head
of Iran’s Quds Force, as well as Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy
commander of the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq (PMF, or Hashd
al-Shaabi). The full consequence of this strike remains unknown, but
possible implications cannot be overstated given ongoing insecurity in
the Middle East, historical tensions with continued political and societal resonance, and potential counterproductive consequences for security to follow.4
The contradiction between President Trump’s domestic calls for less
foreign intervention and a political platform of ending U.S. military
engagement in the Middle East, and unilateral decision to kill one of
the most powerful military leaders from a foreign country in the sovereign territory of another foreign country, in addition to then sending
more military troops, is an example of the continued unpredictability of
U.S. policy. As stated by former U.S. defense secretary and CIA director
Leon Panetta, “Trump has vacillated between his isolationist impulses and his desire to present an image of strength to foes around the
world, leading to confusion about his foreign policy ideology.”5 This
unpredictability is not unnoticed by allies and is of serious concern for
those advocating security cooperation and multilateralism with respect
to international laws and norms. These are cornerstones to the existing
international order, that while shifting6 and no panacea to global security, has provided some sense of stability.
While not of immediate geographic impact for the Americas,7 de-

4. For example, the 5 January 2020 announcement from Iran that they will suspend all
commitments with the JCPOA nuclear agreement.
5. Toluse Olorunnip, Robert Costa, and Anne Gearan, “Trump Plunges toward the
Kind of Middle Eastern Conflict He Pledged to Avoid,” The Washington Post, 4
January 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-plunges-towardthe-kind-of-middle-eastern-conflict-he-pledged-to-avoid/2020/01/03/f0dc0fdc2e45-11ea-9b60-817cc18cf173_story.html?utm_campaign=evening_edition&utm_
medium=Email&utm_source=Newsletter&wpisrc=nl_evening&wpmm=1.
6. For example, economic challenges by a rising China, military challenges to existing
organizations such as NATO by Turkey and Russia, and the growing role of nonstate actors such as multinational corporations, non-state armed groups, and cities.
7. For the purpose of this analysis, “the Americas” refers to North America, Central
America, South America, and the Caribbean.
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spite discussions of proxy actors in the hemisphere supportive of Iran,8
this U.S. strike is of immediate impact in terms of where order and disorder in security and politics goes from here, from individual to international levels. Such a strike, done without alerting key U.S. allies such
as the United Kingdom (UK), no clear cut domestic or international
legal justification, and significant risk of igniting further violence and
instability, is one indicator of the consistent inconsistency of U.S. foreign and security policy.9
In looking at remarks from key leaders in the Americas, FrançoisPhilippe Champagne, minister of foreign affairs for Canada, responded
to the strike stating “We call on all sides to exercise restraint and pursue
de-escalation. Our goal is and remains a united and stable Iraq. Canada has long been concerned by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’
Qods Force, led by Qasem Soleimani, whose aggressive actions have had
a destabilizing effect in the region and beyond.”10 At the time of writing,
Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has so far not commented, aside from stating “I won’t go into that, that’s to do with foreign
politics” at a daily press conference, reported 3 January 2020.11
Beyond the Americas, leaders expressed a similar focus on regional
stability and restraint. King Salman of Saudi Arabia “discussed the importance of de-escalating region tensions with Iraqi President Berham
Saleh,” French President Emmanuel Macron “agreed with his Iraqi
counterpart to make efforts to dampen tensions in the Middle East,”
“Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has expressed concern over a possible
rise in violence in the Middle East,” China Foreign Minister Wang Yi
said “the US should not ‘abuse force’ and should instead seek solutions through dialogue,” and Qatari Foreign Minister Mohammed bin
8. For example, statements that Hezbollah operates in the tri-border area of Argentina,
Brazil, and Paraguay. Parisa Hafezi, “From War to Diplomacy, Iran Weighs Response
to Soleimani’s Killing” Reuters, 3 January 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-iraq-security-blast-scenarios/from-war-to-diplomacy-iran-weighs-response-tosoleimanis-killing-idUSKBN1Z221M.
9. As written in the KCIS 2019 Conference report, a kind of predictable
unpredictability.
10. Global Affairs Canada, “Statement from Minister Champagne following the
Airstrike Carried Out by the U.S. on Iranian Commander Qasem Soleimani in
Iraq” (3 January 2020), https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2020/01/
statement-from-minister-champagne.html.
11. Reuters, “Mexico President Won’t Comment on U.S. Killing of Top Iranian
Commander” (3 January 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-securityblast-mexico-idUSKBN1Z21GC.
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Abdulrahman Al Thani in meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif discussed “especially the events in Iraq as well as
ways of calm to maintain collective security of the region,” (as reported
by Qatar News Agency).12 In terms of regional political security dynamics, of particular interest here given a regional focus on the Americas, European Union Foreign Affairs Chief Josep Borrell spoke with
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif about “the need for
de-escalation” and “the importance of preserving the JCPOA [nuclear
deal],” urging Iran “to exercise restraint” and stating “a regional political solution was “the only way forward.”13
Notable in these reactions is the attentiveness to regional cooperation, providing important theoretical and practice-oriented space for a
renewed emphasis on regionalism as a means through which to build
multilateral institutions to stabilize an increasingly multipolar world
order. Referencing the Conference Report for the 2019 Kingston Conference on International Security, “A Changing International Order?
Implications for the Security Environment,” the authors conclude:
What appears to be certain is that the status quo international order is undergoing significant change. What is not certain is whether that change represents a corrective adaptation within the norms
of the existing system, or a fundamental change that will replace
existing norms and the leadership over the system.14

Through this chapter I engage with this conclusion by considering
international order with respect to the Americas. Such a regional anchor provides a useful vantage point from which to think about shifting
security dynamics in terms of specific issue areas as well as broader
processes of (dis)ordering.
From colonial histories of, and violence to, political economic institutional arrangements such as NAFTA (as well as its “NAFTA 2.0”
version, the USMCA) and MERCOSUR, to the relatively long standing
Organization of American States (OAS) formed in the name of strengthening democracy and human rights, the Americas comprise a number
12. Al Jazeera, “Aftermath of Soleimani Killing in US Raid: All the Latest Updates” (4
January 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/aftermath-soleimanikilling-raid-latest-updates-200104061026015.html.
13. Arnaud Siad, “EU Foreign Affairs Chief Invites Zarif to Brussels” CNN, 5 January
2020, https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/us-iran-soleimani-tensionslive-intl-01-05-20/h_7ed02088614ba5ae254277b415b5d03d.yaho.
14. Conference Report: KCIS 2019, 13.
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of arrangements through which to engage debates on order and disorder in regional politics. In addition to broader themes of key importance for international relations (IR) scholarship and practice, such as
legitimacy, sovereignty, and ethics, the region is confronted by key security issues of immediate concern.
One key challenge and opportunity to bolster regional stability and
order is to ensure effective and long-lasting collective partnerships
around issues of insecurity. Such insecurities include, but are not limited to, human trafficking, non-state armed groups, climate change,
and economic inequality. A connecting thread across such insecurities
is that they are arguably impossible to tackle unilaterally. They are by
definition transnational given the complex interdependence of the contemporary international system, and as such demand mitigating and
adaptive responses that are not based on a single state actor. While critiques point to the ineffectiveness of international norms at regulating
state behavior, these critiques however convincing, do not mean that
multilateralism is futile. Rather, they point to a need for revisiting how
perhaps a growing emphasis on bilateral initiatives by states can be
redirected in the name of regional institutions to mitigate unilateral destabilizations and strengthen security through what has been referred
to as a “building blocks” approach.15 In this way, perhaps regionalism
can enable states to find greater resonance with each other through
their proximity, enabling an attentiveness to human security (prioritizing the individual), state security, and regional security.
The intent in both identifying limitations of the existing international order while reinforcing the need for multilateralism enables us to
attend to relational dynamics of security and politics and disrupt assumptions of order that may obscure alternative possibilities. This disruption includes challenging realist and liberal traditions which both
assume the centrality of the state and state self-interest as a driver of decision making even as they vary in terms of how cooperative behavior
does or does not play a role. While constructivist IR theory has since the
late twentieth century provided more complexity in terms of managing
both ideational and material factors, it is arguably critical security stud15. See Robert Falkner on critiques of multilateralism and “minilateralism” alongside
the potential of regional clubs as building blocks for more effective policy, here
in the context of climate change but with potential for security more broadly. “A
Minilateral Solution for Global Climate Change? On Bargaining Efficiency, Club
Benefits, and International Legitimacy,” Perspectives on Politics 14, no. 1 (1 March
2016): 87–101.
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ies that provides a more imaginative alternative lens through which
to view contemporary security challenges to minimize insecurity by
questioning state centrism as the focal point of security.
Combining critical security studies with an explicitly relational attentiveness also challenges linear thinking and assumptions of material
power, and I argue is central to supporting a more comprehensive and
ethical take on contemporary security challenges. Such an approach
helps us to not ignore conventional power politics, such as military
capability and economic growth, but to not let conventional power
politics unnecessarily limit our conceptual and practice-oriented conclusions. It also encourages us to take seriously areas of security consequence including populism and nationalism in domestic politics, uncritical realist and liberal ordering assumptions, and a tendency for the
state-based international order to stop short of providing sustainable
and human-centered responses to contemporary security challenges.
The objective here is not to uncritically demonize the state as a global16
actor. Rather, it is to provide space for more imaginative thinking on
how shifts in order that may initially be viewed as a threat to stability
may hold potential for less insecurity if we conceptualize security and
politics differently.
To do so, I suggest that we consider (dis)ordering dynamics with a
conscious eye on two areas of relational interplay: One, that of domestic politics and foreign policy; and, two, that of short and long-time
horizons. The latter timing17 focus is something often underestimated
by analyses saturated by the temporal immediacy of social media and
Internet (dis)information overload. Indeed, the long-term investment
required by contemporary security challenges demands attention to futures beyond election cycles and generational lifespans. This does not
disregard the role of communications technology with acute impact,
but it does situate the influence of such impact along a different temporal horizon. The former focus on the interplay of domestic and foreign
politics/policy is a theme receiving increasing explicit engagement by
16. “Global” is used here purposefully in place of international to move beyond a
default of state centrism while acknowledging the continued role and potential of
state actors.
17. On time and timing, see Andy Hom, “Timing is Everything: Toward a Better
Understanding of Time and International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 62,
no. 1 (2018): 69–79; and Christopher McIntosh, “Theory Across Time: The Privileging
of Time-Less Theory in International Relations,” International Theory 7, no. 3 (2015):
464–500.
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security scholars and practitioners, as observed throughout the majority of panels at KCIS 2019, and is central to understanding order and
disorder. By way of conclusion, I respond to questions posed by the
2019 KCIS organizers, and make a call for more explicit engagement
with normative aspects of security decision making, practical but imaginative thinking given the necessity of multilateralism, and a kind of
“humanity-bold” perspective as one way to consider what alternative
future international and regional orders could be.
Relational Interplays—Domestic Politics/Foreign Policy, Short/Long
Time Horizons
A central internal contradiction of consequence for the Americas is tension between the international system as globalized and interdependent, and domestic political discourses such as “America First” that
draw on exclusionary societal, economic, political, and/or security discourses and practices. Embedded in this contradiction are a variety of
specific tensions, for example competing idea(l)s around value-driven
policies. Focusing on the U.S., examples here include, on the one hand,
ongoing stated commitments to democracy, human rights, and the
“free” market, and on the other hand, a disregard for factors essential
to such commitments. For example, drawing on an acute temporal moment to securitize migration from Central America, but disregarding
the longer term histories surrounding “push/pull” factors of migration at play and associated issues of human rights, sustainable development, and so on. Working from a standpoint of immediate temporal
crisis is then exacerbated by domestic political discourses of xenophobia and isolationism, contributing to foreign and security policies that
make longer term, sustainable security moves harder to achieve.
One example of how the relational interplay of domestic politics and
foreign policy in the immediate term may risk longer term sustainable
security can be seen in the recent proposal by U.S. President Trump
to label Mexican criminal groups as terrorist organizations. Mexican
Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard responded that “Mexico will never
accept any action that violates our national sovereignty,”18 a reminder
18. Mary Beth Sheridan, “Trump Plans to Designate Mexican Cartels as Terror
Groups, Stirring Outcry” The Washington Post, 27 November 2019, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/trump-plans-to-designate-mexican-cartels-as-terrorgroups-stirring-outcry/2019/11/26/8ebaeefa-10b7-11ea-bf62-eadd5d11f559_story.
html.
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of the enduring norm of state sovereignty as well as historical precedents to US military interventionism in the region.19 The proposal was
relatively quickly put on hold by the US, with Mexican President Obrador stating “We thank President Trump for respecting our decisions
and for choosing to maintain a policy of good neighbourliness, a policy
of cooperation with us,” pointing to the importance of regional collective security.20 Such an attentiveness to regional order has seemingly
been reinforced through the recent call to strengthen the U.S.–Mexico High-level Security Group (GANSEG) created 27 August 2019, in
particular “cooperation in arms trafficking, money laundering, international drug trafficking and how to work together on transnational
crime and international drug trafficking.”21 Such a move is, however
nascent, an example of how, while order and disorder in the international system is in flux, bilateral, and perhaps regional, efforts in security cooperation are not entirely absent. While it remains to be seen
how GANSEG develops, not least given the increasingly limited time
horizons of politics during a U.S. election year, its creation speaks to
promising recommendations from a recent joint UC San Diego-Brookings report in the name of mutual security interests: “(1) aligning policy
objectives, (2) deepening subnational cooperation, and (3) addressing
chronic irritants.”22
U.S.–Mexico security relations such as this are one example through
which to consider how strengthening bilateral initiatives in the face of
temporal and political constraints may provide both short- and longterm gains for the Americas and order. By attending to individual state
priorities as well as broader issues of regional order, including a reduction of violence and strengthening of law enforcement and judicial
institutions, such efforts may mitigate the uncertainty and insecurity
19. Joshua Zeitz, “The Last Time the U.S. Invaded Mexico,” Politico, 4 February 2017,
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/02/the-last-time-the-us-invadedmexico-214738.
20. BBC News, “Trump Halts Plan to Designate Mexican Drug Cartels as Terrorists” (7
December 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-50697635.
21. Gobierno de México, “Mexico-US Security Collaboration Advances” (6 December
2019), https://www.gob.mx/sre/en/articulos/mexico-us-security-collaborationadvances-228997?idiom=en. See also the Brookings Report, “U.S.–Mexico Security
Cooperation 2018–2024” (2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2019/04/Whitepaper_Security_Taskforce.pdf.
22. Brookings and UC San Diego, “Key Takeaways from “US-Mexico Security
Cooperation 2018-2024” (26 March 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/usmexico-security-cooperation-2018-2024/.
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stemming from contradictory unilateral policy moves and domestic political bluster.23 Drawing on KCIS 2019 conference conclusions by Ambassador Ben Rowswell, focusing on the role of middle powers such as
Canada, and in this case Mexico, holds significant potential in terms of
mitigating the risk of destabilizing unilateral action by strengthening
bilateral and multilateral security cooperation.
In the case of the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, a second specific example in the contemporary political and security environment is that of
the United States-Mexico-Canada-Agreement on Trade (USMCA). Of
interest here are not the particulars of the proposal as that is best left to
political economy experts. Rather, it is the way in which this proposal
came together and how its very existence reinforces how contemporary security challenges, to include economic, cannot be managed by
individual states on their own. Cooperation at all levels is essential and
depends on institutional arrangements that can mitigate international disordering practices by strengthening regional efforts. The Office
of the United States Trade Representative fact sheet states the USMCA
will “support mutually beneficial trade leading to freer markets, fairer
trade, and robust economic growth in North America,”24 and despite
convincing critiques that highlight the paradoxical nature of overall
economic growth and growing inequality, the USMCA has in fact been
endorsed by U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren who cited the agreement’s
promise for farmers and labor standards, in contrast to the views of
rival U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders.25
Here we see how the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy as well as short- and long-time horizons can in fact at times
contribute to the strengthening of regional institutional architecture,
and ideally, to regional order. In terms of U.S.-Canadian relations building on the aforementioned regional measures of GANSEG between the
U.S. and Mexico, and USMCA between Canada, Mexico, and the U.S.,
a high volume of trade continues, military partnerships remain strong
through NORAD and NATO, shared ideological commitments to mar23. Ibid.
24. Office of the United States Trade Representative (n.d.). “UNITED STATES–MEXICO–
CANADA TRADE FACT SHEET Modernizing NAFTA into a 21st Century Trade
Agreement,” https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/unitedstates-mexico-canada-agreement/fact-sheets/modernizing.
25. Daniella Diaz, “Elizabeth Warren Says She Will Vote for USMCA,” CNN, 3 January
2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/03/politics/warren-trade-agreement-usmcanafta/index.html.
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kets and democratic institutions foster trust, and their geostrategic position as neighbors encourages short- and long-term cooperation. While
these examples are only a partial picture, they do provide snapshots of
how relational dynamics of domestic politics and foreign policy, and
short- and long-time horizons, can be a challenge and opportunity for
order in the Americas.
Taking a step back from these examples provides a less ordered picture. Despite such regional initiatives and promises of ongoing security
cooperation, U.S. decision making in the Trump administration entails
notable unpredictability across ideological, material, and geostrategic
domains.26 In ideological terms we often see values-based arguments
that are at odds with associated practices. For example, democracy
promotion that projects ambitions of stability and governance, but in
reality often creates societal blowback and instability, as has happened
in Iraq and Afghanistan. We also see uncertainty and inconsistency in
domestic political statements such as America First alongside an ongoing if not increasing forward military presence, with potentially grave
long-term consequences given how U.S. diplomatic efforts continue to
be challenged in funding and personnel.
While there remains a foreign policy attentiveness to maintaining
supremacy in material capabilities and power projection, we also observe domestic political narratives promising less foreign military intervention. Such contradictions can be seen in the 2019 call to pull out
of Syria followed by the announcement of troops remaining, as well as
the strike on Soleimani discussed at the very beginning of this analysis
that simultaneously asserts an America First domestic narrative alongside high risk foreign security policy decisions that lead to more U.S.
foreign military engagement and a disregard for international norms.
This paradox is not exclusive to military policy but also impacts the
economic realm. Domestic political references to America First are built
on profit maximization and a promise to cut consumer costs and protect U.S. workers. However, and despite the USMCA referenced earlier,
this political promise has occurred alongside pulling out of trade deals
such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and engaging in a trade
26. Jeffrey A. Engel, Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Andrew Preston (eds.), America in the
World: A History in Documents from the War with Spain to the War on Terror (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2014). They ask, “In making policy toward the outside
world, have U.S. leaders been guided principally by ideology, material ambitions, or
geostrategic calculation?” (3).

The Americas: (Dis)Ordering, Security, and Politics 75

war with China even as the current globalized economy is not fit for
economic protectionism. In geopolitical terms, domestic political posturing prioritizes the “homeland” (for example as in the 2018 National
Security Strategy), but given the transnational nature of contemporary
security challenges, from climate change to human trafficking, homeland security depends on regional cooperation.
While acknowledging such unpredictability in the short term, if
thinking through a longer temporal lens, there is notable consistency.
No matter what U.S. political party takes office in 2020, it can be expected that global engagement in the name of promoting U.S. influence will
continue, albeit in different ways, despite increased domestic societal
and political polarization. A prominent example here that has taken a
recent backseat in much public U.S. discourse is migration along the
U.S.–Mexico border despite implications for broader hemispheric order and disorder. These implications range from immediate physical
insecurity for those individuals undertaking risky journeys to escape
violence, to damaging societal unrest invoking “us” versus “them” exclusionary discourses that will no doubt heighten as the 2020 U.S. election comes closer.
Fundamental questions around order and disorder in a state-based
international system highlight tensions in how a privileging of national
interests and increasing skepticism (if not outright animosity) to globalist, “global citizen,”27 or non-zero sum thinking on interdependence
threaten security given the need for multilateral cooperation to ensure
short- and long-term security sustainability.
Alternative Order(s): How to be Imaginative and Practical?
Contemporary security challenges from transnational organized crime
to a globalized economy and the growing impact of climate change are
not constrained by state territorial borders even as we see a reassertion
of the state in domestic politics across the globe. We are arguably in an
increasingly multipolar world that could be seen as “decentred globalism,” explained as how “the mode of power that underpinned global
modernity is both less unevenly concentrated and more combined than

27. As UK Prime Minister Theresa May said, “if you are a citizen of the world, you are
a citizen of nowhere.” Theresa May, “Theresa May’s Conference Speech in Full,” The
Telegraph, 5 October 2016, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/05/theresamays-conference-speech-in-full/.

76

Kathryn Marie Fisher

in previous stages of global modernity.”28 In this interdependent context
order and disorder are confronted by transnational security challenges
as well as increasing domestic polarization and exclusionary politics,
reinforcing the need to strengthen cooperative regional security engagements. It is perhaps through such regional vehicles that we can harness
bold and imaginative promises to not negate state actors and interests,
but mitigate counterproductive unilateral action by underscoring how
single states cannot manage contemporary security challenges on their
own, no matter how much material power they hold.
This leads us to broader theoretical debates in areas of security, to
include normative commitments and analytical efforts. It is in many
ways necessary to bifurcate critical and problem solving theories,29
however this does not foreclose the possibility for critical approaches,
rightly challenging assumptions of the state as “natural” or states as
the way to greater security (not least when states are the ones often
creating violence, terrorism, and insecurity), to ignore problem solving
ambitions all together. Indeed, a collective goal for those bridging theory and practice more broadly, and theoretical camps and practitioner
spaces more specifically, is to mitigate ongoing insecurity.
Starting from this assumption that critical approaches do not negate
problem solving goals, when “asked to identify indicators of a changing international order,” the first indicator we cannot underestimate for
order and disorder in the Americas is the inconsistency and unpredictability of U.S. policy making. It is not surprising that such inconsistency
may cast doubt on U.S. norms and commitments to the region. Not only
does this pose an immediate challenge to security relations, but it is
connected to a kind of consistent contradiction in U.S. domestic politics
and foreign policy when viewed through a longer historical context.
For example, going back to the earlier example of migration, transnational crime, and border security between the U.S., Mexico, and Central
American states. To better understand the impact of such relational dynamics it is essential to consider the historical context of regional dynamics, power exploitations, domestic politics and foreign policies, and
competing time horizons. Even as more recent narratives of America
28. Barry Buzan and George Lawson, The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and
the Making of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015),
274.
29. Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations
Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 126–155.
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First, xenophobia, racism, and the securitization (if not militarization)
of the U.S. border, inflame societal polarizations that can lead to violence, these insecurities are connected to a much more entrenched historical with intersecting issues of exploitation and racialized power dynamics. It remains to be seen what kind of short- and long-term effects
domestic politics will have on U.S. border security and immigration
policies, and by default a range of relations with the Americas as well
as individual human experiences with insecurity. Given this, not least
during an election year, some U.S. allies may be increasingly interested
in hedging, moving away from engagements with the U.S. At the same
time, it is too early to assess whether such possibilities are challenging
existing ordering practices at the system level or presenting challenges within the status quo, with the earlier mentioned regional arrangements of GANSEG and the USMCA (NAFTA) reminders that bilateral
and multilateral institutional agreements continue to be pursued.
It is perhaps useful to end by responding to a KCIS 2019 question on
“what tentative insights might be offered about potential alternative
international order futures and their security implications” for the region. Thinking of anchoring points through this analysis, one response
is to be more attentive to relational interplays of domestic politics and
foreign policies as well as multiple time horizons, and how such interdependent dynamics influence regional security architectures without
ignoring the very real experiences of insecurity for individuals across
regions. Through a regional attentiveness we may be able to better
identify what kinds of short-term alliances could be facilitated and/
or maintained to support a “humanity-bold” commitment to long term
economic equality, social justice, and more effective and ethical border
security practices. One way to not just think about but engage with
alternative futures given a global order that is more multipolar than
unipolar, and more decentered than centered, is to push theoretical and
empirical analyses to include explicit attention to normative claim making alongside regional levels of analysis. For example, not just “is” the
U.S. (or other actor) doing this or that, with this or that outcome, but,
should the U.S. (or other actor) be doing this or that, given this or that
outcome? It is not that such normative argumentation is absent from
existing debates, rather, that underscoring such a normative baseline
may help us prioritize the human and individual level of security without ignoring the continued role of state actors. A goal here, in particular
as relates to regional cooperation, is to try and support more imaginative and transformative commitments to security challenges such as
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economic inequality, climate change, and transnational criminal organizations, that are not only impossible to tackle unilaterally, but in so
doing, may indeed be made much worse in the short and long term.

6

Southern Approaches: Border Security
and the International Order
Sara K. McGuire

Introduction: Border Security Shifts after 9/11
Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11), the concept
of “homeland security” subsumed former conceptions of border security. The advent of a so-called “new security environment” oriented
towards preventing future terrorist attacks, precipitated a fundamental shift in the nature of border security. In the past, border security
focused on the traditional defense of borders against armed attack by
organized military forces; following the 9/11 attacks, however, the emphasis shifted to policing the frontiers against clandestine transnational
actors and would-be terrorists. Borders were re-crafted in a way that involved a “thickening” of border security efforts that extended beyond
the formal ports of entry to more distant approaches.
In recent years, border security priorities in the United States have
undergone a further shift. In the absence of the arrival of foreign terrorist actors at U.S. border checkpoints, the focus has now shifted towards
immigration control that is specifically focused on the state’s southern
approaches. The U.S. administration of Donald J. Trump has employed
aggressive rhetoric that obscures the real factors influencing the need
for immigration and asylum reform in the Americas.
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The Northern Triangle
In an increasingly globalized world, local crises tend to precipitate regional impacts. This has certainly been the case in the Northern Triangle, a region that has become known for widespread crime, government
corruption, and violence following civil wars in the 1980s that initiated
a legacy of criminality and fragile institutions. Indeed, instability in this
region of Central America—Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras—is
arguably one of the most pressing security challenges for U.S. policy
in the Western Hemisphere due to insecurity in this region. According to the World Bank, approximately 49 percent of Guatemalans, 31
percent of Salvadorans, and 50 percent of Hondurans live on less than
USD$5.50 per day.1
There are numerous sources of insecurity in Northern Triangle countries. Following the passage of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act, gang members imprisoned in the United
States were transferred back to Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras without a clear plan for monitoring, rehabilitating, or reintegrating
these violent offenders. Criminal groups, many of which are associated
with drug trafficking organizations, operate undeterred in these countries. These gangs include the infamous Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and
the Eighteenth Street Gang (M-18) as well as regional padillas or street
gangs. Conservative estimates suggest that 90 percent of documented
cocaine flows into the U.S. from this region as a result of these groups.2
While previously localized in specific urban areas, these gangs are increasingly moving into rural zones where they pursue exclusive control
in order to dominate the local population and impose their own rules.
As a result of the dominance of these gangs, the Northern Triangle
countries are some of the most violent states in the world. According
to the Congressional Research Service, in 2017 the homicide rates in
these states were twenty-six per 100,000 in Guatemala, forty-four per
100,000 in Honduras, and sixty per 100,000 in El Salvador.3 The perpe1. Cited in Peter J. Meyer. “U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America:
Overview” Congressional Research Service: In Focus (3 January 2019).
2. Cristina Eguizábal, Matthew C. Ingram, Karise M. Curtis, Aaron Korthuis, Eric L.
Olson, and Nicholas Phillips. “Crime and Violence in Central America’s Northern
Triangle: How U.S. Policy Responses are Helping, Hurting, and Can be Improved”
Woodrow Wilson Center Reports on the Americas #34 (Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, 2015).
3. Meyer, “U.S. Strategy.”
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trators of violence in these countries often target children and youth.
In response, the governments of Northern Triangle countries have implemented mano dura (iron fist) policies that involve police and military
crackdowns, mass incarceration, and neighborhood security forces in
an attempt to curb the violence. Yet these efforts have been largely unsuccessful. While the nature of the violence differs amongst the three
states, the continued spread of gangs, drug trafficking, political corruption, and the absence of the rule of law are common to them all. According to a recent study, “as many as 95% of crimes go unpunished in some
areas, and the public has little trust in the police and state security forces.”4 The three states have undertaken complementary efforts as part of
their Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle. However, to date, these efforts have remained unsuccessful. As a result of
the ongoing violence, the Northern Triangle has become a “significant
source of mixed migration flows of asylum seekers and economic migrants to the United States.”5 Tens of thousands of people have fled the
region and have headed north, many of them unaccompanied minors,
seeking asylum from the violence that dominates the region.
U.S. Responses to the Northern Triangle
Recent U.S. administrations have responded to this violence and northern migration from the Northern Triangle in different ways.
Bush Administration
In the immediate post-9/11 period, President George W. Bush focused
on supporting growth and stability in Central America by initiating
free-market reforms and increasing trade. The Bush administration
awarded hundreds of millions of dollars in grants to Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador through the Millennium Challenge Corporation.
In 2005, when rising crime rates led to a surge of northern migration
from the region, the Bush administration adopted Operation Streamline, a “zero-tolerance policy under which migrants illegally crossing
the U.S.–Mexico border were criminally prosecuted and deported.”6 In
its last year, the Bush administration introduced the Merida Initiative,
4. Rocio Cara Labrador and Danielle Renwick. “Central America’s Violent Northern
Triangle,” Council on Foreign Relations (21 June 2018).
5. Meyer, “U.S. Strategy.”
6. Labrador and Renwick, “Central America’s Violent Northern Triangle.”
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a security assistance package for Central America. The administration
was also responsible for the 2006 Secure Fence Act (the Act), which authorized the construction of 700 miles of fencing along the Mexican border. At the time the Act was signed into law in October of 2006, Bush
stated that the Act would “help protect the American people,” would
“make borders more secure,” and would serve as “an important step
toward immigration reform.”7
Obama Administration
Upon taking office, the administration of Barack Obama rebranded the
Merida Initiative as the Central America Regional Security Initiative
(CARSI) after removing Mexico from this grouping. U.S. strategy for
Central America was later revised to adopt a more holistic interagency
approach that prioritized three objectives: (1) prompting prosperity and
regional integration, (2) strengthening governance, and (3) improving
security. In 2014, following a massive influx in northern migration, in a
nationally televised address from the White House, Obama announced
that there was an “actual humanitarian crisis on the border.”8 He urged
Congress to take action on his immigration agenda in light of the surge
of migrants from Central America seeking to enter the United States.
Initially, the Obama administration sought to implement a deterrence strategy that would discourage would-be migrants from undertaking the journey to the United States. This strategy involved the
identification and deportation of recently arrived migrants whose asylum claims had been denied in order to dissuade the flow of northern
migration. Yet following the 2014 surge of arrivals, the Obama administration emphasized the humanitarian situation in the Northern Triangle. However, despite the humanitarian rhetoric used to describe the
migration situation, the Obama administration initiated the policy of
housing the migrant children in temporary camps on military bases
and pushed for long-term detention of migrant families while their asy7. President George W. Bush, “President Bush Signs the Secure Fence Act” (26 October
2006), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061026.
html. See also “The Big, Beautiful Border Wall America Built Ten Years Ago,” The
Economist, 24 November 2018.
8. Cited in Brian Fonseca and Jonathan D. Rosen, The New U.S. Security Agenda: Trends
and Emerging Threats. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 67. See also Joel Rose,
“President Obama Also Faced a ‘Crisis’ at the Southern Border,” NPR, 9 January
2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/01/09/683623555/president-obama-also-faced-a-crisis-atthe-southern-border.
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lum cases played out in immigration courts. Federal courts ultimately
blocked this policy.
Concluding that it was “in the national security interests of the United States to work with Central American governments to promote economic prosperity, improve security, and strengthen governance in the
region,” the Obama administration ultimately approved a new plan for
Central America.9 The U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America
involved a whole-of-government approach that requested significant
increases in foreign aid. “With congressional support, U.S. assistance to
Central America more than doubled from $338.1 million in FY 2014 to
$753.7 million in FY 2016.”10 It expanded the network of migrant shelters contracted by the Department of Health and Human Services that
served unaccompanied children. While migrant families were sometimes separated in detention, billions of dollars were spent in providing
aid to Central Americans in an attempt to curb the migrant surge.
Trump Administration
In many respects, the administration of Donald J. Trump failed to account for lessons learned by the Bush and Obama administrations
when addressing northern migration from Central America. Trump’s
populist appeal is frequently fueled by his brash social media presence
whereby foreign policy proclamations are released on Twitter. Before
coming to office, Trump adopted a hard line on immigration policies,
especially those that affect Central Americans. He has publicly argued
that, in the midst of the rising number of asylum seekers, many individuals have been “coached” in order to manipulate the system and
win their claims. Early electoral speeches emphasized the need to “take
control” of the immigration system in order to prevent so-called undesirables from accessing U.S. resources. Numerous tweets and public
statements called for the construction of a “mighty” border wall along
the country’s southern border.
In the spring of 2019, Trump moved to cut foreign aid to countries
like Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.11 While initially indicating
support for programs aimed at developing prosperity and security in
9. Meyer, “U.S. Strategy.”
10. Ibid.
11. Megan Specia, “Trump Wants to Cut Aid to Central America. Here Are Some of the
Dozens of U.S.-Funded Programs,” New York Times, 2 April 2019, https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/04/02/world/americas/trump-funding-central-america.html.
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the Northern Triangle, the administration sought to significantly scale
back assistance to that region. However, Congress rejected the majority
of his proposed cuts.12 In 2019, the president’s budget request proposed
a 30 percent cut to assistance for the region compared with the previous
year’s budget.13
In December 2018, Trump announced the Migration Protection Protocols, more commonly referred to as the Remain in Mexico policy, and
put it into effect in January 2019. While there are conflicting reports,
approximately 3,500–5,000 Central American migrants were returned
to Mexico to await asylum hearings in the U.S.14 Following a legal challenge, launched in May 2019 by eleven plaintiffs who were returned
to Mexico after trying to enter California to claim asylum, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals determined that this program could continue.
In March 2019, the commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Kevin McAleenan, travelled to El Paso, Texas and announced that the border was at a breaking point. He stated that “CBP
is facing an unprecedented humanitarian and border security crisis
all along our southwest border.”15 In the same period, then-Secretary
of Homeland Security Kristjen Nielson went to Honduras to address
the issues leading to northern migration directly. She met with security officials from El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala and initiated
plans for a new agreement to deal with what she described as a “system in free fall.”16 In spite of these efforts, however, the day after her
announcement, the president criticized the Northern Triangle countries
for accepting monetary aid from the U.S. while doing nothing in return.
Two months later, the Trump administration announced plans for a
new “common sense” immigration plan that would replace chain migration with a points-based system. The president said that this plan
12. Alex Leary, “U.S. to Cut Some Aid to Central American Countries,” Wall Street
Journal, 30 March 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-cut-some-aid-to-centralamerican-countries-11553987422.
13. Ibid.
14. Emily Green, “Trump Policy to Send Asylum Seekers Back to Mexico Overwhelms
Shelters,” NPR: All Things Considered (10 May 2019); see also Camilo MontoyaGalvez and Angel Canales, “More than 5000 Asylum Seekers Have Been Returned
Under ‘Remain in Mexico’ Policy,” CBS News, 13 May 2019.
15. CBP Public Affairs, “CPB Commissioner Addresses Current Border Crisis” (27
March 2019), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-commissioneraddresses-current-border-crisis.
16. Kate Pavlich, “Trump and Obama Agree – There’s a Crisis at the Border,” The Hill, 2
April 2019.
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would “stop illegal immigration and fully secure the border” while
at the same time “establishing a new legal immigration system that
protects American wages, promotes American values, and attracts the
best and the brightest from around the world.”17 While this new plan
addressed northern migration by adding to the wall and modernizing
ports of entry, it did not address the issue of undocumented entry into
the country by potential asylum claimants.
On 30 May 2019, Trump revealed that he would impose a tariff on all
imported goods from Mexico, beginning in June. His tweet announcing
this policy change stated that “On June 10th, the United States will impose a 5% tariff on all goods coming into our country from Mexico, until such time as illegal migrants coming through Mexico, and into our
Country STOP.”18 This tax would “gradually increase” until the flow of
undocumented migrants across the U.S.–Mexico border stops. Calling
the continued flow of northern migration from the Northern Triangle
a “persisting crisis” the president has abdicated U.S. responsibility in
dealing with the issue of overcrowded migrant shelters and a backlogged immigration system.
Assessing Trump’s Foreign Policy
Three themes run through Trump’s foreign policy decisions. First is his
direct, populist appeal to the general public. Many of his border and
immigration security policies have been first articulated by tweet. The
call to “build the wall and crime will fall”19 was initially made on Twitter. There has been a deliberate attempt to represent the views of voters
that he argues were “left behind” by an “out-of-touch elite.”20 His rhetoric has been marked by a classic populism, with elites disparaged in
order to connect with so-called everyday people. The use of social media platforms, such as Twitter, is a strategy that allows for unmediated
access to his supporters, and that allows for the bypass of traditional
media formats and fact-checkers. The harsh rhetoric about the need to
17. Donald J. Trump, “Remarks by President Trump on Modernizing Our Immigration
System for a Stronger America” (whitehouse.gov, 16 May 2019), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-modernizing-immigrationsystem-stronger-america/.
18. @realDonaldTrump (Twitter, 30 May 2019).
19. @realDonaldTrump (Twitter, 23 January 2019).
20. Jean-Christophe Boucher and Cameron G. Thies, “I Am a ‘Tariff Man’: The Power of
Populist Foreign Policy Rhetoric Under President Trump,” The Journal of Politics 81,
no. 2 (March 7, 2019).
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secure the border and the seemingly novel focus on non-criminal undocumented immigrants obscures the fact that prior administrations
also focused on the deportation of both criminal and non-criminal undocumented aliens.
The second foreign policy trend was the direct appeal to American
self-interest.21 In his inaugural address, Trump stated that, “From this
day forward, it’s going to be America First…We will seek friendship
and good will with the nations of the world, but we will do so with the
understanding that it is the right of all nations to put their own interests
first.”22 One of the manifestations of the America First strategy has been
a preoccupation with bilateral trade deficits. Trump’s foreign policy
rhetoric demonstrates a worldview that sees U.S. alliances as bad deals
that involve Washington bearing the cost and risk of such partnerships
while allies reap the benefits.23 This has been further demonstrated by
the attempt to unilaterally determine strategies for addressing northern
immigration along the Southern border of the United States.
Finally, the current administration has demonstrated a desire to divorce U.S. foreign policy from any sort of moral foundation. This perspective was directly articulated in the president’s speech to the UN
General Assembly, when he asked the world to “choose a future of
patriotism, prosperity, and pride.”24 The administration’s rhetoric describing the influx of migrants from the Northern Triangle has focused
primarily on the challenges of dealing with undocumented arrivals,
and has largely ignored the socio-economic factors fueling this migration pattern.25 In this sense, it can be argued that Trump has further accelerated a trend in foreign policy signaling Washington’s retreat from
humanitarian responsibilities.

21. Hal Brands, “The Unexceptional Superpower: American Grand Strategy in the Age
of Trump,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 59, no. 6 (2017): 7–40.
22. Donald J. Trump. “The Inaugural Address” (whitehouse.gov, 20 January 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/the-inaugural-address/.
23. Brands, “Unexceptional Superpower.”
24. Donald J. Trump, “Remarks by President Trump to the 73rd Session of the United
Nations General Assembly: New York, New York” (whitehouse.gov, 25 September
2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-73rdsession-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-ny/.
25. Elliott Abrams, “Trump Versus the Government: Can America Get Its Story
Straight?” Foreign Affairs 98, no. 129 (2019); Eliot A. Cohen, “America’s Long
Goodbye: The Real Crisis of the Trump Era,” Foreign Affairs 98, no. 138 (2019).
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The Asylum Process
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines the
concept of a refugee in international law and sets out the rights and
protections afforded to those who claim asylum. It affirms the principle
first articulated in Article 14 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human
Rights that, “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”26 The 1951 Convention affords protection to those persons who, “owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
(or her) nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself (or herself) of the protection of that country.”27 As a signatory to the Convention, U.S. domestic law must reflect the protections
enshrined in this document.
While U.S. law adheres to the international norms prescribed by the
1951 Convention, it does not recognize asylum as a universal right. In
the United States, refugee status is conferred at the discretion of asylum
officers and immigration judges. Non-citizens who arrive in the United
States can enter into the asylum process by expressing a credible fear
of persecution upon return to their country of origin. The Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 provides that, “any alien who is physically
present in the United States…irrespective of such alien’s status, may
apply for asylum in accordance with this section.”28 Section 101 of the
Refugee Act of 1980 asserts that federal employees must seek to distinguish asylum seekers from other migrants.29 While those migrants with
a well-founded fear of persecution must be entitled to initiate the asylum process, the U.S. government does not provide irregular migrants
with legal counsel.
Irregular migrants arriving in the U.S. from Northern Triangle countries generally cross the southern border and then either surrender willingly to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers or they are
arrested for unauthorized entry. Once taken into custody, the asylum
process is initiated. Many Northern Triangle migrants make the trip to
26. United Nations General Assembly, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights”
(Article 14, 10 December 1948).
27. United Nations General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees”
(28 July 1951).
28. United States Congress, “Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952” (Section 208).
29. United States Congress, “Refugee Act of 1980” (17 March 1980).
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the United States because of information distributed in their country
of origin that suggests that asylum is a path to U.S. citizenship.30 There
are two means by which newly arrived persons can seek asylum. They
can do so during their initial interactions with border security personnel (affirmative asylum), or they can do so upon arrest, regardless of
how long they have been in the United States (defensive asylum). In the
latter instance, immigrants placed into expedited removal proceedings
can request a credible fear interview, in which asylum officers determine whether or not there is a “significant possibility” that the individual would face persecution if returned to their country of origin.31
The Need for Asylum Reform
The responses of successive administrations to the influx of migrants
from Central America demonstrates the need to reform the North
American immigration system in order to address the security challenges posed by northern immigration. First, there is a need to reassess the role that human smuggling plays in the North American asylum process. Many of the irregular migrants traveling to the U.S. from
Central America rely on some sort of human smuggling network. One
estimate found that human smuggling operators facilitating northern
migration made somewhere between $200 million to $2.3 billion, with
a considerable portion of that profit ending up in the hands of transnational criminal organizations linked to the illegal drug trade.32
There is a clearly demonstrated need for the current U.S. administration to make changes that would effectively speed up the asylum claim
process. The surge of migrants from the northern triangle has created a
massive backlog in the immigration courts. The system is overwhelmed
with more than 850,000 cases and fewer than 400 judges.33 The current
30. Josiah Heyman, Jeremy Stack, and Emily Guerra, “Bordering a ‘Crisis’: Central
American Asylum Seekers and the Reproduction of Dominant Border Enforcement
Practices,” Journal of the Southwest 60, no. 4 (Winter 2018): 761.
31. David Inserra, “Issue Brief – Seeking Asylum: Congress Should Fix Critical
Loopholes to Secure the Southern Border and Help the Persecuted,” The Heritage
Foundation, 4851 (7 May 2018), http://report.heritage.org/ib7851.
32. Courtney Vinopal, “How the U.S. and Mexico Find Common Ground on
Immigration,” PBS, 5 June 2019.
33. Nick Miroff and Maria Sacchetti, “Burgeoning Court Backlog of More Than 850,000
Cases Undercuts Trump Immigration Agenda,” The Washington Post, 1 May 2019,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/burgeoning-court-backlog-of-more-than850000-cases-undercuts-trump-immigration-agenda/2019/05/01/09c0b84a-6b69-11e9-a66da82d3f3d96d5_story.html.
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policy of metering, which limits the number of asylum seekers allowed
into the state from Mexico each day is ineffective, and in violation of the
spirit of the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees. The number of asylum cases has more than quadrupled since 2010, and reforms
are needed to make this system more efficient.34 The current backlog in
the asylum queue serves as an incentive for more would-be migrants to
file asylum claims that allow them to enter the U.S. and then wait out
their future hearings.
Finally, it can be argued that a definition of “well-founded fear of
persecution” common across North America would ensure that all asylum claims are judged fairly. Many of the migrants fleeing the Northern
Triangle region are seeking to escape violent gangs that target women,
children, and young unaffiliated adults for extortion and violence. As
such, upon arrival at the U.S. border, they are filing asylum claims on
the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution” in their country of origin.35 In 2014, the Board of Immigration Appeals ruled that violence
on the basis of gender, sexuality, or resistance to gang activity met the
threshold for persecution.36 However, others have disagreed with this
finding, arguing that the violence faced by those from Central America
is “generalized” and does not meet the 1951 Convention’s threshold.37
In June 2018, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions declared that gang
violence and domestic violence were not grounds for asylum. It is important to note that the 1951 UN Convention enshrined the right to seek
asylum, but not the right to asylum in any particular country. Sovereign states have the right to determine for themselves what constitutes
a well-founded fear of persecution.38 The establishment of a common
definition for this criterion that is consistent across North America
would be the first step in establishing an effective asylum system.

34. James Gibney, “Asylum is as American as Apple Pie,” Bloomberg, 9 December 2018.
35. Emma Sarappo, “What Asylum Means for the U.S. and the Central Americans Who
Want It,” Pacific Standard, 2 November 2018.
36. Hillel R. Smith, “Asylum and Related Protections for Aliens Who Fear Gang and
Domestic Violence,” Congressional Research Service: Legal Sidebar (15 January 2019).
37. Gibney, “Asylum.”
38. Katie Benner and Caitlin Dickerson, “Sessions Says Domestic and Gang Violence Are
Not Grounds for Asylum,” New York Times, 11 June 2018.
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Conclusion
The Trump administration has failed to learn from past attempts to address irregular migration along the southern border. The decision to
freeze aid to Northern Triangle countries is likely to ensure the continued flow of irregular migrants into the United States. There is an
unstated assumption that aspiring “illegal” migrants seeking entry into
the U.S. must be repelled and deterred from further entry; however,
the current immigration system is not well equipped to address those
with a legitimate claim to asylum. The Safe Third Country Agreement
must be updated in order to address loopholes that exist in the current
asylum protocol. Working together with its North American neighbors,
Mexico and Canada, the U.S. should seek to implement a common understanding of the principle of a well-founded fear of persecution as it
applies in the case of irregular Northern Triangle migrants.
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The European Union: Soul-Searching
and Role-Searching in Unsettling Global
Times
Anna Geis

Introduction: Rough Times for the European “Civilian Power”
Reflecting about a changing world order would be incomplete without
reflecting on the European Union (EU) and how it seeks to define its
place and role in an increasingly multipolar world order that is shaped
by a so-called “great power competition”—or at least so the grand neorealist narrative goes. The EU is, of course, no single “great power”
but a unique experiment of a regional integration process, providing
a “liberal regional order” for 27 small- and medium-sized democratic
countries—now that the United Kingdom has definitely left the EU.
We must start with the narrative that the European Union has been
a great success as a liberal peace project, notably even awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize in 2012.1 But, while for the last six decades the European integration process has resulted in a stable, peaceful, and prosperous community of liberal democracies, it has never been a progres1. See Ian Manners and Philomena Murray, “The End of a Noble Narrative? European
Integration Narratives after the Nobel Peace Prize,” Journal of Common Market Studies
54, no. 1 (2016): 185–202.
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sive success story without severe setbacks. However, the successful
integration of thirteen new member states since 2004, many of them
post-socialist societies, the tremendous expansion and differentiation
of the EU’s “multi-level governance” system, the integration of ever
more policy fields transformed the liberal club of democracies within
but also inspired a transformative ambition towards countries outside
of the club. By means of its complex enlargement and neighborhood
policies, the EU embarked on a remarkable project of exporting liberal norms and inducing reforms of economies, societies, and political
systems of neighboring countries without using military force. Based
on the strength of the Single Market of some 500 million people, the
EU started to invent itself not just as an inward-looking community of
states, but also as a regional actor, with some even imagining that the
EU would become a truly global actor in world politics. But whatever
the EU was—or is—with regard to its power status, there is little doubt
that it has constituted a stable pillar of a liberal world order.
Does the EU enjoy its welfare, stability, and peace at the expense of
others? While a postcolonial perspective is not often heard within EU
mainstream political discourse—even if it would be warranted—critical voices often came from Europe’s ally, the United States. The American demand that Europe should “pay more” is a long-standing imperative that has reappeared in different disguises over time. Importantly,
however, the NATO issue of burden-sharing is not just one of money,
equipment, or people. As Robert Kagan argued in the context of the
trans-Atlantic rift over the Iraq War 2003, the Europeans were able to
live in their “Kantian paradise” only due to the robust and expensive
security provider activities of the U.S. The European Union has established a “democratic peace” among its members, Kagan asserted, but
thrives well only as long as it enjoys the hegemon’s costly protection, if
need be, by the use of force.
That is why on major strategic and international questions today,
Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They
agree on little and understand one another less and less. And this
state of affairs is not transitory – the product of one American
election or one catastrophic event. The reasons for the transatlantic divide are deep, long in development, and likely to endure.
When it comes to setting national priorities, determining threats,
defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign
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and defense policies, the United States and Europe have parted
ways.2

While Kagan was writing his critique of EU-Europe’s weakness in
the context of the severe Iraq crisis, some twenty years later the state of
affairs between “Venus” and “Mars” looks fairly similar at first glance—
even though the world order has moved well beyond the “unipolar
moment.” In a more refined manner, such role conceptions have been
widely discussed in the scholarly debate on the question “What type of
power is the EU?”3 Concepts such as “civilian power” or “normative
power” highlight that the EU as a collective actor relies on non-military
means in its external relations.
However, severe trouble in the (putative) “postmodern paradise”4 is
currently leading to a reconsideration of the EU’s role as a security provider in the region and in parts of Africa. Challenges arise from the East,
the South, and even the West—and from within: the violent conflict in
the Eastern Ukraine; the annexation of the Crimea, the destabilization
of many countries in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region;
the authoritarian backlash in Turkey; Brexit; the electoral successes of
populist parties; and U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s irritating remarks about the value of NATO. Strategic challenges resulting from
both strong nation-states and failing states have led to a much stronger
emphasis on security issues within the EU. Transnational terrorism, migration, and climate change have added to the subjective threat perceptions and anxieties of EU-Europeans.5 An increasing sense of ontological
insecurity, the perception that one cannot fully rely on traditional allies
and partners anymore and that the world order is changing towards a
multipolar one have inspired the EU’s recent search for an enhanced
“strategic autonomy.” This chapter will outline—very selectively due
to space constraints—this intended shift to a more comprehensive role
conception and the challenges that are associated with it.

2. Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order
(New York: Vintage Books, 2004), 4–5.
3. For an overview see, for example, Wolfgang Wagner, “Liberal Power Europe,”
Journal of Common Market Studies 55, no. 6 (2017): 1398–1414.
4. Kagan, Of Paradise and Power, 53–69.
5. Catarina Kinnvall, Ian Manners, and Jennifer Mitzen, “Introduction to 2018 Special
Issue of European Security: ‘Ontological (In)security in the European Union,’”
European Security 27, no. 3 (2018): 249–65.
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In Search of Role Conceptions: Promoting Liberal Norms
The process of European integration has always been a project between
a small number of European member states that agreed especially on
market integration measures. It took a long time until the EU—by then
enlarged—started conceiving of itself as an international actor, capable
and willing to shape the international environment—mainly by trade
agreements, diplomacy, incentives for reform in its neighborhood, development cooperation, economic sanctions, etc. Within the framework
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and especially its
integral part Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the EU also
developed its military deployment capabilities. In the meantime, thirty-five military and civilian missions and operations have been conducted within this framework, mainly in (South-) Eastern Europe, Africa and the MENA region, the majority of which were civilian missions.6
That the EU started to discover itself as an international actor triggered enormous scholarly debate about the “actorness” of the EU as a
collective entity sui generis and the question of what type of power this
collective might constitute. Numerous (and usually benign) “power”
labels have been proposed: “civilian,” “normative,” transformative,”
“ethical,” “market,” “integrative,” and “soft,” to name but a few. By
contrast, neorealist-inspired scholars have criticized the EU for its inherent military weakness and its inability to play power politics.7
Whatever label one might prefer, most concepts refer to the “distinctiveness” of the EU as a collective actor, engaging more in spreading liberal norms and selling goods around the world than in building
military bases. As Ben Rosamond has argued, the EU pursues different
liberal norms at the same time in different policy areas, thereby promoting contradictions and frictions in its external relations but also
within its member states.8 The EU’s attempt to spread liberal norms
and its governance models beyond its own borders, especially by offer6. See https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilianmissions-and-operations_en.
7. A more detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter; see, e.g., for the
“actorness” debate, Arne Niemann and Charlotte Bretherton, “EU External Policy at
the Crossroads: The Challenge of Actorness and Effectiveness,” International Relations
27, no. 3 (2013): 261–75; for the “type of power” debate, see Wagner, “Liberal Power
Europe.”
8. Ben Rosamond, “Three Ways of Speaking Europe to the World: Markets, Peace,
Cosmopolitan Duty and the EU’s Normative Power,” British Journal of Politics and
International Relations 16, no. 1 (2014): 133–48.
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ing neighborhood policies or even membership perspective, has been
significantly weakened in the last decade. Not only are EU-European
populations “tired” of enlargements but the current global competition
between the West, Russia, and China is also visible in Europe, as the
war in Ukraine or a number of controversial infrastructure investment
decisions show. Russia is strongly opposed to the inclusion of further
East European countries into the EU and pursues a divisive policy in
Europe, while China also seeks to exploit existing rifts among European member states.
Europe’s alleged influence as a “normative power,” i.e., defining “what
passes for ‘normal’ in world politics,” seems to have been exaggerated
right from the introduction of this concept by Ian Manners,9 which has
had an astonishing resonance in academia. Even in areas such as human
rights and climate protection, where the EU might indeed act as a norm
entrepreneur, the impact of securitization under the umbrella of counterterrorism and the very different interests between the EU member states
weaken the credibility of the “normative power.” A community of states
that is deeply divided on many policy issues can hardly act as an attractive model to the outside world. In addition, external attempts to divide
the EU member states further, increase the difficulties for the EU to keep
their community together. And keeping it together is in itself a contribution
to international peace—that the EU appears to look like a Kantian paradise of democratic peace is result of perpetual efforts, not something that
can be taken for granted now and forever.
Seeking to Enhance Strategic Autonomy in Defence Policy
The EU’s current main reference document for its foreign and security
policy—the “Global Strategy” (titled “Shared Vision, Common Action:
A Stronger Europe”) from 2016—suggests that its key geographies of
concern are its Eastern and Southern neighborhoods that are located
beyond the borders of the EU. It intends to stabilize those countries and
to encourage reform—but by conducting its European Neighborhood
Policy it has also greatly enhanced conflict with Russia. “Enemies” are
absent from the Global Strategy; the role of Russia comes closest to what
can be described as a strategic threat for the EU. However, the Global
Strategy also shows how difficult it is for the EU to find a clear stance
9. Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms,” Journal of
Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 235–58; quotation at 236.
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towards Russia. While Russia is considered as having “challenged the
European security order at its core” during the last years (33), Russia
and the EU are also seen as “interdependent” (33): “We will therefore
engage Russia to discuss disagreements and cooperate if and when our
interests overlap” (33).
Global power projection is beyond the capabilities, the ambition, and
the outlook of the EU. However, in a changing world order and rapidly
changing security environment, the EU is increasingly facing the challenge of strengthening its own military capacities and thus reconsidering established role conceptions for the EU. As Federica Mogherini, the
then high representative of the union for foreign affairs and security
policy, wrote in her foreword to the Global Strategy:
The European Union has always prided itself on its soft power—
and it will keep doing so, because we are the best in this field.
However, the idea that Europe is an exclusively “civilian power”
does not do justice to an evolving reality. For instance, the European Union currently deploys seventeen military and civilian
operations, with thousands of men and women serving under the
European flag for peace and security – our own security, and our
partners’. For Europe, soft and hard power go hand in hand. (4).

Ursula von der Leyen, the German minister of defence from 2013
to 2019, put an even greater emphasis on the EU’s altered role in the
world. When she became the new president of the European Commission in December 2019, she labelled her new commission as a “geopolitical commission.”10 Emmanuel Macron, the president of France, had
warned shortly beforehand that Europe might “disappear geopolitically” amid an escalating Chinese–U.S. rivalry, and famously stated in an
interview with The Economist in October 2019 that we were currently
experiencing “the brain death of NATO.”11 Given that at the time of
completing this contribution the novel coronavirus (covid-19) crisis has
hit individual countries and the EU as a collective very strongly, it remains to be seen whether von der Leyen will be able to focus on the
envisaged challenges as she had planned in December 2019. It cannot
be anticipated which types of policy changes will be agreed upon by
10. See https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/interview-with-eu-commission-presidentursula-von-der-leyen-a-1303392.html.
11. See https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europenato-is-becoming-brain-dead. Macron had said: “Pour moi, c’est la mort cérébrale de
l’OTAN.”   

The European Union: Soul-Searching and Role-Searching 97

the EU, but it can be expected that taking comprehensive measures of
promoting economic recovery and prevent a new euro debt crisis will
take highest priority for years to come. Against this background of the
fully unexpected covid-19 pandemic crisis and the consequences it will
have on the global level, the following initiatives in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) might also slow down.
“Strategic autonomy” is part of a larger political discourse on increasing “European sovereignty” in a multipolar world order. What
“strategic autonomy” might mean is fairly vague. However, hardly
anyone seriously expects an “emancipation” from the U.S. in the sense
of becoming independent from NATO’s protection. Rather, the EU is
expected to adopt greater responsibility in conducting autonomous
missions and operations in its neighborhood (or globally, if so required)
by enhancing its financial and operational investments in defence.12 On
the basis of their combined raw military capabilities, the EU looks as
though it has the potential of being one of the leading military powers
in the world.13 However, the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of European defence is one of the major driving forces behind the most recent
initiatives to improve defence cooperation. According to estimations,
80 percent of procurement and more than 90 percent of research and
technology are run on a national basis, and up to 30 percent of annual
defence expenditures could be saved through pooling of procurement.14
The fragmented approach when it comes to defence also leads to
unnecessary duplication and affects the deployability of defence
forces. There are 178 different weapon systems in the EU, compared to 30 in the US. There are 17 different types of main battle
tanks in the EU and only one in the US. For certain helicopter
programmes, there are more helicopter types in Europe than governments able to buy them.15
12. Daniel Fiott, “Strategic Autonomy: Towards ‘European Sovereignty’ in Defence?”
Paris: EUISS Policy Brief 12/2018, 2.
13. According to the European Defence Agency (EDA), in 2018 the total defence
expenditure of its twenty-seven member states (at that time including UK, and
excluding Denmark due to its “opting-out” clause) amounted to €223.4 billion
(1.4 percent of GDP). See https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/edadefence-data-2017-2018. Defence personnel numbers have been steadily decreasing
since 2006; the EDA counted about 1.4 million military personnel for all EU member
states in 2016: https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/eda_defencedata_
a4).
14. See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_1508.
15. Ibid.
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Enhancing the strategic autonomy of the EU is seen by most advocates as a complementary strategy to NATO. The bottom line of most
recent initiatives in the field of defence and security echoes the creed
“remain transatlantic, become more European.” European member
states have quite differing historical bonds, threat perceptions, and
strategic cultures; a number of EU countries are formally “neutral”
states (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden). A purely “European” defence policy would not find majority support and is clearly
rejected by Eastern European members. Given that a Europeanization
of defence policy has met with strong resistance for decades, the shock
caused by Brexit provided at the same time a new opportunity to advance European integration in this “hard core” of national sovereignty.
In the last several years, a number of initiatives have been started in the
CSDP, while older ideas—such as a European Army—have found new
advocates (while still remaining a utopia). It is beyond the scope of this
chapter to discuss, for example, legal and financial frameworks such
as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European
Defence Fund (EDF), or more informal initiatives of “coalitions of the
willing,” including third party countries, such as the European Intervention Initiative.16 It is also somewhat too early to assess the long-term
effects of the unique “hyperactivity” observable in the defence and security domain since 2016. As a result, there is considerable skepticism:
as a recent review of twenty years of CSDP noted,
the reality today is that the “alphabet soup” of EU security and
defence – CSDP, PESCO, EDF, CARD, CDP, MPCC, NIPs, EPF, etc.
– has not led to any tangible shift in the Union’s capability base or
readiness for deployment. The expectations for EU security and
defence have perhaps never been higher, but neither has the risk
that the EU fails to deliver.17

However, what becomes clear is that the EU has started to reconsider
its international role also with regard to security and defence. A purely
16. For useful overviews, see Daniel Fiott, Antonio Missiroli, and Thierry Tardy,
“Permanent Structured Cooperation: What’s in a Name?” Paris: Chaillot Papers No.
142/2017; Erik Brattberg and Tomáš Valášek, “EU Defense Cooperation: Progress
amid Transatlantic Concerns” (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2019).
17. Daniel Fiott, ed., The CSDP in 2020. The EU’s Legacy and Ambition in Security and
Defence (Paris: EUISS, 2020), https://www.clingendael.org/publication/eus-legacyand-ambition-security-and-defence, Executive Summary, 3.
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“civilian power” does not seem to be able to endure in a changing environment that has been getting tougher and tougher since the liberal
heyday of the 1990s. It remains to be seen whether the EU will develop
into a kind of “security community” of its own within the broader security community of NATO. An indicator of such a community is the
mutual assistance clause—Article 42 (7)—of the Treaty on the European Union. This overlooked clause became known to a larger audience
for the first time when Jean-Yves Le Drian, then the French minister of
defence, referred to it after the disastrous ISIS terrorist attacks in Paris
of 13 November 2015, and asked the other European member states
for assistance; all defence ministers unanimously agreed to activate the
clause.18
The pursuit of enhanced strategic autonomy is challenged by a large
number of problems: The EU has to deal with several large-scale and
enduring crises at the same time, with the covid-19 pandemic now creating an especially difficult crisis. The highly controversial and emotionalized politicization of some of these conflicts such as the euro debt
management, migration and border control, or the pandemic crisis
management has summed to a governance crisis of the EU and also a
crisis of legitimacy in the eyes of many citizens. In the area of security
policy, the strategic cultures of EU member countries often differ so
much that a lasting agreement on the scope, tasks, and objectives of the
CSDP seems difficult. Both Macron and Angela Merkel, the German
chancellor, have argued that the lack of a common strategic culture in
the EU is one of the biggest challenges in the CSDP.
This is quite obvious with regard to France and Germany, the two
large member states that used to be the “engine” of the European integration during the Cold War, and now play a crucial role again after the
exit of the UK. At a time when visionary European leaders are hardly
available, Macron has been acting as the most persistent political entrepreneur, repeating his “wake-up calls” for Europeans, continuing to
push for a greater European autonomy in defence and security, and
seeking German support for a more pronounced (robust) security policy of the EU, for example in Mali. By contrast, the German government
under Merkel’s leadership seems very hesitant to adopt a high profile
in security policy, reflecting the views of a majority of German citizens
who prefer a distinctly “civilian” and mediating outlook for German
18. See https://verfassungsblog.de/awakening-dormant-law-or-the-invocation-of-the-europeanmutual-assistance-clause-after-the-paris-attacks/.
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foreign policy. As a result of Brexit (and the demise of the INF treaty),
the issue of a European nuclear deterrence has also been put back on
the agenda, leaving France as the only nuclear weapons state within
the EU. Macron has invited other Europeans, and especially Germany,
to conduct a strategic dialogue on the role of French nuclear weapons,
but has so far met with little enthusiasm from Germany, again because
of a German culture of military restraint.
The “level of ambition” which the Global Strategy of 2016 envisages and the long-term goal of an enhanced strategic autonomy of the
EU—or of Europeans, since the nature of the future relationship with
UK is still not fully clear—will certainly remain very limited since European member states obviously have quite different priorities in their
security agendas—or, to be more precise, their securitized agendas. European attitudes towards Russia (also in light of the EU’s strong dependency on energy supplies by Russia), towards migration policies
and climate change, and, more recently, towards China as partner or
rival in infrastructure investments are only some cases in point. The
disunity between member states has rather grown—a renationalization
of political agendas being in some countries accompanied by an overtly
illiberal backlash such as in Hungary and Poland. The list of challenges could be easily continued. The ineffective, complex, decision-making process in the CSDP, based on unanimity of all members, would
warrant a chapter on its own. While a weakening of unanimity is very
controversial in the political realm, a greater flexibility, informalization
and the establishment of ever more “coalitions of the willing” within
the European Union’s formal framework seems to be inevitable and
is already in the making, as exemplified by the European Intervention
Initiative, pushed forward by Macron in 2017. It goes without saying
that a greater informalization creates new problems such as democratic
accountability, a fragmentation of EU foreign policies, and a more unpredictable norm application.
Conclusion: The West United in Disunity?
For decades, the European integration process has constituted a core
pillar of a broader liberal world ordering project, protected and promoted by the U.S. as the liberal hegemon. While the “European project” has always been strong on the issues of markets and liberal political rights and freedoms, it tended to be weak in providing for its
own security. As I have argued in this chapter, the post-Brexit EU-27
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has started to reconsider its international role conception in light of all
the changes outside of and within the European Union. With regard
to counter-terrorism measures, European countries have aligned more
and more with a “robust” turn in the “Global War on Terror,” resulting
in a convergence of the military practices of European countries and
the U.S., including the legal problems that come with it.19 EU (Military)
Training Missions in the Central African Republic, Mali, and Somalia,
and the so-called Migration Partnerships with some authoritarian African states indicate that the EU seeks to “enable and enhance” strategic
partners and that in case of that, when there are normative conflicts,
the “hard” security interests of the EU in Africa tend to take precedence
over the protection of human rights norms. The all too benign concept
of a “normative power” Europe, developed and cherished in academia,
veils the multi-faceted nature of the EU’s role conception in different
policy areas. What the EU practices in international politics rather resembles nowadays what the Global Strategy vaguely labelled as “principled pragmatism.” Depending on the conflict setting, it can be much
more pragmatism than principles, it seems—especially in the field of
migration policies.20
“Civilian powers” are dependent on an international environment
that allows them to promote human rights norms, legalization, multilateralism, and civilian means. While the 1990s seemed favorable in this
regard, the international and regional orders have changed massively;
strategic narratives about the liberal hegemony in decline, “great power competition” and a multipolar world order indicate the fear of the
West to be overtaken by other powers in the long run. Whether the
European Union will remain a “pole” in a multipolar world is far from
certain. The EU-28 as of 2019, still including the UK, one of its strongest
members in terms of economic and military power and population size
(66 million people), comprising 512 million people in small- and medium-sized countries. The never-ending story of the “Brexit chaos” has
in the meantime defused ambitions of continental populist parties in
the EU to promote the exit of their countries as well. How individual
European countries would keep their prosperity and security in today’s
19. See Anthony Dworkin, Europe’s New Counter-Terror Wars, European Council on
Foreign Relations, 21 October 2016, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/europes_
new_counter_terror_wars7155.
20. Anne Koch, Annette Weber, and Isabelle Werenfels, eds., Profiteers of Migration?
Authoritarian States in Africa and European Migration Management (Berlin: SWP
Research Paper No. 4/2018).
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world order, where India and China alone have each more than 1.4 billion people, is not easy to see—and the population of Europe is declining and “over-aged.” While we may talk about a “multipolar” world
order, what we mean are actually powerful nation-states.
In such a world, the EU is a strange animal indeed. Can it even be
seen as a “pole” in this multipolar world order? With the UK included, the EU accounted recently for a share of some 22 percent of the
global GDP, North America for 28 percent, East Asia (China, Japan,
South Korea, ASEAN) for 27 percent. With the UK included, four out
of seven members of the “G7” club are European countries. So, in economic terms, the EU might still be a “pole,” although the consequences
of Brexit are difficult to predict. However, this is only part of the story: How can a Union of twenty-seven individual states compete with
strong nation-states in the world, regarding quick, unified, decisive and
strategic behaviour?
The electoral successes of left-wing and right-wing populist parties,
a renationalization of politics, disunity, lack of political will and leadership, structural deficits in the national economies and social welfare
and health systems (which the covid-19 crisis revealed to a shocking
extent)—such developments suggest that the EU will be a rather weak
“pole” in the future and an “uncertain power.” In this concluding section, it is useful to point to an interesting insight that Ian Manners proposed almost two decades ago in his influential article on “normative
power Europe.” Manners argued:
The concept of normative power is an attempt to suggest that not
only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly
that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics.
It is built on the crucial … observation that the most important
factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does
or what it says, but what it is.21

Is it clear in the year 2020 what the EU “is”? In my view, it is not, especially after the Brexit drama that has shaken the EU’s self-confidence
to its core. University textbooks on the EU all include chapters on how
to become a member; not a single one had even a small section on how
to leave it. So, what might remain from the distinctiveness of the EU
also in the next decade is its character as a multilateral actor. While
the other key players in the world are individual nation-states, a group
21. Manners, “Normative Power Europe,” 252.

The European Union: Soul-Searching and Role-Searching 103

of 27 (or more) states needs more time, daily consensus-building, and
compromise-seeking. This might render the EU “slower” than others;
however, at the same time its political representatives are trained in
day-to-day multilateralism, negotiation, and striking compromises—
soft skills that will be required in any type of international order.
While it is an enduring process and an eternal effort to keep the
European Union not only “somehow” together as a club of democratic
states but creating an “ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe”
(as the solemn promise in several European treaty documents runs; my
emphasis), the outside world does not exactly facilitate this endeavor:
During the last years of an enhanced geopolitical contest, China and
Russia have contributed their shares to increasing disunity among
EU-Europeans. This might come as less of a surprise. What is more disturbing is that not only do the “strategic rivals” Russia and China seek
to weaken the EU but also the liberal superpower and most important
ally, the U.S. Apart from “trade wars” among friends and allies: With
regard to the burden sharing issue within NATO, it is confusing for
Europeans to be told to “pay more” but when these Europeans try to
enhance defence cooperation or refer to a European army idea, they
are criticized or ridiculed by the same U.S. administration. One of the
central elements of a “security community,” as it was developed in the
social sciences by Karl W. Deutsch and his colleagues in the 1950s, is
based on the notion of “trust.” Ideally, societies and political elites learn
to build trust in each other over time, develop shared norms and values
and identities, and thus overcome the security dilemma. NATO used
to be described as the most robust security community in real world
politics so far. A divided transatlantic “community in disunity” will not
prove an effective guardian of a liberal world order.
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India and the Global Liberal Order
Šumit Ganguly

As a state that embraced the principles of liberal democracy at the time
of its founding, following its emergence from the detritus of the British
colonial empire in South Asia, it seems reasonable to surmise that India would have wholeheartedly supported a global liberal agenda. Yet,
India has long had an ambivalent stance toward global liberalism. This
chapter will examine India’s equivocal approach toward the global liberal order. It will argue that India’s stance toward the international liberal order has varied considerably depending on issues, areas, and time
frames. On certain subjects, India’s posture toward liberal ideas and
principles far exceeded that of its most ardent proponents. In others,
however, India had long adopted a rather intransigent stance for extended periods of time. Following an examination of India’s positions
in a number of arenas and their evolution over time, the chapter will
focus on the possible future of India’s approach to both global political
and economic liberalism.
India and Political Liberalism
India’s post-independence political leadership had a firm and mostly
unyielding commitment to political liberalism. At home it fashioned
liberal, democratic, and representative institutions and swiftly enshrined the principle of universal adult franchise in a desperately poor
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country.1 Indeed, India’s commitment to and practice of liberal democracy posed a significant challenge to a commonly held social science
nostrum which asserted that democracy was only possible when states
achieved a particular threshold of economic well-being. Over the decades, through a series of what are widely deemed to be free and fair
elections, it made democracy the only game in town.
That said, at least four episodes or periods in the post-independence
era have blighted India’s record on political liberalism. The first, of
course, involved the blatant suppression of personal rights and civil
liberties in the late 1970s when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared
a “state of emergency” for entirely self-serving reasons.2 Fortunately,
she ended the “state of emergency” of her own accord and lost the subsequent election. The second involved the pogrom that swept through
New Delhi in the wake of her assassination in 1984, when several
thousand hapless Sikh citizens were massacred. The New Delhi police
proved to be either complicit or at least passive bystanders when this
tragedy took place. The third episode is more recent: it took place in
the state of Gujarat during the tenure of Narendra Modi, who was then
the chief minister of the state. In the wake of an altercation between
Hindu pilgrims and local Muslim vendors at a railway station, some
coaches of a train had been set on fire leading to the deaths of a number
of the pilgrims. In its wake Hindu mobs rampaged through various
parts of the state wantonly killing Muslims. It is widely believed that
the local police forces did little or nothing to stop the marauders.3 The
final glaring lapse has been India’s human rights record when fighting
domestic insurgencies. In the conduct of counterinsurgency operations,
the Indian state has frequently departed from its stated commitment
to the protection of human rights and civil liberties. This has been true
in the states of India’s northeast in the 1960s to the present day, in the
Punjab in the 1980s and most notably in the disputed state of Jammu
and Kashmir since the late 1980s. These failures and departures aside,
India’s record of domestic political liberalism, though hardly free of
blemishes, has not been markedly worse than that of a host of other
democratic states including consolidated democracies.
1. Ornit, How India Became Democratic: Citizenship and the Making of the Universal
Franchise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
2. Henry C. Hart, ed. Indira Gandhi’s India: A Political System Reappraised (Boulder:
Westview, 1976).
3. Siddharth Varadarajan, Gujarat: The Making of a Tragedy (New Delhi: Penguin, 2003).
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Along with the pursuit of domestic political liberalism, India’s
post-independence leadership, under the tutelage of Jawaharlal Nehru, played a vital role in delegitimizing colonial rule on a global basis.4 More to the point, when the vast majority of the proponents of the
global liberal order sought to rationalize their support for the apartheid
regime in South Africa, India proved to be its most relentless critic.
In the context of decolonization, one important and popular canard
needs to be effectively demolished, namely India’s decision to use force
to oust the Portuguese from their colonial possessions on the west coast
of India. India resorted to force only after all diplomatic efforts to induce the Portuguese to leave had failed. More to the point, Nehru authorized the use of force after he had come under criticism from African
leaders who underscored India’s inability to rid itself of colonial possessions even as it was advocating decolonization elsewhere.5
India not only sought to delegitimize colonialism in various international forums, but it also supported multilateral institutions. Even prior
to independence it had supported the creation of the United Nations.6
Subsequently, from the 1950s it played a vital role in United Nations
peacekeeping operations on a global basis. Indeed, even today India
still ranks as one of the principal contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. More broadly, India’s support for multilateral institutions and
the rule of law, for the most part, during the Cold War remained unflagging.
It is also worth discussing two contentious issues involving the global norms of state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention where India took an unusually bold position. The first involved India’s decision
to intervene in the civil war in East Pakistan in 1971. India’s armed
intervention not only ended the genocide but led to the creation of the
state of Bangladesh. Admittedly, India acted out of mixed motives. It
was faced with an unprecedented refugee burden as a consequence of
the repression in East Pakistan and it saw an extraordinary opportunity to break up its nettlesome adversary, Pakistan. However, recent
scholarship has shown that genuine humanitarian concerns also motivated its choices. Even though it faced considerable global opprobrium
4. Šumit Ganguly and Manjeet Pardesi, “Explaining Sixty Years of India’s Foreign
Policy,” The India Review 8, no. 1 (2009): 4–19.
5. Arthur G. Rubinoff, India’s Use of Force in Goa (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1971).
6. Manu Bhagavan, ed. India and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2019).
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violating the sovereignty of another state, Indian policymakers argued
that the prevailing conditions in East Pakistan made it imperative for
it to act.7
The other episode that deserves discussion involved India’s stance
toward the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1979. Once
again, while much of the world condemned Vietnam’s military intervention, India adopted a contrary stance. When Vietnam invaded Cambodia
to topple the brutal regime of Pol Pot, which was engaged in autogenocide, the vast majority of the states of Southeast Asia along with the entire Western world condemned the invasion, even though the outcome
was an end to the mass killings by the Khmer Rouge. However, the Soviet Union, which was allied with Vietnam, offered support. India, which
had friendly relations with Vietnam, also supported the overthrow of the
Pol Pot regime on humanitarian grounds. Once again, it can be argued
that India’s motives were not entirely pristine: clearly its diplomatic ties
with Vietnam influenced its decision. Nevertheless, its willingness to
depart from the norm of sovereignty on humanitarian grounds demonstrated its commitment to an important ethical principle.8
Only on a small handful of occasions did India evince an interest in
illiberal propositions. For example, it had supported certain antediluvian proposals such as the creation of a “new world information and
communication order.” Interestingly enough, even as the Indian government expressed support for this proposal important Indian newspaper editors expressed skepticism about it.9
Despite India’s commitment to political liberalism at home it has,
however, been quite reticent to embrace some ideas that came to the
fore especially at the end of the Cold War. To that end, India has not
shown any real enthusiasm for the democracy promotion agenda that
the United States boosted at the Cold War’s end. At best, when prodded, India’s response has proven to be mostly lukewarm.10 In consid7. For international reactions, see Srinath Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the
Creation of Bangladesh (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013).
8. For a forthright argument that the Vietnamese invasion amounted to humanitarian
intervention see James Lutfy, “Humanitarian Intervention: The Invasion of
Cambodia,” New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 2, no. 1
(1980): article 8.
9. Paul Lewis, “The Debate Sharpens on a New World Information Order,” New York
Times, 15 February 1981.
10. Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “Do Democracies Support Democracy? Reluctant India,”
Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (October 2011): 97–109.
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erable part India has refrained from joining the democracy promotion
enterprise because it recognizes that it has significant democratic deficits at home.
Similar concerns also explain India’s reticence to wholeheartedly
support the principle of the “responsibility to protect,” even though
during the Cold War years, as argued earlier, it twice supported an
antecedent principle, that of humanitarian intervention. Given India’s
own domestic vulnerabilities, especially in insurgency-wracked regions where its security forces have been accused of rampant human
rights violations, it is not entirely surprising that India has proven timorous in its support for the principle.11
Economic Liberalism at Home and Abroad
During much of the Cold War years, India was actively hostile toward a
global liberal economic order. Such a stance was hardly surprising given its domestic commitment to an import-substituting industrialization
regime.12 Such an economic growth strategy was based upon export
pessimism and a generalized distrust of laissez-faire economics.13 Much
of the distrust of laissez-faire economics stemmed from the association
that many Indian leaders, most notably, Nehru, had made between
capitalism and imperialism. Not surprisingly, he and his closest cohort
had a deep distrust of unbridled, free markets. Instead, under his tutelage, India had preferred to pursue a strategy of state-led growth with
an emphasis on authoritative allocations.14 This strategy, barring minor changes, had long survived Nehru. His successors, including his
daughter, Indira Gandhi, had not markedly altered the contours of the
policies that her father had set in motion.
This preference for authoritative allocations also found echoes in India’s stance toward major global economic challenges. It was an early
and enthusiastic supporter of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD), an organization that sought to boost the
11. Šumit Ganguly, India and the Liberal Order (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund,
2013).
12. For an early and excellent critique and evaluation of the regime, see Jagdish
Bhagwati and Padma Desai, India: Planning for Industrialization: Industrialization and
Trade Policies Since 1951 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970).
13. Francine R. Frankel, India’s Political Economy: The Gradual Revolution:1947–2004 (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009).
14. Stephen Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
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interests of developing states in the global economy and sought to regulate multinational corporations. Also, in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis,
India had supported the calls for a “new international economic order”
which called for a substantial redistribution of global wealth though
enhanced foreign assistance.15
Indeed, it was only after the end of the Cold War, when India was
faced with an unprecedented fiscal crisis, that the government in New
Delhi fitfully adopted a new strategy of economic growth that led to
a gradual embrace of economic liberalism both at home and abroad.16
This new strategy of economic growth enabled India to escape the
stranglehold of slow growth that had done little or nothing to alleviate endemic poverty.17 Since then, governments of different ideological
persuasions have mostly supported a liberal economic agenda—albeit
in fits and starts.
The current Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which came to power a
second time in 2019, dominated government and has shown a waning
enthusiasm for continuing liberal economic reforms except in a handful
of areas. Such an approach is not entirely surprising. There are distinct
elements with the party that remain skeptical about the benefits of a
market economy at home and are hostile toward opening the Indian
market to external competition. Consequently, for the immediate future
the Indian commitment to further economic liberalization in either sector appears flagging.
However, it is hard to visualize a future in which India keeps avoiding the liberalization agenda. Sustaining growth and reducing poverty
simply cannot be accomplished in the absence of significant and continued liberal economic reforms. Furthermore, it is far from certain that
the present government will win another five-year mandate when its
term ends in 2024. A new government could well decide to return to a
more robust economic liberalization agenda. A more fraught question,
however, is whether a future government can restore India’s historic
commitment to domestic political liberalism, which has suffered considerable erosion under the present government.
15. K. B. Lall, “India and the New International Economic Order,” International Studies
17, no. 3–4 (1978): 435–61.
16. Jagdish Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya, India’s Reforms: How They Produced
Inclusive Growth (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012).
17. A. Kotwal, Bharat Ramaswami and Wilima Wadhwa, “Economic Liberalization and
Indian Economic Growth: What’s the Evidence?” Journal of Economic Literature 49, no.
4 (December 2011): 1152–99.
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The Challenge to Political Liberalism
Since the Bharatiya Janata Party returned to office in May 2019 with
an overwhelming majority, it has pursued a blatantly illiberal political
agenda at home. Among other matters it has used its parliamentary
majority to abrogate the special constitutional status of the only Muslim-majority state in India, Jammu and Kashmir. Worse still, to stifle
dissent in the former state it has also suspended all meaningful political
activity in the region and has placed a range of regional political actors
under indefinite house arrest.18
It has also passed the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) that eases the pathway to citizenship for a range of religious minorities from
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan while excluding Muslims. It
has also sought to ruthlessly squelch any dissent on these subjects.19 In
considerable part the BJP has been able to pursue this illiberal agenda
because of a weak, dispirited, and disorganized opposition. However,
it should be highlighted that its choices are meeting with substantial
opposition from India’s vibrant civil society. In effect, despite its ideological proclivities as well as its political clout it has not been able to
squelch the agitational streak that has become embedded in India’s political culture.
Given its hostility toward intellectual and cultural pluralism it is
most unlikely that the BJP government will evince any interest whatsoever in promoting liberal democratic ideals abroad. Instead it appears
to be cozying up to other illiberal regimes. It has invited the president
of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, as the chief guest to India’s annual Republic
Day parade, an occasion that involves much fanfare and pageantry. The
invitation, without a doubt, is laden with considerable symbolic significance.
Conclusion: India and the Future of Global Liberalism
The current political situation in India offers little comfort for India’s
continued support for political and economic liberalism on a global
basis. Yet it may be a bit feckless to assume that India’s positions on
these matters are likely to remain frozen over time. As this chapter has
18. Rana Ayyub, “India’s Crackdown in Kashmir Has Paralyzed and Silenced Entire
Communities,” Washington Post, 23 October 2019.
19. Šumit Ganguly, “An Illiberal India?” Journal of Democracy 31, no. 1 (January 2020):
193–202.
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demonstrated, the country’s views on these matters have waxed and
waned considerably over the decades. It is true that the Modi government has evinced little or no significant interest in political or economic
liberalism either at home or abroad. Yet it would be misleading to suggest that support for both has wholly evaporated within India. Important constituencies for both propositions continue to exist in the country
and especially for the principles of political liberalism. As the current
government has sought to limit the scope of political liberalism it has
faced a significant backlash from Indian civil society. Consequently, it
may be a bit hasty to write a requiem for the future of political liberalism in India. With a possible change in government the current assault
on political liberalism could well draw to a close.
An alteration of the domestic political dispensation could, in turn,
lead to a foreign policy that is more supportive of liberal ideas and principles. That said, there is every likelihood that India’s hesitant stance
toward democracy promotion will stay in place. The reluctance to embrace this idea appears to be fairly well-embedded in India’s political
culture. Consequently, a change in government is unlikely to bring
about a significant shift in approach toward the subject.
Similarly, while liberal economic reforms, for the most part, have tapered off there, it would be rather premature to argue that they are unlikely to be revived. To sustain economic growth this government has
little or no choice but to return to the process of reforms. Furthermore,
it currently faces significant external pressures, most notably from the
United States, to continue the trade liberalization process. Even though
trade liberalization has languished for some time there is reason to believe that to maintain its strategic partnership with the United States,
Indian policymakers will perforce return to the stalled trade liberalization agenda.
The prospects of economic liberalism both at home and abroad are
better than those of political liberalism at least in the foreseeable future.
The present government, despite its current paralysis on the economic
front, does have votaries who are favorably inclined toward the pursuit of a more liberal economic order both internally and externally.
Consequently, they may well be able to seize the reins of economic policymaking before the present government’s term expires especially because this government is also concerned with performance legitimacy.
The issue of political liberalism, however, is far more fraught. A sufficient number of political stalwarts within the current government, including the prime minister himself, actually believe in a majoritarian
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political project. Indeed, in the party’s second term in office they have
systematically sought to implement such an agenda. Consequently,
they have little or no interest in sustaining India’s liberal and plural
political ethos. Not surprisingly, they, in turn, cannot be counted upon
to support liberal principles abroad. Furthermore, given the retreat of
these principles in the politics of a range of states and their abnegation on the part of the U.S. administration of Donald J. Trump, the government in New Delhi has little or no incentive to demonstrate any
support for such norms. Consequently, only a change of government is
likely to see India once again adopt its traditional, albeit fitful, support
for the mores of global political as well as economic liberalism.
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Canada’s Future in the Indo-Pacific Is
Plastic
Christopher Ankersen

Introduction
In global affairs, Canada has always been firmly in the camp of the hegemon. Canadians started under the wing of the British and, certainly
and increasingly since the end of the Second World War, moved into the
orbit of the United States. This has allowed Canada to be secure in the
knowledge that, even with some ebbs and flows in relations, it is firmly
a part of the team that has been in the driver’s seat of world affairs.1
This has not meant that Canada has merely been along for the ride;
we have had to ante up and pay our dues to the hegemons on several
occasions, spending treasure, sacrificing blood, and contributing ideas.2
Being so well ensconced has enabled, but not necessarily determined, putatively independent initiatives abroad. Indeed, such moves
1. The relationship between Canada and Britain can be characterized as one of “mutual
antagonism” rather than undisputed adoration and appreciation: Philip Bruckner,
ed. Canada and the End of Empire (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005).
2. On Canadian contributions to the new world order constructed following World
War II, see Adam Chapnick, The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the
United Nations (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005). For an examination of Canada’s role in
the immediate post–Cold War world, see Bessma Momani, “Canadian Foreign Policy
from the Roaring 1990s,” International Journal 72, no. 2 (2017): 192–202.
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were seen as welcome, as long as they fit within broad parameters, both
international and domestic. In 1947, Canada’s secretary of state for external affairs, Louis St. Laurent, made clear that there should be a linkage between those parameters, arguing that along with national unity,
political liberty, the rule of law, and human values, Canadian foreign
policy must embrace a “willingness to accept international responsibilities.”3 And indeed Canada has demonstrated repeatedly that it could
be a “helpful fixer.” Moreover, this approach to world politics was not
simply altruistic; it cemented Canada’s place in the world. St. Laurent
was correct when he stated that “Competent, energetic, and constructive work … [has won the] respect and confidence … from other countries.”4 While the volume of this work has also ebbed and flowed, this
principle has generally held true.
It is worth noting, though, that both these elements of Canadian foreign policy may be about to change. For one, the role of the United
States as hegemon is in flux. Instead of taking the mantle as global lead
nation, under the administration of Donald J. Trump the U.S. is focusing more on America First, shrinking its commitments to multilateralism, and hardening its approach to its friends. Some even believe that
it may be about to be eclipsed as global supremo, replaced by China.5
While U.S. hegemony may not yet be over,6 what is clear is that
Canada can no longer take its own role for granted. Whether it is the
mercurial personal relations between Trump and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau; the unprecedented application of tariffs on Canadian steel
and aluminum for reasons of national security; the grueling re-negotiations surrounding the successor to NAFTA; or the insistence of Secretary Mike Pompeo lumping Canada in with Russia, labelling Canada’s
Arctic claims as “illegitimate,”7 Canada’s standing as the hardworking
3. Louis St. Laurent, The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs, The Gray
Lectures. 1947, https://www.russilwvong.com/future/stlaurent.html.
4. Ibid.
5. Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for
War?” The Atlantic, 24 September 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/.
6. For example, Fareed Zakaria, “The Self-Destruction of American Power: How
Washington Squandered the Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2019),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-06-11/self-destruction-american-power.
7. Annie Karni and Katie Rogers, “Trump Abruptly Exits NATO Gathering After
Embarrassing Video Emerges,” New York Times, 4 December 2019, https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/12/04/world/europe/trump-video-nato.html; Ana Swanson, “White
House to Impose Metal Tariffs on E.U., Canada and Mexico,” New York Times, 31
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handmaid to the heedful hegemon is in jeopardy.
Nowhere is this more noticeable than the Indo-Pacific region. Canada must take note of the many changes going on there and design,
resource, and implement its foreign policy accordingly. Merely showing up with a “how do you like me so far?” smile and a fistful of shopworn credentials from other parts of the world earned in times gone
by is unlikely to garner Canada the kind of influence and opportunity
it appears to seek. Asia is a very different environment from that on
which Canada has built its reputation. It is already the most populated
continent in the world; it is set to dominate the world economy in the
future;8 and it appears that defence spending in the region is on track to
do so, as well. China is no longer a rising power, but in material terms
has risen remarkably. What is not clear is the full extent of its ambitions:
it has been ambiguous regarding its desire to take over from the U.S. as
world leader. India is a force to be reckoned with, gaining in both material power and confidence. Japan, since the end of the Second World
War a meek actor on the world stage, has emerged as more than an
economic player; Shinzo Abe sought the conditions for his country’s return as a military power in its own right. Asia is an important, dynamic
region that deserves our attention.
Regardless of its importance, convincing Canada to look West is not
easily done. As Kim Richard Nossal has convincingly argued, the Canadian ship of state remains grounded by an outsized North Atlantic
anchor.9 And even if Canadians were able to cast their gaze more in
an Asian direction, Canada lacks the same historical ties in the region
that have served the country well in Europe. If Canada wants to gain
traction in this increasingly relevant part of the world, we will need to
May 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/31/us/politics/trump-aluminum-steel-tariffs.
html; John Geddes, “Chrystia Freeland and the Art of the Deal,” Maclean’s Magazine,
5 October 2018, https://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/chrystia-freeland-and-the-art-ofthe-deal/; and Leyland Cecco, “Mike Pompeo Rejects Canada’s Claims to Northwest
Passage as ‘Illegitimate,’” The Guardian, 7 May 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2019/may/07/mike-pompeo-canada-northwest-passage-illegitimate.
8. Wang Huiyao, “In 2020, Asian Economies Will Become Larger than the Rest of the
World Combined—Here’s How,” World Economic Forum, 25 July 2019, https://www.
weforum.org/agenda/2019/07/the-dawn-of-the-asian-century/; David Pierson, “Military
Spending Is Soaring in the Asia-Pacific Region. Here’s Why,” Los Angeles Times, 7
June 2019, https://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-asia-defense-industry-20190607-story.
html.
9. Kim Richard Nossal, “The North Atlantic Anchor: Canada and the Pacific Century,”
International Journal 73, no. 3 (2018): 364–78.

118 Christopher Ankersen

take serious steps in that direction, rather than relying on our previous
accomplishments.
Sadly, not everyone is taking the opportunity to reflect on the future
of Canadian foreign policy. Looking backwards, some observers correctly identify the key elements of what they regard as our global role.
As Ben Rowswell, the president of the Canadian International Council,
argues in the conclusion:
We had a seat at the table [after World War II] because we made
our loyalties clear, and contributed men, materiel and money to
advance our shared objectives.… What made Canada a middle
power was that, inside that alliance, we retained the ability to
set our own course. We could draw on our relationships outside
NATO—in the Commonwealth, with francophone nations, or as
a major donor to developing countries—to do things that other
allies could not do.10

While this nearly mythological view of Canada’s Golden Age may
be true of the time, it is debatable whether or not it pertains today.
Caught between the Scylla of “Canada’s Back” and the Charybdis of
“Canada First,” we appear ignorant of the reality that (a) Canada is
doing less; (b) the activities that Canada has done in the past may no
longer be appreciated in the same way; and (c) the world has moved
on, with new issues and new actors taking the fore. Simply holding
our breath, waiting for things to return to normal, and resting on our
laurels from good deeds done in the past is not adequate. As one former
diplomat has concluded, “The triumphant declaration that ‘Canada’s
back’ is morphing rapidly into the more widely held conviction that
on the matters that count internationally, Canada isn’t even here. Or
there. Or anywhere.”11 The future is not elastic—it will not “snap back”
to some previous condition, no matter how nostalgic we may be for it.
Instead, the future of the global system is likely to be plastic—many of
today’s deformations will remain moving forward. It is in this environment that Canada must see itself and plan accordingly.

10. Ben Rowswell, “Then and Now: Canada’s Role in Uniting the Democracies,” below,
126.
11. Daryl Copeland, “‘Canada’s back’ – Can the Trudeau Government Resuscitate
Canadian Diplomacy?,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 24, no. 2 (2018): 252.
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Canada in Asia: Small and Alone
Asia represents a very different political and economic environment.
Many of the characteristics that Canadian foreign policies have exploited since the end of the Second World War do not exist in the same measure in Asia as they do elsewhere. It is not enough for Canada to rely on
its global repertoire of achievements if it wants to operate successfully
in the Indo-Pacific.
In diplomatic terms, Canada has a little over thirty embassies, consulates, and trade offices in the region.12 Visits to Asia since 2015 have
represented less than a quarter of the total foreign trips by the prime
minister. By contrast, European countries accounted for over twothirds of visits. Perhaps Canada’s experience in Europe has conditioned
it to rely on multilateral fora as arenas for foreign policy development.
Spaces provided in NATO and the UN have served Canada well, allowing it to take a seat at the table. However, across Asia multilateral
“[i]nstitutions are far less legalized…[i]nformal understandings underlie cooperation.”13 Few diplomats and infrequent state visits mean fewer opportunities to discuss issues of importance to Asian countries and
develop “understandings.”
It must be recognized that Canada is a member of key Asian institutions, such as ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC. However, these
arrangements, at least for Canada, tend to focus on annual summits,
and as such are performative, rather than substantive, affairs. The most
recent APEC meeting in November 2018 ended without issuing a communiqué, due to disagreements over U.S.–China trade.14 Short, annual
appearances are not enough to impress participants. Furthermore, they
cannot be regarded as analogues to their North Atlantic relatives.15 As
12. Global Affairs Canada, “Embassies and Consulates by Destination,” https://travel.
gc.ca/assistance/embassies-consulates.
13. Jochen Prantl, “Multilateralism in East Asia: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,”
in International Relations and Asia’s Southern Tier, eds. Gilbert Rozman and Joseph
Chinyong Liow (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 31.
14. Katharine Murphy, “APEC Leaders Unable to Agree on Communique Amid USChina Trade Tensions,” The Guardian, 18 Nov 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2018/nov/19/apec-leaders-unable-to-agree-on-communique-amid-us-china-tradetensions.
15. Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia?
Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International
Organization 56, no. 3 (2002): 575–607; Amitav Acharya, “‘Why Is There No NATO
in Asia?’ The Normative Origins of Asian Multilateralism,” Paper No. 05-05
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Indian Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has said,
“fundamental questions are being asked about the reliability and relevance of the alliance systems which have anchored American policy
and global order for many years.”16 Those same systems have been a
hallmark of Canadian foreign policy, too. More relevant, at least from
India’s perspective, is the more flexible arrangement of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (known as the Quad), an ad hoc meeting between it, the U.S., Japan, and Australia. Canada is not a part of this
club, which is aimed at sharing information amongst four like-minded
democracies in the Indo-Pacific.
This may be partly due to the fact that in defence terms, Canada
is a bit player in the Indo-Pacific. Canada’s military contingent on the
West Coast numbers around four thousand personnel, five frigates,
and three conventional submarines. From these scant assets, Canada
mounts a few, small ongoing operations in the Indo-Pacific, such as OP
NEON, Canada’s contribution to the monitoring of international sanctions against North Korea. This operation consists of “a Canadian frigate and/or a CP-140 Aurora [surveillance aircraft]”17 and sometimes
involving sailing through the Taiwan Strait (although the Department
of National Defence insists this is routine and not part of a deliberate
freedom of navigation campaign).18 Historically, Canada has sent military assistance to humanitarian relief operations to the region, such as
in 2015 to Nepal, in 2013 to the Philippines, 2010 to Pakistan, and 2004
to Sri Lanka. Canada continues to be part of United Nations Command,
the international military contingent mandated with maintaining the
United Nations Armistice Agreement between the two Koreas. While
all of this military effort is discretionary and it is credit-worthy for Canada to expend it at all, it is small beer within the region and cannot be
relied upon to buy the country much influence.19
(Cambridge, MA: Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, 2005).
16. Council on Foreign Relations, “A Conversation with Foreign Minister
Subrahmanyam Jaishankar of India,” 25 September 2019, https://www.cfr.org/event/
conversation-foreign-minister-subrahmanyam-jaishankar-india-0.
17. See https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/militaryoperations/current-operations/list.html.
18. “Canada Again Sails Warship through Sensitive Taiwan Strait,” Reuters, 10
September 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-canada-taiwan-china/canada-againsails-warship-through-sensitive-taiwan-strait-idUSKCN1VW08R.
19. For an in-depth discussion on contemporary Canadian military operations in Asia,
see David Dewitt, et al. “AWOL: Canada’s Defence Policy and Presence in the Asia
Pacific,” International Journal 73, no. 1 (2018): 5–32.
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Table 1
Top Five Canadian Trade Partners, Imports and Exports (2017)
Canada’s Top 5 Trade
Partners (2017)

Share of
Imports

Canada’s Top 5 Trade Share of
Partners (2017)
Exports

U.S.

51.33%

U.S.

75.85%

China

12.64%

China

4.32%

Mexico

6.33%

UK

3.24%

Germany

3.20%

Japan

2.17%

Japan

3.12%

Mexico

1.44%

Source: World Bank, https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/CAN.

Economically, Canada’s impact on Asia is likewise small. While China is Canada’s number two import and export partner, and Japan is
within the top five, overall Asian trade pales in comparison with that
of the U.S., as Table 1 demonstrates. Even Canada’s participation in the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is forecast to increase imports and exports by less than
0.25 percent.20 As it stands now, Canada lacks economic clout in Asia.
Beyond the numbers, though, how Canada comports itself in the Indo-Pacific matters, too. Prime Minister Trudeau’s bizarre visit to India,
and his surprise “no-show” at a key meeting during the final negotiations prior to the signing of the CPTPP give the impression that Canada
is not a serious player.21
One way in which this manifests itself is in how China has chosen
to deal with Canada. Perhaps because it too regards Canada as the hegemon’s henchman, China has opted to play hardball, rebuffing Ca20. Office of the Chief Economist, Global Affairs Canada, “Economic Impact of Canada’s
Participation in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership,” 16 February 2018, https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/impact-repercussions.aspx?lang=eng.
21. Carlo Dade, “Canada’s Trade Reputation Takes a Hit in Asia,” Globe and Mail, 26
March 2019, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/article-canadas-tradereputation-takes-a-hit-in-asia/.
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nadian overtures for a free trade deal and detaining two citizens as retaliation for the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, the chief financial officer of
Huawei, in Vancouver in December 2018. This incident has made plain
two aspects of reality that Canada faces in the Indo-Pacific. First, those
Canadian values promoted by St. Laurent, the erstwhile bedrock of foreign policy for at least eighty years, can be regarded differently there.
The rule of law is not immutable, but seemingly the stuff of political
negotiations. Second, Canada is largely alone in Asia. Despite the fact
that Meng was arrested at the behest of the United States, neither it, nor
other allies, such as Australia, have been quick to come to Ottawa’s assistance.22 Combined, these differences highlight how much the world
has changed for Canada, as both times and geographic settings move
away from the more familiar postwar North Atlantic nexus.
Conclusion: What Is To Be Done?
Against such a bleak backdrop, what should Canada expect and what
can it do in Asia? First, Canada needs to be honest with itself. While
a number of options for Canada exist, each one will require a vision,
leadership, a plan, and resources to bring it about. Beyond these truisms, part of being honest means being humble. Canada is not going to
burst forth into the Indo-Pacific fully formed, playing a major role anytime soon. Whatever foreign policy objectives Canada seeks to achieve
should be modest in the first instance. More immodest desires will take
time to develop. Asians are not unique in wanting to deal with putative
partners who are prepared to have “skin in the game” rather than managing the latest wave of carpetbaggers. Moreover, bolder initiatives will
necessitate the allocation of increased resources. The odd foreign junket, a few dozen diplomatic posts and a handful of ships is never going
to amount to a significant presence in the Indo-Pacific. If spending beyond this level is not politically acceptable, then we will have to cut our
coat to fit our cloth. There are no easy, cheap, or painless choices in the
making of effective foreign policy.
The second question, therefore, that must be answered is whether or
not we want to make Asia a foreign policy priority. If so, we should aim
to create a consistent and balanced portfolio of national instruments that
22. Emily Rauhala, “Canada Arrested Huawei’s Meng for the United States. As China
Retaliates, It’s on Its Own,” Washington Post, 8 May 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/the_americas/canada-helped-the-us-arrest-meng-wanzhou-as-it-gets-punished-bychina-its-on-its-own/2019/05/07/c8152fbe-6d18-11e9-bbe7-1c798fb80536_story.html.
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can be used to achieve our goals there. This may mean shifting resources
and attention away from other issues or regions; adding the Indo-Pacific
to a growing laundry list of “nice to haves” is unlikely to bear fruit.
Third, it is worth remembering that we have trod this path before.
In the 1970s, Pierre Trudeau, seeking options for Canada that would
allow us to escape the sometimes stifling embrace of the United States,
attempted to chart a course to the Pacific.23 Similarly, then-foreign minister Joe Clark supported innovative multi-stakeholder efforts at generating confidence-building measures via the North Pacific Cooperative
Security Dialogue in the 1980s.24 We should take the time to assess these
efforts and commit ourselves to identify and learn the relevant lessons
they contain.
Fourth, Canada prefers to work with like-minded countries, several
of which exist in the region. However, we must be mindful of the fact
that countries like Australia and Japan—states with whom we have
long histories of cooperation—have their own agenda across the Indo-Pacific. Working together when and where it makes sense to do so
should be the goal. Flexible approaches, informed by clear and transparent commonly held objectives, are preferable to fixed alliances.
While such a posture is not Canada’s preferred foreign policy style, it is
not impossible to adopt.
Fifth and finally, Canada needs to base all of its actions in the Indo-Pacific on a rigorous conception of what its national interests are in
the region. The time for “doing favours” for any country, old friend or
new acquaintance, must be over. The rewards for such behaviour are
unlikely to be forthcoming. It is time to appreciate—if not completely
embrace—a more hard-headed strategy of transactional foreign policy.
In sum, Canada needs to plan for a plastic future, not yearn for an
elastic one. While certain deformations may persist long after the forces that caused them cease to exist, Canada can help determine their
shape. Canada may be back, but not as before. In the Indo-Pacific, that
means waking up to the reality that if we want an Asian foreign policy,
we need to be the ones creating new roles and new relationships for
ourselves.
23. For a decidedly rosy view of what Trudeau père achieved, see Greg Donaghy, “Pierre
Trudeau and Canada’s Pacific Tilt, 1945–1984,” International Journal 74, no. 1 (2019):
135–50.
24. Stewart Henderson, “Zone of Uncertainty: Canada and the Security Architecture in
Asia Pacific,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 1, no. 1 (1992): 103–20.
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Then and Now: Canada’s Role in
Uniting the Democracies
Ben Rowswell

As the current president of the Canadian International Council, I have
been intrigued by how John W. Holmes, one of my predecessors, would
have assessed the world order today. Holmes was a senior Canadian
diplomat who had contributed to many of the negotiations that led to
the creation of the international order after the victory of the allies in
World War Two. He served in Canada’s embassy in Moscow after the
war, then was one of the first heads of mission at the fledgling United
Nations. Like many of his colleagues who were “present at the creation”
of the postwar international order,1 he brought a uniquely Canadian perspective that many other allies found valuable. However, he was forced
to resign from the Foreign Service in 1960 for a homosexual encounter
in Moscow in the 1940s.2 This act of discrimination against a servant of
Canada was a travesty. If there was a silver lining to this violation of his
rights, it lay in the fact that he could then take that unique perspective
from the coalface of international politics and share it with the public.
1. The phrase used by Dean Acheson, United States secretary of state during the
administration of Harry S. Truman, to describe the foundation of the liberal
international order: Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State
Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969).
2. On Holmes’s public life, see Adam Chapnick, Canada’s Voice: The Public Life of John
Wendell Holmes (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009).
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Ousted from government service, Holmes was appointed to head
the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, as our organization was
called then. Drawing on this expertise he could explain to his fellow citizens how power works in the international system. When he explained
to Canadians how our nation had a distinctive contribution to make in
global affairs, it was tempered not by the exaggerated self-regard of a
country that sees itself as uniquely virtuous, but by the hard realities of
power. Holmes had no time for Canadians who argued that we should
be a neutral or even a pacifist nation, keeping both superpowers at a
distance so that we might advance causes based on independent moral
judgment. Rather, he argued that Canada had influence because it was
aligned with the United States and other liberal democracies. We had
a seat at the table because we made our loyalties clear, and contributed
men, materiel, and money to advance our shared objectives.
It was Holmes who popularized the idea that Canada was a “middle
power” in world affairs and seeded that concept in the public imagination, both in Canada and elsewhere. What made Canada a middle power, he argued, was that inside the Western alliance Canadians retained
the ability to set their own course. We could draw on our relationships
outside NATO—in the Commonwealth, with francophone nations, or
as a major donor to developing countries—to do things that other allies could not do. Like lead a peacekeeping force that enabled the UK
to back down in the Suez Crisis without appearing to have bowed to
American pressure.
Canada was both allied and autonomous, and derived power from
both of those characteristics. By aligning ourselves with the United
States and other democracies we benefitted from their power. And by
retaining a certain independence of initiative, we could wield power
within the alliance as well. As Holmes put it, being a middle power
meant that we were “a loyal ally without being a satellite, preserving
as much of our sovereignty and identity as is compatible with the economic and military realities of the nuclear age.”3
The concept caught the imagination of a generation of foreign policy thinkers, diplomats, and military leaders. Successive governments
of either political stripe described Canada’s role in the world in this
way, and it helped articulate a broad foreign policy consensus across
the partisan divide. It was such a compelling concept that it outlasted
3. John Holmes, “Canada as a Middle Power,” Centennial Review 10, no. 4 (Fall 1966):
430–45, www.jstor.org/stable/23737968, quotation at 436.
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the Cold War and continues to be invoked today, three decades since
the standoff between the USSR and the United States came to an end.
How Canada Helped Unite Democracies in the 1940s
We can debate how relevant the middle power concept is today. But it
was very relevant in the formation of our alliance in the first place. The
world’s democracies emerge from World War Two in very different situations. The United States, principally responsible for the victory and
flush with the largest economy the world had ever seen, was expected to return to its tradition as an isolationist power. Since the days of
George Washington, the most consistent tendency in U.S. foreign policy
was to avoid “foreign entanglements.” The United Kingdom was also
victorious, but flat on its back economically and so desperately overstretched in its far-flung empire that it started shedding its imperial
possessions in a hurry, from India to Israel. The Labour government
of Clement Attlee knew that it could no longer hold the line in Europe
should a new menace arise.
Canada was extraordinarily close to both Britain and the United
States—deeply loyal to an empire whose flag we still flew back then—
but now fully integrated into the U.S. military orbit since the 1940 Ogdensburg agreement. If any country had an interest in deepening the
special relationship between these two anglophone giants, it was Canada.
The first signs of a new menace arose not in Europe, but in Ottawa of
all places. In September 1945, just weeks after the war ended, a cipher
clerk at the Soviet Union’s embassy in Ottawa defected with evidence
of an extensive espionage network through Canada. It was so novel to
hear that our wartime ally was spying on us on such a large scale that at
first Igor Gouzenko could not find anyone in the Canadian government
to accept his defection. After two days of knocking on doors he finally
convinced the RCMP to review his documents, only to find Prime Minister Mackenzie King willing to send him back to the Soviets to avoid
upsetting our wartime ally. It took a disobedient deputy minister of
external affairs to grant him asylum and start sounding the alarm bell
to our allies.
Over the next two years relations with the USSR would deteriorate
as tensions flared in Iran, Turkey, and Germany, then administered
jointly by the U.S., UK and France as well as the USSR. But public attitudes change slowly, and the newly minted United Nations was very
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popular. Surely the growing disagreements could be worked out in the
Security Council.
Canadian diplomats played a disproportionate role in the establishment of the UN system, drafting key documents like the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. Lester Pearson served as the first president of the General
Assembly. This talent for building institutions is one reason why the
UK insisted in having Canada at the table when Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary, first put the idea of a transatlantic security pact to
the United States. Canadian diplomats were the biggest champions of
a broad and deep mandate for what would become NATO, constantly
pressing other allies to go further in aligning political and economic objectives as well as military ones. Indeed, this was the other reason Bevin
wanted Canada at the table. He knew our diplomats would propose a
more ambitious degree of integration and press more firmly than any
others. In those early weeks of negotiation, the U.S. was divided between those who wanted to move quickly and those who still sought to
avoid “foreign entanglements.” Canada tipped the hand of the former
by being the first country to publicly endorse a formal treaty. We then
singled out the recalcitrant U.S. diplomats one by one, including the
influential George Kennan, and wore them out arguing for a full treaty.
When the French government dug in their heels on demands the U.S.
could not meet, it was Canada’s ambassador to Paris who talked them
down.
Canada never achieved the full extent of political and economic integration that it sought for NATO. Article 2, which outlines the political
character of the alliance, was a significant dilution. Because Canadians
pushed so hard for the closest possible union, however, the resulting
treaty produced an alliance more tightly aligned that anyone would
have predicted just a year before.
A Changing World Order
Reflecting on Canada’s role in the formation of NATO suggests four
intriguing parallels between the late 1940s and the world order today.
First, in both eras we see a shifting global balance of power. For much
of the early twentieth century, the UK and Germany had dominated international affairs. By 1945 Germany was defeated and occupied by the
victorious allies. And while the United Kingdom had prevailed, it had
exhausted its ability to project itself as a top military power. Canada’s
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mutual allies in the war, the United States and the Soviet Union, had
filled the void created by the decline of the great powers of Western
Europe. In the contemporary period we see a similar shift. The United
States is losing its predominance and Russia, while reduced compared
to its former Soviet self, increasingly defies the United States where
and when it pleases, from Syria to Crimea to Venezuela. China is a
more significant challenger to U.S. power. Its military power may lag
behind, but it is on a path to overtake it in economic weight within
twenty years. In soft power terms it may already be on a par with the
U.S. The Beijing model seems more attractive to many Asian and African countries, and many would prefer to collaborate with Xi Jinping’s
China than with Donald Trump’s America. Now, as then, the balance of
power is shifting under our feet.
The second parallel is the degree to which rising powers start pushing the limits, challenging norms established by previous powers.
We’ve already seen how the Soviets engaged in espionage inside our
countries to a scale not previously seen. In countries it dominated it
did not hesitate to eliminate the free press, crush independent civil society or murder inconvenient politicians such as the foreign minister
of Czechoslovakia. In our day Russia has launched chemical weapons
attacks on British soil, supported extremist parties within democratic
states, and subjected countries that criticize it to disinformation campaigns designed to confuse and discourage our citizens. China, for its
part, kidnaps ex-diplomats from countries which displease it, and subject them to interrogation methods many consider to be a violation of
the Vienna Convention on treatment of diplomats. Now, as then, norms
that used to govern international behaviour are being discarded as the
newly powerful stretch their wings.
A third similarity is that liberal democracy is facing a determined
challenge both at home and abroad. In the 1940s, political parties directed from Moscow grew in influence inside our nations, supported
by newspapers that took their editorial line from similar quarters. In
1946 it looked quite likely that Greece would fall into the Soviet orbit,
and in France and Italy parties deeply hostile to democracy were on
the march, winning 26 and 19 percent of the vote in each respective
country. Back then, there were real divisions within our countries that
the Soviets could work with. Liberal democracy had its critics in the
1940s, and they had a point. Misguided economic policies had exacerbated a terrible economic crisis, generating profound inequality and
social injustice. Canadians joined many other established democracies
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in flirting with ideologies of the far left just as they had with the far
right before the war. There were two MPs representing the communist
party in the Canadian Parliament, one of which was eventually found
to be collaborating with the Soviet government.
Today, democratic parties are challenged by unprecedented interest
in parties of the far right and the far left. The patience of many voters in
our democratic processes is wearing thin. For citizens exasperated by
those on the other side of the political divide, victory over other parties
begins to take precedence over preserving the institutions for which
those parties are competing. Hostile foreign powers happily exploit
these growing divisions in our society. Russia supported the “Leave”
side in the Brexit referendum, the candidacy of Donald J. Trump in the
United States, and various parties on the extreme ends of the European
political spectrum. The ostensible goal is to polarize the population and
exacerbate the frustration that voters have with their fellow citizens.
Now, as then, liberal democracy faces challenges on the domestic as
well as the international level.
A fourth parallel is fierce debate within democracies over whether
the national interest is best pursued by collaborating with or by remaining independent of other democracies. In the 1940s, North Americans
and Western Europeans had significant debates about sovereignty in
the 1940s. The isolationist tradition in the U.S. before the Second World
War had not dissipated. Many Americans were proud of their nation’s
independence of action and disdainful of alliances that might draw it
into the fights of the bellicose Europeans. Furthermore, the U.S. Constitution assigned the power to declare war to Congress, not the president.
Asking the U.S. to automatically come to the defence of another democracy was seen by many as unconstitutional since it would override
the prerogatives of Congress. For many Americans, sovereignty meant
not entering into binding treaties. For its part, France objected to an
overly confrontational approach to the USSR, in part because the Moscow-friendly Communist Party enjoyed high levels of support through
France and in part because France saw itself as a potential intermediary
between the U.S. and the USSR. For many in France, sovereignty meant
preserving total freedom of action in strategic matters.
In 2019, as citizens feel less assured that their countries retain any
real power in the face of growing global threats, the instinct to invoke
sovereignty more and more loudly leads some countries to take rash
and self-defeating measures, such as jettisoning the partnerships that
allow them genuine control in an increasingly global economy. The
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UK is the most extreme example of this: a small majority of its citizens
was willing to reduce the influence over the country’s principal trading
partners under the guise of “taking back control.” But we see this confusion over sovereignty in the words of a president who claims that the
alliances and institutions that the U.S. created to amplify its own power
now constrain it.
Aligning Liberal Democracies Back Then
I also invoke the memory of the 1940s to show that dramatic change is
possible in a short period of time. When the Gouzenko affair broke in
early 1946, no one imagined that the world’s democracies would respond to the growing Soviet threat by building a new alliance. Three
years of remarkable diplomacy overcame each of the objections to
greater cooperation. Truman cajoled Congress into accepting treaty obligations that would constrain their constitutional prerogatives.
Through his Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and then NATO, America did
a 180-degree turn in its foreign policy traditions, shedding isolationism
for the most robust commitment to global engagement imaginable. In
return Western European countries and Canada relinquished final authority over their war-making capabilities to the alliance. Even France
went along, until Charles de Gaulle suspended France’s participation
in the command structure and kicked NATO out of Paris.
In signing the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, twelve liberal
democracies committed themselves to the defence of one another. They
subordinated their sovereignty to the goal of maximizing the power
they would yield together. By pooling our sovereignty with other democracies, we arguably created the greatest power that has ever been
assembled. NATO stood tall at the frontlines of the Cold War and wore
down the opposing Warsaw Pact. With NATO armies massed on the
western side of the Iron Curtain for decades, the Soviet Union decided
that stalemate was preferable to a new world war.
The solidarity that drove this pooling of sovereignty required a new
narrative about what united these countries who had spent so many
centuries at war with one another. The countries that made up NATO
had a far deeper history of conflict than of collaboration. Thus was born
the concept of the “the West” as a single entity—the idea that there
was some kind of unity to a disparate set of countries that extended
from the Elbe all the way to the Pacific Ocean, from Berlin all the way
to British Columbia. There had not been any single military formation
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of any kind across Europe since the Roman Empire, but nostalgia for
a “West” that included the defeated Germans as well as the victorious
Brits, Free French, and others soon made our alliance seem predestined.
It felt anything but beforehand.
Aligning Liberal Democracies Today
To be sure, 2019 is not 1948. The U.S. is falling in the global balance of
power, not rising. Liberal democracies are not confined to Western Europe and North America but spread out across six continents. There is
no single ideological rival challenging democracy at home and abroad,
but two: authoritarian China and populist, nationalist Russia.
But the similarities seem more relevant than the differences. Then as
now, liberal democracies faced a sudden and dangerous new challenge,
both at home and abroad. Will we be up to the challenge of combining
our power to preserve our interests in today’s more dangerous world
order?
I believe we can, and I sense a willingness on the part of Canada to
play its traditional role. Canada’s foreign minister, Chrystia Freeland,
told the House of Commons in June 2017 that “we can and must play
an active role in the preservation and strengthening of the global order
from which we have benefited so greatly. Doing so is in our interest,
because our own open society is most secure in a world of open societies. And it is under threat in a world where open societies are under
threat.”4 In his first major foreign policy speech, the leader of the opposition, Andrew Scheer, told a Montreal audience in May 2019 that “a
new era of great power rivalry is upon us…. On one side are the free
democracies… And on the other, the imperialist, despotic, and corrupt
regimes that seek to destabilize the rules-based international order.
Canada must always side with those who value freedom, democracy,
human rights and the rule of law.”5
The alliance that became NATO began with an ambitious dream, one
that never materialized. Ernest Bevin and Lester Pearson had imagined
a federation of democracies from the Elbe to the Pacific Ocean. I do not
4. Chrystia Freeland, “Address by Minister Freeland on Canada’s Foreign Policy
Priorities,” Ottawa, 6 June 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/
news/2017/06/address_by_ministerfreelandoncanadasforeignpolicypriorities.html.
5. John Paul Tasker, “In first major foreign policy speech, Scheer takes aim at
‘disastrous’ Trudeau,” CBC News, 7 May 2019; archived at https://rhoma-acmar.ca/
wp-content/uploads/2019/05/20190506_VisionForCanPack_8-5x11_EN_R4_V4.pdf.
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have a single new alliance or institution to recommend. But I believe
that if we apply the same urgency that our forebears did in the 1940s,
we can find a way to combine the power of the world’s democracies
into a new and effective force for good. In the best tradition of a Canada that seeks to unite democracies around a single purpose, let me
propose an approach that might respond to the dangers present in the
world order emerging today.
The shift in the global balance of power today is not so much from
the U.S. to China as it is a gradual dispersion of power more generally.
As Moisés Naim points out in the End of Power, institutions from the
state to companies to religious organizations no longer hold the sway
they once did. It is this loss of power that drives some political actors to
turn back the clock on international cooperation in a misguided effort
to “win back” a sense of sovereignty they enjoyed in the past. I would
argue that sovereignty is the right concept to start with. But we increase
our power over our own lives not by embracing competition with allies and trading partners. We increase our sovereignty by acquiring influence over our economy and our society at the level at which both
increasingly operate: globally. That requires banding together with the
largest number of countries to pool our common efforts to exercise that
influence.
Our overarching goal should be to expand our sovereignty by banding together. But because we are democracies, we should be expanding
popular sovereignty— pooling as much power together and then placing it at the disposal of our citizens. Cajoling democracies to align more
closely won’t be easy, particularly with a unilateralist president in power in Washington DC. But the issues requiring greater unity among democracies proliferate daily. Now that technology dominates our lives,
could liberal democracies adopt a common approach to the implementation of the 5G network so that the rights of individual citizens are
protected no matter in which democracy they live? Could we present
a common front when managing relations with an increasingly aggressive China across other policy areas? Could we monitor foreign interference in electoral processes in another’s countries to minimize the
confusion and division that Russia seeks to sow? These are the practical
problems a pragmatic power like Canada could help solve through its
convening power, demonstrating utility beyond our modest size.
Building any new alliance begins with framing interests in common.
The shared goal of expanding popular sovereignty provides a basis for
such a frame. If power requires joining forces, then we should maximize
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the amount of power we can amass together, then place it at the service
of voters. To do so we should integrate our security and military forces
as much as possible. We should strive to maximize social and economic
outcomes through the kind of integration that drove dramatic improvements in the quality of life in post-war Europe and North America. We
could consider regulatory alignment to maximize the trade and investment flows that drive high growth.
Once common interests are defined, we can build institutions to uphold them. Coordination at the political level could occur through regular summits between leaders. An apparatus at the officials’ level would
help prepare summits and implement their outcomes, not unlike how
G7 countries turn leaders’ declarations into policy. Given our shared
commitment to popular sovereignty we could also explore cooperation
between the domestic institutions that preserve citizens’ rights. Members of this alliance should help one another uphold democratic values and traditions. We have an interest not only in the power we build
together but in ensuring that the public benefits from that power. We
could monitor one another’s elections to preserve their integrity. Interchanges and joint agendas could be explored by parliaments and political parties; civil society organizations could adopt similar standards of
data privacy and security to protect rights online.
This new solidarity between democracies might look like the North
Atlantic Community that Canadian diplomats once proposed during
the negotiations that created NATO. This time the community would
not be limited to North America and Western Europe, but to all continents where liberal democracy thrives.
Conclusion
John W. Holmes called Canada a middle power. I don’t think the term
applies anymore, since we no longer live in a Cold War where we derive strength through loyalty to one superpower and generate useful
solutions to countering the influence of the other. But I do think that
the broader role Canada played as a uniter of democracies remains relevant and available to us today. We see this role playing out yet again
in the face of the Venezuelan crisis. Canada’s principal response has
been to unite the democracies of Latin America in a new multilateral
body, the Lima Group. That is because our natural home is with the
world’s democracies. Even when these democracies disagree with one
or another, we find ways to bring them together.
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And I believe that role could enjoy support from both liberals and
conservatives. Canadians of all stripes embrace democracy. Some like
certain democracies better than others. But that drive to bring partners
together, to smooth out the differences and find pragmatic solutions
that unite us, that’s quintessentially Canadian. Building a new alliance
that extends beyond the West will prove challenging. But that’s the
kind of challenge Canada has excelled at in the past. It’s time to unite
the world’s democracies once again.

Envoi
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